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Introduction
Software systems are the basis for human everyday activities, which are increasingly de-
pendent on software. Software is an integral part of systems we interact with in our daily
life raging form small systems for entertainment and domotics, to large systems and in-
frastructures that provide fundamental services such as telecommunication, transportation,
and financial. In particular, software systems play a key role in the context of critical
domains, supporting crucial activities. For example, ground and air transportation, power
supply, nuclear plants, and medical applications strongly rely on software systems: failures
affecting these systems can lead to severe consequences, which can be catastrophic in terms
of business or, even worse, human losses. Therefore, given the growing dependence on soft-
ware systems in life- and critical-applications, dependability, i.e., ”the ability of the system
to avoid service failures that are more frequent and more severe than is acceptable” [1], has
become among one of the most relevant industry and research concerns in the last decades.
Software faults have been recognized as one of the major cause for system failures
[2, 1, 3] since the hardware failure rate has been decreasing over the years [4]. Time and
cost constraints, along with technical limitations, often do not allow to fully validate the
correctness of the software solely by means of testing [5, 6]; therefore, software might be
released with residual faults that activate during operations. According to [1], the activation
of a fault generates errors which propagate through the components of the system, possibly
leading to a failure. Therefore, in order to produce reliable software, it is important to
understand how errors affect a software system. For example, analyzing types of
1
2errors that affect the software, the effect these errors may have on it as well as how they
propagate through its components, allows both (i) the design of dependability structures and
mechanisms, such as Error Detection Mechanisms (EDMs) and Error Recovery Mechanisms
(ERMs), and (ii) their optimal placement in the source code, allowing the improvement of
the system reliability.
This is of paramount importance especially in the context of complex critical soft-
ware systems, where the occurrence of a failure can lead to severe consequences. However,
the analysis of the error behavior of this kind of system is not trivial. They are often dis-
tributed systems based on many interacting heterogeneous components and layers, including
Off-The-Shelf (OTS), third party components and legacy systems. In addition, they are ex-
pected to satisfy the rules imposed by certification standards, such as the DO-178B [7] in the
avionics domain. Often, they include legacy components and/or obsolete kernel versions,
which limit the use of cutting-edge technologies and the level of intervention, e.g., in terms
of code instrumentation for error analysis. All these aspects, undermine the understanding
of the error behavior of complex critical software system.
A well established methodology to evaluate the dependability of operational systems
and to identify their dependability bottlenecks is represented by field failure data analysis
(FFDA), which is based on the monitoring and recording of errors and failures occurred
during the operational phase of the system under real workload conditions, i.e., field data.
Indeed, direct measurement and analysis of natural failures occurring under real workload
conditions is among the most accurate ways to assess dependability characteristics [8]. One
of the main sources of field data, are monitoring techniques, such as event logging, assertion
checking, source code instrumentation. Beside being recommended by several international
safety standards and governmental guidelines, e.g., IEC 61508-7 [9], the AUTomotive Open
System Architecture (AUTOSAR) through the ISO-26262 [10], and the DoD Guide for
achieving Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) [11], they are a consolidated
3and pervasive practice both within the open-source community and proprietary software
systems industry.
The contribution of the thesis is to provide a methodology that allows un-
derstanding the error behavior of complex critical software systems by means
of field data generated by the monitoring techniques already implemented in
the target system. The use of available monitoring techniques allows to overcome the
limitations imposed in the context of critical systems, avoiding severe changes in the system,
and preserving its functionality and performance.
The methodology is based on fault injection experiments that stimulate the target sys-
tem with different error conditions. Injection experiments allow to accelerate the collection
of error data naturally generated by the monitoring techniques already implemented in the
system. The collected data are analyzed in order to characterize the behavior of the system
under the occurred software errors. In particular, the dissertation aims to provide answers
to the following compelling research questions (RQs):
• RQ1: Is it possible to use monitoring techniques to characterize the error behavior
in complex critical software system? Field data generated by means of monitoring
technique contain valuable information about the behavior of the target system at
runtime. However, it is not trivial to analyze them in order to obtain valuable infor-
mation about the error behavior of the system during failing executions, and especially
about the propagation of errors. Therefore, there is the need to understand if data
provided by monitoring techniques can be leveraged to analyze the error behavior of
a software system.
• RQ2: Is it possible to improve the error detection/recovery of a complex critical
software system from error data? The knowledge of the error behavior of the target
system and of how the errors propagate through its components are often used in the
4literature to identify the locations for EDM and ERM, which allow an improvement
of the detection and recovery of errors in the target system. However, there is no
prior experience on the use of field data to infer the locations where the placement
of EDMs and ERMs might be beneficial for the system, and the type of error/failure
they have to cope with.
• RQ3: How do the error and failure reporting ability change between different moni-
toring techniques implemented in a given system? And what about the dissimilarity
of their data? A number of monitoring techniques can be implemented in a complex
critical software system, which can be of different types and consider different error
models; therefore, it can be useful to compare the performance exhibited by each
technique in order to provide insights to developers to implement better monitoring
techniques. There are existing studies that try to address this topic; however, they do
not characterize the effectiveness of a monitoring technique with respect to failures
and errors.
• RQ4: Is it useful to combine different monitoring techniques implemented in a critical
complex software system? Different monitoring techniques implemented in a software
system might expose orthogonal performance, complementing each other in terms of
failure reporting and/or error propagation reporting ability. However, the orthogonal-
ity of monitoring techniques and the potentiality of their combination in a software
system is still unexplored.
In order to provide answers to the before-mentioned research questions, the proposed
methodology leverages a set of innovative means defined in this dissertation, i.e., (i) Error
Propagation graphs, which allow to analyze the error propagation phenomena occurred
in the target system and that can be inferred by the collected field data, and a set of metrics
composed by (ii) Error Determination Degree, which allows gaining insights into the
5ability of error notifications of a monitoring technique to suggest either the fault that led
to the error, or the failure the error led to in the system, (iii) Error Propagation Re-
portability, which allow understanding the ability of a monitoring technique at reporting
the propagation of errors, and (iv) Data Dissimilarity, which allows gaining insights into
the suitability of the data generated by the monitoring techniques for failure analysis.
The methodology has been experimented on two instances of complex critical software
systems in the field of Air Traffic Control (ATC), i.e., a communication middleware support-
ing data exchanging among ATC applications, and an arrival manager that is responsible
for managing flight arrivals to a given airspace, within an industry-academia collaboration
in the context of a national research project1.
Results show that field data generated by means of monitoring techniques already im-
plemented in a complex critical software system can be leveraged to obtain insights about
the error behavior exhibited by the target system, as well as about the potential benefi-
cial locations for EDMs and ERMs. In addition, the proposed methodology also allowed
to characterize the effectiveness of the monitoring techniques in terms of failure reporting,
error propagation reportability, and data dissimilarity.
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 introduces to the context of complex
critical software system and provides basic notions of dependability. Moreover, an overview
on the software error analysis is presented, along with its challenges in the context of
complex critical software systems.
Chapter 2 describes the field failure data analysis methodology and examines the related
literature. A discussion about open issues and challenges about the use of FFDA for analyze
the error behavior of complex critical system is also provided.
1The systems considered in this dissertation are developed by Finmeccanica, a top leading company in
electronic and information solutions for critical systems (www.finmeccanica.com). The evaluation versions
of the systems are used as case study to support research activities conducted in the framework of the MIN-
IMINDS PON Project (n. B21C12000710005), funded by the Italian Ministry of Education and Research,
and led by the Federico II University of Naples, CINI and Finmeccanica
6Chapter 3 describes the proposed methodology, providing details on all its characteris-
tics, such as faultload, workload, experimental procedures and evaluation metrics. Also the
description of the proposed metrics is provided.
Chapter 4 provides the description of the target systems and of the target monitoring
techniques that are considered in this dissertation, and on which the proposed methodol-
ogy has been applied. Also details about the conducted experimental campaign, i.e., the
workloads, faultloads, labeling and error clustering processes, are provided. Finally, the
obtained datasets are detailed at the end of the chapter.
Chapter 5 discuss the results obtained by applying the proposed methodology to the
considered monitoring techniques. Their effectiveness has been evaluated by measuring the
evaluation metrics of the methodology.
Chapter 6 provides a comparison of the considered monitoring techniques, which has
been conducted by comparing the measures obtained from the evaluation metrics of the
proposed methodology. Also their combination has been analyzed in order to evaluate the
potential benefits that can be achieved by considering multiple techniques at the same time.
Chapter 1
Error Characterization of Complex
Critical Software Systems
Characterizing error behavior of a software system is crucial to engineers. Characterization encom-
passes, for example, errors classification, analysis of error propagation, identification of error-prone
components. The knowledge of which types of software errors affect the system, the effect these
errors may have on it as well as how they propagate through its components allows both the design
of efficient dependability structures and mechanisms, and their placement where they are the most
effective, improving the dependability of future system releases. This knowledge is extremely valuable
especially in the context of complex critical software system, where the occurrence of a failure has a
high cost since it can lead to severe consequences, such as loss of life, damage to the environment or
extensive economic losses. This chapter introduces to complex critical software systems, and provides
basic notions of dependability that will be used in the rest of the dissertation. Then an introduction
to the software error analysis is presented, along with its challenges in the context of complex critical
software systems.
1.1 Complex Critical Software Systems
Critical systems are a special class of systems providing functionalities whose malfunction,
i.e., failure, could result in damage to the equipment, reputational losses or, even worse,
in human injury, loss of life, damage to the environment or extensive economic losses [12].
Examples of critical systems include embedded medical systems, flight control systems,
automobile control systems, and online money transfer systems. For these systems a high
level of dependability is essential in order to reduce the risk of failure and the losses that may
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result from such a failure. Based on the consequences of a system failure, critical systems
can be divided in three different categories:
• Safety-critical systems: A system whose failure may result in loss of life or serious
environmental damage, such as a control system for a chemical manufacturing plant.
• Mission-critical systems: A system whose failure may result in the failure of some
goal-directed activity, such as a navigational system for a spacecraft.
• Business-critical systems: A system whose failure may result in very high costs for
the business using that system, such as the customer accounting system in a bank.
The complexity of critical systems has increased during the years. Many modern critical
systems have been built with such complexity that they cannot be based on hardware
alone. For example, advanced, aerodynamically unstable, military aircraft require continual
software-controlled adjustment of their flight surfaces to ensure that they do not crash.
Software is essential in order to cope with this growing complexity, making it possible to
manage large numbers of devices, complex control laws and functionality. In addition, it
can be cheaper than hardware solutions.
Many critical systems are nowadays based on large and complex software, such as smart
grids, air traffic control (ATC) systems. These systems, named Complex Critical Soft-
ware Systems, are in general the result of the integration of many strongly interacting
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heterogeneous components and layers, including Off-The-Shelf (OTS) and third party com-
ponents, such as operating system, communication middleware, database, network proto-
cols, virtual machines, as well as legacy systems1. In addition, they are typically distributed
systems, composed by several software-intensive systems deployed on many remote nodes
communicating on a network.
As critical software systems grow in complexity, interconnectedness, and distribution,
the possibilities to incur in a system failure increase. Complex critical software systems
have a long lifetime, during which they evolve since they are integrated with other systems,
and/or extended to cope with new requirements. The evolution causes a further growth of
their complexity, and it often forces the integrated systems to operate beyond the original
design conditions. The usage of many heterogeneous components causes complex interde-
pendencies, and introduces sources of non-determinism, that often lead to the activation
of subtle faults. Such behaviors, due to their complex triggering patterns, typically es-
cape the testing phase. The activation of these faults and the propagation of errors among
components can result in failures and system downtime with huge costs [14].
There are many examples of critical software systems which have failed due to software
related faults. For instance, the Ariane V launch failure [15], which was due to a fault with
software successfully used on earlier version of the launcher, and the loss of the Mars Climate
Orbiter [16], which was due to a mismatch between Imperial and SI units. In addition,
1Legacy systems are software systems that have been developed in the past, often using older or ob-
solete technology. The maintenance actions of these systems (e.g., modifications to the source code) are
prohibitively costly because (i) the component is written in a programming language which has become
obsolete as compared to the rest of the technologies used by the enterprise and/or (ii) the component is not
well-documented [13]. They are maintained because it is too risky to replace them.
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some studies of anomalies of NASA space missions Voyager and Galileo has revealed that
anomalies of the most recent mission are mostly due to software and are fixed by changing
in-flight or ground-software systems [17, 18].
The high costs of failure of critical systems imply that they have to be developed so
that failures are very rare, but they have also include effective monitoring and recovery
mechanisms that are of paramount importance if and when failures occur. In many complex
critical systems a problematic issue is that one single source problem often leads to many
software errors that are often unrelated to the actual problem. In such a situation, it is
of prime importance that the monitoring software gives the user a fast hint about what is
really going wrong. Therefore, understand the error behavior of complex critical software
systems and the effectiveness of the monitoring techniques they implement are vital issues
in these type of systems.
1.2 Basic Dependability Concepts
Dependability has been considered a fundamental attribute since early computer systems.
First studies in the context of dependable computing dates back to the 1960s, e.g., [19].
However, the effort on the definition of the basic concepts and terminology for computer sys-
tems dependability dates back to 1980, when a joint committee on ”Fundamental Concepts
and Terminology” was formed by the Technical Committee on Fault-Tolerant Computing
of the IEEE Computer Society and the IFIP Working Group 10.4 ”Dependable Computing
and Fault Tolerance”. A synthesis of this work, which represents a milestone in the area
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of dependability, was presented at FTCS-15 in 1985 [20], where computer system depend-
ability was defined as the quality of the delivered service such that reliance can justifiably
be placed on this service. This notion has evolved over the years. A later work [1] defines
dependability as the the ability of the system to avoid service failures that are more frequent
and more severe than is acceptable. The dependability is a composed quality attribute, that
encompasses the following subattributes:
• Availability: readiness for correct service;
• Reliability: continuity of correct service;
• Safety: absence of catastrophic consequences on the user(s) and the environment;
• Confidentiality: absence of improper system alterations;
• Maintainability: ability to undergo modifications and repairs.
1.2.1 Threats: Fault, Error, Failure
The causes that lead a system to deliver a service deviating from its function, i.e., an
incorrect service, are manifold and can manifest at any phase of its life-cycle. Hardware
faults and design errors are an example of the possible sources of failure. These causes
are categorized as failures, errors, and faults, and are recognized in the literature as
dependability threats [1].
A failure is an event that occurs when the delivered service deviates from correct service.
for example, a service might fail either because it does not comply with the functional
specification, or because this specification did not adequately describe the system function.
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A service failure is a transition from correct service to incorrect service. The period of
delivery of incorrect service is a service outage, while the transition from incorrect service
to correct service is a service recovery or repair. The deviation from correct service may
occur in different ways that are called failure modes.
An error can be defined as the part of the system state that may lead to a its subsequent
failure. Precisely, a failure occurs when the error causes the delivered service to deviate from
correct service. A fault is the adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error. Faults can be
either internal or external of a system.
Failures, errors, and faults are related each other in the form of a chain of threats [1], i.e.,
the so-called fault-error-failure chain. A fault is active when it produces an error; otherwise,
it is dormant. An active fault can be either i) an internal dormant fault that has been
activated, or ii) an external fault. A failure occurs when an error is propagated to the service
interface, leading the service delivered by the system to deviate from correct service. An
error that does not lead to a failure is said to be a latent error. For example, programming
bugs, i.e., faulty instructions in a program (e.g., common programming mistakes, such as
missing variable initializations, or poorly-written logical clauses), are dormant fault in the
software; they are activated when an appropriate input pattern is fed to the component
where the faulty instruction resides, and an error is generated. The error might propagate
within the system and affect the delivered service, i.e., a failure has occurred. A failure of a
system component causes an internal fault of the system that contains such a component, or
causes an external fault for the other system(s) that receive service from the given system.
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1.2.2 Means
The need to attain the various attributes of dependability during system operations has
lead to the design of a variety of dependability means over the last decades. These means
can be grouped into four major categories [1]:
• Fault prevention aims to prevent the occurrence or introduction of faults. Fault
prevention is enforced during the design phase of a system, and applies both for
software, e.g., information hiding, modularization, use of strongly-typed programming
languages, and hardware, e.g., by means of precise design rules.
• Fault tolerance aims to avoid service failures in the presence of faults. It takes place
during the operational life of the system. Fault tolerance is commonly achieved by
means of redundancy, either temporal or spatial. Temporal redundancy attempts to
re-execute the operation which caused the failure after the system has been restored
in an error-free state, while spatial redundancy exploits the computation performed by
multiple systems replicas. Spatial redundancy relies on the assumption that replicas
are not affected by the same faults: this is achieved via design diversity [21]. Moreover,
both temporal and spatial redundancy adopt error detection and recovery approaches,
i.e., once the error is detected, a recovery action is initiated.
• Fault removal aims to reduce the number and severity of faults. The removal ac-
tivity is usually performed during the verification and validation phases of the system
development, by means of testing and/or fault injection [22]. During the operational
phase, fault removal encompasses corrective and perfective maintenance.
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• Fault forecasting aims to estimate the current number, the future incidence, and
the consequences of faults. Fault forecasting is conducted by performing an evaluation
of the system behavior in face of activated faults. Evaluation can be either qualitative,
which aims at identifying and classifying the failure modes, and quantitative, which
aims to evaluate in terms of probabilities the extent system attributes are satisfied in
terms of probabilities.
1.3 Understanding the Behavior of Software under Error
Software errors represent a major dependability threat for any software systems. As dis-
cussed in Section 1.2.1, the activation of a fault lead to a software error, which can propagate
through the components of the system, leading to a system failure. Therefore, in order to
produce reliable software, it is important to understand how faults and errors may affect a
software system. The knowledge of which types of error affect the software, the effect these
errors may have on it as well as how they propagate through its components allows both
(i) the design of efficient dependability structures and mechanisms, and (ii) their placement
where they are the most effective.
The study of the behavior of errors in software systems may be used to find the compo-
nents which are most exposed to errors and to understand how different components affect
each other in the presence of different type of errors. In addition, the analysis of software
errors occurred in a system allows also to know where and what type of errors are likely
to do the most damage. This information represents a valuable knowledge when deciding
where to place an error detection mechanism (EDM ), such as assertion, logging instruction,
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or an error recovery mechanism (ERM ), such as wrapper, redundant piece of code. Indeed,
two factors that might impact the effectiveness of both EDMs and ERMs are (i) the type
of error they have to cope with and (ii) their location.
Several studies have addressed the analysis of the software errors in order to charac-
terize the error behavior of a software systems and/or to identify locations for EDMs and
ERMs. For example, in [23] an approach that allows early identification of effective detec-
tor locations in dependable software design is presented. The approach leverages module
coupling to identify potential error detector locations at module-levels for data-value errors.
Detailed information are required for each module composing the target system in order to
evaluate its coupling, such as input and output data/control parameters, global variables
used as data/control, number of modules called/calling. In addition, the approach works for
fault-intolerant software, which has to be subsequently enhanced with detectors at specific
locations. An open-source flight simulator has been used to validate the approach.
Authors in [24] proposed an analytical approach to estimate the probability of error
propagation between components in a software architecture. The approach is base on a
proposed metric, named error propagation probability, which represents the probability that
an error that arises in one component propagates to other components. The evaluation of
the metric requires analytical approach that is based on architecture specifications, and
uses information that is typically available at an architectural level, such as set of states of
a component and set of messages that a component can exchange with another component.
The analytical approach has been validated by comparing the analytical results with the
ones obtained by an experimental campaign, both conducted on a part of a large command
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and control system used in a critical application.
A black-box error analysis technique for Commercial OTS (COTS) system is described
in [25]. The proposed technique studies how information flows between software compo-
nents. The technique forcefully corrupts the information that flows between components
and observes what impacts the corruption had, in order to isolate those components that
cannot tolerate the failure of other components. A fault injection technique that injected
faults into the interfaces between components is used along with a set of monitors that
checks the output of each component to evaluate the propagation of error through the
system.
In [26] an extension of an existing Bayesian methodology for reliability estimation of
component-based software systems is proposed in order to take into account also the prop-
agation of errors. To this aim, an approach to error propagation probability calculation is
presented, which has been integrated into the existing Bayesian methodology for reliability
prediction. An automated Personnel Access Control System has been used as case study
to compare the existing methodology with the existing one. The obtained results indicate
that error propagation can make a significant difference in system reliability prediction, es-
pecially if components leaking erroneous states are complex and frequently used. However,
the approach is based on some assumptions, i.e., existence of information about failure rates
for components and connectors; independence of the failures among different components;
each component is expected to exhibit the same failure rate whenever it is invoked.
The impact of inter-modular data error propagation is assessed in [27]. Adopting a
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white-box approach, the authors characterized the data error propagation process and de-
rived a set of metrics that quantitatively represents the inter-modular software interactions.
A real embedded target system has been used to perform fault-injection experiments to
obtain experimental values for the proposed metrics. The obtained results showed that
the metrics allow to determine candidate module for replication or equip with EDMs and
ERMs.
An approach to the analysis of the reliability of a component-based system that takes
into account the error propagation probability is proposed in [28]. The modeling approach
can be used to drive several tasks, such as: (i) placing error detection and recovery mecha-
nisms, (ii) focusing the design, implementation and selection efforts on critical components,
(iii) devising cost-effective testing strategies. In order to generate the model, the approach
assumes that the operational profile of each component is known, as well as its internal fail-
ure probability, i.e., the probability that, given a correct input, a failure occurs during the
execution of the component causing the production of an erroneous output. The approach
has been validate on an Automated Teller Machine (ATM) bank system example.
In [29] the authors present an approach based on static software product metrics to
identify software modules where the effects of a fault in that module are not observable.
Indeed, the conducted study shows that there is an empirical relationship between static
software product metrics and propagation of errors. The work used an adventure game,
named Nethack, as case study for the proposed approach.
Other studies, such as [30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35], address the analysis of the software errors
by leveraging the information provided by field data, i.e., data generated by the target
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system during operational phase. These studies are detailed in the Chapter 2, where an
overview on the analysis of field data is proposed.
1.4 Challenges to Software Error Analysis in Complex Crit-
ical Software Systems
As discussed in Section 1.3, software errors represent a major dependability threat for any
software systems, since they can propagate through the components of the systems and can
potentially lead to a system failure if they are not properly managed.
The analysis of software errors occurred in a software system is a valuable process as it
allows to understand how and what type of errors may affect the system, the effect these
errors may have on it as well as how they propagate through its components. In turn,
this knowledge provides valuable insights on where to place EDMs or ERM, which allow
improving the reliability of the system.
This is of paramount importance especially in the context of complex critical software
system, where the occurrence of a failure has a high cost since it can lead to severe conse-
quences. However, the analysis of the error behavior of this kind of system is not trivial. As
discussed in Section 1.1, complex critical software system are often based on many strongly
interacting heterogeneous components and layers, including OTS and third party compo-
nents, legacy systems, and are typically distributed, composed by several software-intensive
systems deployed on many remote nodes communicating on a network. In addition, they
are expected to satisfy the rules imposed by certification standards, such as the DO-178B
[7], as well as they might not be built on the top of cutting-edge technologies as they include
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legacy and/or obsolete kernel versions, which limit the intervention degree on the system.
Moreover, complex critical systems often lack of documentation, since they can be based
on OTS and legacy components, which often do not have a specification, or when this is
present, it is not precise and complete.
All these aspects, undermine the use of existing approaches since they are not designed
to this kind of system and cope with their complexity. For example, the approach in [24]
requires information that is typically available at an architectural level, such as set of states
of a component and set of messages that a component can exchange with another compo-
nent, while the ones in [26, 28] require information about failure rates of each components.
The approaches proposed in [27, 29] require a white-box view of the system. Differently, the
technique proposed in [25] is black-box, but the used fault injection technique requires both
to know the undesirable states of each components and a monitor for each components of
the system. In addition, these approaches are not applied to complex systems, as reported
in Table 2.1 that summarizes the most complex case study used in each before-mentioned
study and in the ones that are detailed in Section 2.4.
Therefore, the contribution of the thesis is to provide a methodology that
allows understanding the error behavior of complex critical software systems,
going beyond the limits imposed by this type of systems. To this aim, the method-
ology leverages the data generated by the target system during operational phase, i.e., field
data, by means of monitoring techniques, and is based on the fundamental of Failure Field
Data Analysis (FFDA). An overview of FFDA and field data is provided in Chapter 2,
while the methodology is described in Chapter 3.
Chapter 2
Field Failure Data and Software
Errors
Field Failure Data Analysis (FFDA in the following) provides information that allows to understand
the effect of errors on system behavior. It provides accurate information on the target system, for the
elaboration and validation of analytical models, and for the improvement of the development process.
The collected data helps to characterize the system under observation. Quantitative analysis of the
failure, error and fault types observed in the field yields feedback to the development process and can
thus contribute to improving the production process as well as the reliability of the systems. This
chapter discusses the principles of the FFDA methodology and the related literature is examined.
Finally, a discussion about open issues and challenges about the use of FFDA for analyze the error
behavior of complex critical system concludes the chapter.
2.1 Field Failure Data Analysis: definition and goals
Field Failure Data Analysis groups all fault forecasting techniques which are performed in
the operational phase of the life time of a software system. This analysis is valuable in
a variety of industrial domains, because it allows evaluating and improving dependability
characteristics of computer systems. It is based on the monitoring and recording of errors
and failures occurred during the operational phase of the system under real workload condi-
tions, i.e., the failing behavior is not forced or induced in the systems by means of fault/error
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injection techniques. Filed data contain rich information about the system reliability, pro-
viding valuable information on actual error/failure behavior of a software system during the
normal system operation: analysis of naturally-occurring failures/errors is among the most
accurate ways to achieve insights into the failure/error behavior of the system [8, 36]. The
objective of a FFDA campaign mainly concerns the detailed characterization of the actual
dependability behavior of the operational system. More in detail, main goals of FFDA
studies can be summarized as the following:
• identification of the classes of errors/failures as they manifest in the field, i.e., the
actual failure model and error model of an operational system;
• analysis of failure and recovery times statistical distributions;
• correlation between failures and system workload;
• modeling of the failing behavior and recovery mechanisms, if any;
• identification of the root causes of outages, and indication of dependability bottle-
necks;
Although FFDA studies are useful for evaluating the real system, they have some draw-
backs. For example, they are limited to manifested failures, such as the ones that can be
traced. In addition, the particular conditions under which the system is observed can vary
in different installations of the system, thus raising doubts on the statistical validity of the
results. Noteworthy, the analysis of data collected on a given system is hardly beneficial
to the current version of the system. It can be instead useful for the next generations of
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systems. In addition, FFDA may require a long period of observation of the target system,
especially when the system is robust and failure events are rare. To achieve statistical va-
lidity and to shorten the observation period, these studies should be carried out on more
than one deployed system, each of them under different environmental conditions.
2.2 FFDA methodology
FFDA studies are usually based on three consecutive steps: (i) collection, concerning the
collection of data to analyze from the actual system, (ii) filtering, which consists in the
extraction of the information which are useful for the analysis, and (iii) analysis, that is
the derivation of the intended results from the manipulated data. Figure 2.1 summarizes
the FFDA methodology, highlighting the sequential relationship among its phases. In par-
ticular, once a data source has been selected and field data have been collected from a
target system, data filtering phase makes it possible to infer failure data from the selected
data source. Finally, failure data are analyzed to characterize properties of interest of the
system. Details about the best practice on each of these steps are presented are surveyed
in the following.
Figure 2.1: The FFDA methodology.
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2.2.1 Collection
The collection phases of the FFDA methodology allows the gathering of the field data
generated from the target system during operational phase. A preliminary study of the
system is required for this phase in order to understand what to collect and how to collect
it, along with the technique that can be successfully used.
Techniques that are commonly used for the collection phase of FFDA are Failure reports
and Monitoring techniques.
Failure reports are generated by human operators, typically users or specialized main-
tenance staff. A report usually contains information such as the date and hour when the
failure has occurred, a description of the observed failing behavior, comments form the
operator about the action taken to restore the system, the hardware/software module pin-
pointed as responsible of the failure, and, if possible, the root cause of the failure. The
problem with this technique is that human operators are responsible for the detection of
the failure, hence some failure may remain undetected. Moreover, the information con-
tained in the report depends on the experiences and opinions of the operator and can vary
from one operator to another. Automated failure report systems have been proposed. An
example is represented by the Corporate Error Reporting software proposed by Microsoft.
It creates a detailed report every time that an application crashes or hangs, or when the
OS crashes. The report contains a snapshot of the state of the system during the crash;
including a list that contains the name and timestamp of binaries that were loaded in the
memory of computer at the time of crash, as well as a brief stack trace. This information
Chapter 2. Field Failure Data and Software Errors 24
allows for a quick identification of the routine that caused the failure as well as the reason
and cause for the failure.
Monitoring [37, 38] is a well-established practice in software systems because it supports
a variety of engineering tasks, such as managing the computing environment, measuring
performance indicators, troubleshooting and post-mortem characterization of failures and
errors. A monitoring system is defined as a process or a set of possibly distributed processes
whose function is the dynamic gathering, interpreting, and acting on information concern-
ing an application as it executes [37]. Therefore, monitoring is a valuable source of field
data that analysts can leverage to understand the behavior of a software system at runtime.
Beside general-purpose software, monitoring is recommended (if not even mandatory) to
comply with a number of international standards and governmental guidelines in critical
software systems. In fact, monitoring makes it possible to verify whether a critical system
is compliant with its expected behavior and preventing catastrophic consequences, such as
loss of life and damage to the environment. For example, the IEC 61508-7 [9] suggests
the use of “failure detection by on-line monitoring”, the DoD Guide for achieving Reliabil-
ity, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) [11] emphasizes the need to “monitor system
performance to ensure that RAM performance levels meet user needs and constraints”, the
AUTomotive Open System Architecture (AUTOSAR), whose safety is enforced through the
ISO-26262 standard [10], indicates the use of execution sequence monitoring to trace the
paths taken by a given program and detect control flow errors.
It is worth noting that monitoring the occurrence of failures plays, and will play, a crucial
role in critical systems. Testing activities are not able to exhaustively validate a complex
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system against every potential fault trigger because of time and budget constraints. A
software system is likely to be released with a number of residual software faults. Gaining
insights into the reporting ability and limitations of a monitoring technique against failures
is crucial to increase the accuracy of runtime data and to infer a number of implications in
developing and improving monitoring.
Several techniques are currently used to generate monitoring data. Monitoring tech-
niques can be broadly classified into direct and indirect. Direct monitoring techniques
actively involve the monitored system in the data gathering phase [39, 40, 41, 42]. Moni-
toring data are either (i) generated by the target system itself, i.e., push-based monitoring,
or (ii) obtained by querying the target system, i.e., pull-based monitoring. Indirect mon-
itoring aims to collect data without relying on the monitored system [43, 44, 45, 46]. The
data concerning the system execution are generated at different locations, such as network
or operating system, by means of internal or external probes. Examples of indirect monitor-
ing tools are Ganglia [43] and Nagios [44], which monitor the target system by evaluating
metrics, such as CPU utilization, system load, used memory, number of running processes.
In the case of direct monitoring, the source code of a software system is arranged at
development time in a way to generate monitoring data at runtime. For instance, event
logging, which belongs to direct monitoring, has been extensively used over the past decades
for either post-mortem failure analysis [47, 48, 49], on-line analysis [50, 51], and for char-
acterizing the runtime behavior of industrial and critical systems [52, 53]. On the contrary,
indirect monitoring relies on a number of probes that generate data without the need for
the direct involvement of the monitored software system. For example, operating system
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probes can be adopted to measure a number of metrics, such as CPU/memory utilization
and system load.
Several direct monitoring techniques have been proposed and used in many domains in
the last decades. A substantial body of literature used event log files to conduct analysis
studies in several application domains, such as networked systems [47], cloud infrastructures
[54, 55], web applications and large clusters [49, 50]. The log files are generated at run-
time by the monitored software by means of logging instructions in the source code, either
using a dedicated library or simple file writing functions. They contains contain valuable
information to understand the system dependability behavior. Event logging is a widely
consolidated and pervasive practice both within the open-source community and propri-
etary software systems industry [56, 57, 58, 59, 60]. Studies such as [56, 60] point out that
software programs might contain up to one logging instruction every 30 lines of code. Event
logs have been successfully adopted also in the context of critical industrial systems.
For example, in [52] it is proposed a log analysis framework for Mars Science Laboratory
flight software [39]. The proposed method is based on the extraction of simple events from
application text logs. The extraction is implemented by means of regular expressions and
it aims to obtain a well-structured log, which can be analyzed with appropriate patterns to
detect failures. In [53] the authors proposed a failure detection and diagnosis framework for
component-based distributed embedded systems, such as automotive systems. The frame-
work encompasses a logging layer that allows collecting system events, which are fed to a
monitoring and diagnosis layers.
Assertion checking is a direct monitoring technique based on the use of assertions,
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i.e., code statements that check invariant properties of a program and produce an alert
if one of the properties is violated at runtime [61]. An example is range checking, where
the assertions perform boundary checks on the values of program variables in order to
detect anomalies [62]. In [40] is presented an assertions-based mechanism to detect data
errors in Embedded Control Systems. A configuration parameter is defined for each type
of monitored signal. An error in a signal is detected as soon as the signal violates the
constraints given by the configuration parameter. The mechanism is evaluated by means
of an error injection campaign involving an embedded system. Many works use assertions
to analyze the runtime behavior of a system. For example, in [63] the authors presented
an on-line mechanism to detect software errors during operational execution from data and
control-flow viewpoints. In particular, for data viewpoint, the authors used executable
assertions defined on functional blocks to detect anomalies on data values. A general-
purpose monitoring approach that is implemented for sequential, concurrent, and reactive
systems written in Java is presented in [42]. This approach, named JASS (Java with
ASSertion), includes a pre-compiler for annotated Java programs and an assertion language
that support all standard Design by Contract1 assertions that can be introduced in a given
program.
Source code instrumentation is based on the insertion of specific instructions into
the source code of a given program with the aim of monitoring its behavior. Several works
use this approach for failure analysis. For example, [41] presents an approach that uses
1An approach widely adopted in the context of critical systems; it allows the specification of assertions in
the form of method pre- and post-conditions, class and loop invariants, and further additional checks that
can be introduced at several points of the program code.
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code instrumentation to detect violations of time constraints in real-time systems. Au-
thors in [64] propose a rule-based logging approach. The approach defines a set of rules
that establishes how the logging mechanism must be implemented to detect several types
of errors, such as errors affecting services and interactions between software modules. Each
rule defines the placement of the logging instructions in the code. A monitoring framework,
named LogBus, has been developed by the authors in [64] based on rule-based logging. In
[65] the authors used a software instrumentation package, i.e. DTrace, to perform Function
Boundary Tracing (FBT), which traces function entry and exit events, in order to monitor
the execution of a software system. Another technique based on source code instrumen-
tation is Aspect-Oriented Logging, i.e. a systematic approach to log management based
on the Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) paradigm [66]. In this technique logging can
be treated as a system-wide feature orthogonal to other services or to the business logic.
For instance, through aspect weaving, a log entry can be systematically produced for each
runtime exception, with the aim of supporting transparent exception reporting. Monitor-
ing techniques based on source code instrumentation are also used in the area of runtime
verification [67, 68], where a set of properties are checked during the execution of the tar-
get system. The properties, usually written in a formal specification language, are used to
generate a number of monitors; the monitors analyze the events generated by the system
at runtime with the aim of verifying whether the properties are met or not. The system is
previously instrumented in order to generate the events required by the monitors.
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2.2.2 Filtering
Filtering consist in analyzing the collected data for correctness, consistency, and com-
pleteness. This concerns the filtering of invalid data and the coalescence of redundant or
equivalent data. Indeed, given a large volume of data collected in real systems, a crucial
step is inferring the failure data that will be used to perform an FFDA analysis. Filtering
encompasses two types of activity, i.e., (i) removing non-useful data, and, more importantly,
(ii) coalescing redundant failure data by grouping entries that are related to the manifesta-
tion of the same problem. This is especially true when event logs are used. Logs, indeed,
contain many information which are not related to failure events. Only a fraction of the en-
tries in the log is useful to conduct the failure analysis: many entries report non-error events
and can be excluded from the failure analysis [69]. Filtering non-error events is essentially
time-consuming task; however, it does not represent a real problem to failure analysis. It
is used to reduce the amount of information to be stored, and to concentrate the attention
only on a significant set of data, thus simplifying the analysis process. A manual inspection
of the data is valuable to identify the severity of the entries and error-specific keywords.
Two basic filtering strategies can be adopted: blacklist and whitelist strategies. The black-
list can be thought as a list of all the terms that surely identify an event which is not of
interest for the analysis. The blacklist filtering discards all those events which description
message contains at least one of the blacklist terms. On the contrary, the whitelist is the list
of all permitted terms, hence only events which contain these terms are not rejected. Both
the approaches can be supported by de-parameterization procedures. De-parameterization
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replaces variable fields within a text entries (e.g., usernames, IP and memory addresses,
folders) with a generic token. For example, the hypothetical entries
incoming connection from 225.178.20.37
incoming connection from 143.195.0.100
appear the same once IP addresses are replaced with the IPAddr token. De-parameterization
reduces the number of distinct messages templates to scrutinize. As shown by [70] around
200 million entries in the log of a supercomputing system were generated by only 1,124
distinct messages.
Once non-error data has been filtered out, it still remains the problem of grouping the
error entries representing the manifestation of the same problem. Events which are close
in time may be representative of one single failure events. They thus need to be coalesced
into one failure event. Coalescence techniques can be distinguished into temporal, spatial,
and content-based.
Temporal coalescence, or tupling [69], exploits the heuristic of the tuple, i.e., a collection
of events which are close in time. The heuristic is based on the observation that two
failure events, if related to the same fault activation, are likely to occur near in time.
Consequently, if the time distance of the entries is smaller than a predetermined threshold,
i.e., the coalescence window, they are placed in the same group (called tuple). To explain how
the tupling scheme works, let Xi be the i − th entry in the log, and t(Xi) the timestamp
of the entry Xi. If the condition t(Xi+1)t(Xi) < W is satisfied (with W denoting the
mentioned coalescence window), Xi+1 is place in the same tuple of Xi. The window size is
a crucial parameter which need to be carefully tuned in order to minimize collapses (events
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related to two different faults are grouped into the same tuple) and truncations (events
related to the same fault are grouped into more than one tuple).
Spatial coalescence is used to relate events which occur close in time but on different
nodes of the system under study. It allows to identify failure propagations among nodes,
resulting particularly useful when targeting distributed systems. The techniques adopted for
spatial coalescence are usually the same as the ones used for temporal coalescence [71, 36].
Finally, content-based coalescence groups several events into one event by looking at the
specific content of the events into the data. For example, in [72] this technique is adopted
to identify machine reboots: when a the system is restarted, a sequence of initialization
events is generated by the system. By looking at the specific contents of these events, it
is possible to develop proper algorithms to identify machine reboots sequences and group
them into one reboot event. Also, content-based coalescence can be used to group events
belonging to the same type [73].
2.2.3 Analysis
Collection and filtering make it possible to infer the failure event from the collected data;
analysis allows practitioners to achieve meaningful insights from the data. Data analysis
step consists in performing statistical analysis on the filtered data to identify trends, to
evaluate quantitative measures and to assess fault tolerance and recovery mechanisms.
Error and failure classification is a the first step of the analysis, which aims at catego-
rizing all the observed failures events on the basis of different criteria, e.g., their nature,
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severity and originating component. Classification allows pinpoint the most errors/failures-
prone components and, in general, the failure modes of the system. Classification results
can be used to drive finer-grain analysis. In addition, descriptive statistics can be derived
from the data to analyze the location of faults, errors and failures among system compo-
nents, the time to failure or time to repair distributions, the impact of the workload on the
system behavior, the coverage of error detection and recovery mechanisms, etc. Commonly
used statistical measures in the analysis include frequency, percentage, and probability dis-
tribution [74]. They are often used to quantify the reliability, the availability, and the
maintainability.
A substantial body of literature try to conduct the evaluation and modeling of depend-
ability attributes. More detailed analysis try to determine the probability distribution of
the time to failure variable, and, in some cases, of the time to repair. This permits to detail
the failure model of the system under study. To this aim, the real data are fitted with
theoretical, continuous time distributions. The most adopted distributions in this field are
the exponential, the hyper-exponential, the lognormal, and the weibull.
The exponential distribution was firstly adopted to model the time to failure and time to
repair of electronic components. However, it has been often shown that this distribution does
not fit real data, especially when the data involves multiple underlying causes or software
failures. This is due to the simplistic memoryless property of the exponential distribution.
Authors in [75] use a hyper-exponential distribution to fit the duration of failures. This
type of distribution has been adopted in the mentioned study because the authors observed
the existence of multiple predominant failure dynamics in the data: as a result, a two-stage
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hyper-exponential model was chosen.
The lognormal distribution has been recognized as a proper distribution for software
failure rates [76]. Many successful analytical models of software behavior share assumptions
that suggest that the distribution of software event rates will asymptotically approach
lognormal. The lognormal distribution has its origin in the complexity, that is the depth
of conditionals, of software systems and the fact that event rates are determined by an
essentially multiplicative process. The central limit theorem links these properties to the
lognormal: just as the normal distribution arises when summing many random terms, the
lognormal distribution arises when the value of a variable is determined by the multiplication
of many random factors. The lognormal distribution has been also used in the context of
high-performance computing systems [77].
The weibull distribution [78] is probably the most adopted function to model the failure
data. widely used parametric family of failure distributions. The reason is that by a
proper choice of its shape parameter, an increasing, a decreasing, or a constant failure rate
distribution can be obtained. Weibull distributions have been used in many application
domains, e.g., [47, 78, 75].
In practice, the modeling of the failure data by means of statistical distribution, is
usually supported by goodness-of-fit test procedures, e.g., the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, to
establish whether the chosen distribution is a good model to fit the data.
Other types of analysis are concerned with the correlation between failure distributions.
The correlation can uncover possible links between failures in different hardware and soft-
ware modules or in different nodes constituting the system under study. This analysis can
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also conduct to the discovery of trends among failure data on event logs. From a theoretical
perspective, the trend analysis of event logs is based on the common observation that a
module exhibits a period of (potentially) increasing unreliability before final failure. By
discovering these unreliability trends, it can be possible to predict the occurrence of certain
failures. To this aim, principal component analysis, cluster analysis, and tupling can be
adopted [2].
Finally, the analysis activity often conducts to the development of simulation models of
the dependability behavior. Models often adopted in the literature are state-machines, fault
trees, Markov chains, and Petri nets. The understanding gathered from field data allows to
define these models and to populate their parameters with realistic figures, e.g., failure and
recovery rates.
2.3 Relevant Applications
FFDA has been used for decades to characterize dependability of operational systems.
This section summarizes relevant efforts and reference works in the area of dependability
characterization by means of field data: studies have been grouped based on the main
analysis objectives they pursue.
2.3.1 Error and Failure Classification
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, the primary task to achieve insights into the meaning of
collected failure data is classification. Error and failure classification usually represent the
starting point of a FFDA study and have several advantages. For examples, they allow
determining the most-predominant failure classes, pinpointing system components that are
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prone to generate error/failure data, and support the evaluation of the improvement be-
tween subsequent releases of the same product. This information is valuable to conduct
quantitative evaluations of the system, and allows a better interpretation of the measure-
ment.
The work in [79] propose an interesting FFDA study on a server machine with the Sun
SPARC UNIX OS. Starting from event logs, the work performs a classification of failures and
identify the potential trends of errors which lead to failures. Data in the log is classified
and categorized to identify error trends leading to failures, and to support MTBF and
availability measurements. For examples, authors show that the input-output subsystem is
the most error-prone subsystem, and that many network problems observed in the log were
not caused by the system under study.
A characterization of operating system reboots of Windows NT and 2K machines is
proposed in [80]. The data source adopted in the study was collected over a period of
36 months. The study focuses on unplanned reboots, representing the occurrence of a
failure, identified via a content-based coalescence approach. The study demonstrates that
the number of failures caused by the operating system itself is smaller in Windows 2K when
compared to NT machines; however, the number of failures caused by application code is
larger in Windows 2K.
The work in [81] conduct a similar classification study, addressing Windows XP SP1.
Th author shows how the percentage of OS failures decreases from 12% for Windows 2K to
the 5% of Windows XP, thus demonstrating that system crashes are often due to applica-
tions and third party software. In addition, they conduct a detailed classification study to
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pinpoint the .dll and executable files causing crashes.
Authors in [82] face a rather different application domain. From a classification study
of 62 user-visible failures in three large-scale Internet services, i.e., Online, Content, and
ReadMostly, they observe that front-ends are a more significant problem than is commonly
believed. In particular, operator error and network problems are shown to be leading
contributors to user-visible failures.
Understanding the distribution of the failure data among different classes can provide a
feedback about the quality of analysis results. In [70] authors demonstrate, in the context
of supercomputing system, that the classes of failures that bias the content of the log, i.e.,
the most entries-prone classes, can distort measurements.
2.3.2 Diagnosis and Correlation of Failures
FFDA analysis allows achieving in-depth understanding of causes and correlation among
failures. The use of only measurements-based approach does not allow to obtain this type
of evidence. The use of models, and statistic artifacts applied to the data are also required
to reach this goal. Works in the area, dating back to the 1980s, demonstrated the existence
of a relationship between the failure behavior and the workload run by a system.
In particular, during a performance measurement campaign for a large DEC-1OA time-
sharing system, it was found that the simplistic assumption of a constant system failure
rate did not agree with measured data [83]. Subsequent research by the same authors [84]
involves use of a doubly stochastic Poisson process to model failures. The model relates the
instantaneous failure rate of a system resource to the usage of the considered resource.
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Moved by this research, the authors in [85] proposed an approach to evaluate the re-
lationship between system load and failure behavior that presumes no model a priori, but
rather starts from a substantial body of empirical data. The study was conducted on three
IBM 370 mainframes, and both failure data (maintenance failure reports) and performance
counters (via a proprietary IBM system) were gathered. A regression analysis of failure
and performance data evidenced the strong correlation between failure manifestation and
system load.
Several works suggest that failures observed in different components of a computer
system are correlated. In [86] authors defined an analysis methodology for event logs of
Tandem systems through multivariate techniques, such as factor and cluster analysis. The
event logs were gathered from three Tandem systems over a 7 months period. A 2-phase
hyperexponential distribution was adopted to model the error temporal behavior, according
to the two error behaviors exhibited by the three systems: error bursts and isolated faults.
Although the number of errors observed during the system operations was relatively small,
authors observed that multiple processes were affected by the same problem, because of the
presence of shared resources.
Authors in[87] perform a measurement study to assess the dependability of seven DEC
VAX machines. The analysis aimed to estimate the distributions of the Time Between
Errors and Time Between Failures, to analyze dependencies between errors and failures.
Again, shared resources turned out to be a relevant dependability bottleneck. Moreover,
the analysis showed that errors and failures occur in bursts, and that, neglecting failure
correlation phenomena can significantly impact the quality of the measures.
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The work in [88] evidences the feasibility of on-line diagnosis approaches based on trend
analysis and real data. Specifically, it concentrates on the recognition of intermittent failures
and defines a methodology to distinguish between transient, permanent, and intermittent
failures by looking at the correlation between consecutive failure events. Statistical tech-
niques are used to quantify the strength of the relationship among entries in the log. About
500 groups of failures are identified over a 14 months time span.
2.3.3 Failure Prediction
Analysis of failure data log is the basis also failure prediction studies. Several works have
been developing techniques to predict failures, based on the occurrence of specific event
patterns in field data. Predicting failures is challenging; however, it allows applying fail-
ure avoidance strategies, triggering corrective and recovery actions, reducing the Time To
Repair, enhancing system dependability.
In [78] a failure prediction technique, called the Dispersion Frame Technique (DFT), is
presented. The technique is defined by starting from the statistical characterization of real
data observed on a 13 SUN 2/170 nodes, running the VICE file system, over a 22 months
period. By gathering data by both event logs (regarded as errors) and from operators failure
reports (regarded as failures), authors concentrate of the identification of error trends which
lead to failures. The effectiveness of the DFT is shown via direct experiments on actual
data. In particular, it is shown that the DFT uses only one fifth of the error log entry
points required by statistical methods for failure prediction. Also, the DFT achieves a
93.7% success rate in failure prediction.
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Authors in [50] analyze event logs from a 350-node cluster system. Logs encompass
reliability, availability and serviceability (RAS) events, and system activity reports collected
over one year. Authors observed that data in the log were highly redundant: for this reason,
filtering techniques have been applied to model the data into a set of primary and derived
variables. The prediction approach, based on a rule-based classification algorithm, was able
to identify the occurrence of critical events with up to 70% accuracy.
A deep study on the logs from a production IBM BlueGene/L system has been conducted
in [89]. The authors proposes empirical failure prediction methods which can predict around
80% of the memory and network failures, and 47% of the application I/O failures.
2.3.4 Using Field Data to Characterize Security
FFDA campaigns have also been used in the context of security community, where secu-
rity analysis have been conducted starting from the data collected during the progression
of malicious activities and security attacks. several works appeared which attempted to
characterize and to model system vulnerabilities and attacks starting from field data.
An outstanding example is represented by the Honeynet project [90]. A honeypot can
be defined as a monitored computer environments placed on the Internet with the explicit
purpose of being attacked. By placing honeypots on the Internet and by gathering data
on the malicious activity affecting them, one can study the characteristics of attacks and
system vulnerabilities. As an example, the study in [91] aimed at using data collected by
honeypots to validate fault assumptions required when designing intrusion-tolerant systems.
Authors set up three machines equipped with different operating systems (Windows NT and
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2K, and Red Hat Linux) and collected network-related data (via tcpdump) for four months
to analyze the source of attacker and the attacked ports. The work evidenced that, in
most cases, attackers know in advance which ports are open on each machine, without
performing any port scan. Moreover, there were no substantial differences in the attacks
made on different operating systems.
A similar setup has been used by [92]. In this case the testbed was composed by two
Windows 2K machines and security data have been collected over a time period of 109 days
by means of the Ethereal tool. The objective of the study was to establish the characteristics
of the data that allowed separating different classes of attacks. This work, which shows how
to use field data to recognize attacks, established that features, such as, number of bytes
constituting the attack or mean distribution of the bytes across the packets, are valuable
metrics to separate attacks.
The work in [93] exploits data from the Bugtraq database and proposes a classification
of vulnerabilities. In particular, vulnerabilities are dominated by five categories: input vali-
dation errors (23%), boundary condition errors (21%), design errors (18%), failure to handle
exceptional conditions (11%), and access validation errors (10%). The primary reason for
the domination of these categories is that they include the most prevalent vulnerabilities,
such as buffer overflow and format string vulnerabilities. Starting from this data and helped
by code inspections, authors propose finite state machine models for vulnerabilities, which
help to better understand their behavior and/or to uncover new ones.
Authors in [94] conduct an in-depth study of the forensic data (e.g., syslog, Intrusion
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Detection System (IDS) logs) produced by the machine of a large-scale computing organi-
zation. Attack data adopted in the study are collected over a timeframe of 5 years. The
analysis aims to achieve insights into the progression of attacks, to pinpoint the type of
alerts that are more likely to catch different types of attacks, and to investigate causes
of undetected incidents. Analysis results are valuable to model security attributes and to
develop monitoring tools.
2.3.5 Monitoring Techniques Characterization
Field data have also been used to evaluate the effectiveness of monitoring techniques, which
are one of the main sources of field data as discussed in Section 2.2.1.
In [95] a platform, called SMock, for testing and evaluating runtime monitoring tools
is presented. The platform allows generating a Java mock test system, which is used as a
benchmark for the runtime verification tools under test, starting from a specification. The
mock system is run under a given monitoring tool. After the execution, SMock generates a
report that contains the execution time of the system, the average memory usage and cpu
utilization. The analysis of the reports generated by SMock makes it possible to assess the
impact and the performance overhead induced by the considered runtime verification tools
on the mock system.
In [64] the rule-based logging technique is compared to the traditional logging in two
open-source systems. The authors adopt a software fault-injection approach to assess the
logging techniques under different failure manifestations. The results, obtained from the
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analysis of the collected log for the the techniques, indicate that rule-based logging signifi-
cantly improves the failure detection capability of the traditional logging approach; however,
it misses some details that could help to understand failure causes (e.g., a given file could
not be opened, a service was invoked with bad parameters).
The work [96] presents an experimental analysis of different monitoring techniques in
web-based applications. The work focuses on both direct and indirect monitoring techniques
and tools, i.e., Zabbix [97], the log-analyzer Swatch [98], a monitoring module based on
aspect-oriented programming and an end-to-end monitoring technique based on JMeter
[99]. The experimental study consists in the emulation of anomalous scenarios and the
evaluation of coverage, detection latency and overhead of the techniques. The analysis of
the obtained file data allows understandig that the AOP based technique is characterized
by the maximum failure reporting rate, followed by the end-to-end monitoring technique,
Swatch and Zabbix.
It should be noted that no one of the cited works characterize the effectiveness of a
monitoring technique with respect to failures and errors in a comprehensive way. Indeed,
[95] does not focus on the failure and error reporting ability of the monitoring techniques,
[64] is limited to only two monitoring techniques, and citeSilvaAnomalyDet presents prelim-
inary measurements conducted considering a small number of scenarios (i.e., order of 10),
which involved fairly obvious error manifestations, such as abnormal memory and CPU
consumption.
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2.4 Related Research and Thesis Contributions
Literature proposing techniques and measurements based on the analysis of field data en-
compasses different domains, as discussed in the previous Section. Field data have been
used also to characterize the error behavior of software systems and/or identify locations
for EDMs and ERMs. In particular, some studies are based on the use of source code in-
strumentation and monitoring techniques to collect field data in order to analyze how errors
manifests in a given system, the effects they may have on the system as well as how they
propagate through the software.
For example, a framework for profiling modular software with regard to error propaga-
tion and error effect is proposed in [30]. The framework, called EPIC, may be used to find
the modules and signals which are most exposed to errors in a system and to ascertain how
different modules affect each other in the presence of data errors, i.e., errors in variables
and signals. EPIC makes use of variable instrumentation to trace the values of variable in
order to estimate the proposed error permeability, which evaluates the ability of a module
to contain errors, and propose the placement of EDM. The proposed framework has been
successfully applied to part of an embedded control system used for arresting aircraft on
short runways and aircraft carriers.
In [31] authors propose a system, called Triage, that automatically performs onsite
software failure diagnosis providing a detailed diagnosis report, which includes the fail-
ure nature, triggering conditions, related code and variables, the error propagation chain,
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and potential fixes. The system makes use of kernel-level components and of multiple re-
executions of the target software to support failure diagnosis; during each re-execution,
detailed information is collected via dynamic binary instrumentation in order to conduct
the analysis of the occurred failure and its causes. The system has been applied on 9
applications with different complexity, such as TAR, Apache web server, MySQL.
An environment for examining the propagation of errors in software is proposed [32].
The environment, called PROPANE, allows the analysis of the propagation of data errors in
a single-process software system written in C, identifying the error paths and evaluating the
propagation times. With this aim, PROPANE makes use of a fault injection mechanism to
induce data error in the system as well as of instrumentation of the variables of the system
to detect the occurrence of errors. Part of an embedded control system used for arresting
aircraft has been used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed tool.
A method for assessing error data propagation for operating systems is proposed in [33].
The method is focused on the analysis of the behavior of error in device driver, and on
the propagation of these errors to applications which makes use of the target device driver.
Errors are induced into a device driver by means of fault injection at interface level, while
the detection of the propagation of an occurred error to application is obtained by means
of assertions. A set of metrics are proposed, i.e., Service Error Permeability, OS Service
Error Exposure, Driver Error Diffusion, which help to understand if the target driver needs
a wrapper. The method has been assessed on Windows CE .Net operating system, which
was chosen for its limited complexity.
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In [34] an approach to capture the importance of variables in dependable software sys-
tems is proposed. The approach is based on a proposed metric, named importance, which
captures the impact a given variable has on the dependability of a software system. The
evaluation of the metric requires the instrumentation of the variables of the system, in order
to understand when a variable is corrupted. Based on the proposed metric, the approach
allows to provide insights on the design and positioning of EDMs and ERMs in order to
guarantee that critical variables always hold appropriate values. The approach has been
assessed on an open-source flight simulator.
A diagnosis tool, called SherLog, is proposed in [35]. The tool analyzes event logs gen-
erated by a software system during failure executions and its source code to automatically
generate control-flow and data-flow information to help engineers diagnose the errors oc-
curred in the system. In particular, SherLog is able to provide the reporting path of an
error, using a static analysis of the source code. The tool has been evaluated on 8 different
real-world failures from 7 applications, which range between rmdir GNU utils to the Apache
web server.
It is worth noting that the use of these solutions is not trivial in complex critical software
systems, which is the focus of this dissertation. As discussed in Section 1.4, complex critical
software systems are usually distributed, characterized by multiple levels, and several com-
ponents, each one with complex interconnections and several variables. In addition, they are
expected to satisfy the rules imposed by certification standards, such as the DO-178B [7], as
well as they might not be built on the top of cutting-edge technologies as they include legacy
and/or obsolete kernel versions, which limit the intervention degree on the system. These
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aspects undermine the use of existing techniques based on field data in complex critical
software systems. For example, the approaches in [30, 32, 34] are based on instrumentation
of variables, which might be expensive in a complex critical software system composed by
several modules. In particular, the approach in [30] also requires to measure the proposed
error permeability for each input of each module, which lead to a low scalability of the
approach; while the tool in [32] can be used only for single process software, which limits
its applicability to complex software systems. On the other hand, the system proposed in
[31] makes use of kernel-level components and dynamic binary instrumentation, while the
one proposed in [33] is conceived for OS device drivers. In addition, the tool in [35] requires
static analysis of the source code, which can be either expensive on system composed by
a large number of lines of codes, or inapplicable if the source code is not totally available.
Noteworthy, these approaches are not applied to complex systems, as reported in Table
2.1 that summarizes the most complex case study used in each before-mentioned study
and the ones discussed in Section 1.3, along with the most complex one considered in this
dissertation. This is a further evidence of their inapplicability to this type of systems.
Therefore, the contribution of the thesis is to provide a methodology that
allows understanding the error behavior of complex critical software systems
by means of field data generated by the monitoring techniques that are already
implemented in the target system. The use of monitoring techniques already imple-
mented in a software system allows to avoid any changes in the target system, preserving its
functionalities and performance. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, monitoring techniques are
one of the main source of field data since, beside being recommended by several international
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Table 2.1: Most complex case study used in each considered work.
work
Most complex case study
(name, type or LOC)
[31] MySQL
[23, 34] FlightGear Flight Simulator - ∼220K LOCs
[29] Nethack - adventure game
[32, 30, 27] Part of an embedded control system for arresting aircraft
[33] Windows CE .Net operating system
[24] Part of a Computer Software Configuration Item
[25] no case studies
[26] Personnel Access Control System
[28] Automated Teller Machine (ATM) bank system example
[35] Apache web server - ∼317K LOCs
this study Real-world ATC communication middleware - ∼790K LOCs
safety standards and governmental guidelines, e.g., IEC 61508-7 [9], the AUTomotive Open
System Architecture (AUTOSAR) through the ISO-26262 [10], and the DoD Guide for
achieving Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) [11], they are consolidated
and pervasive practice both within the open-source community and proprietary software
systems industry. The following challenging questions are related to the former:
• RQ1: Is it possible to use monitoring techniques to characterize the error behavior in
complex critical software system? Field data generated by means of monitoring tech-
nique contain valuable information about the behavior of the target system at runtime.
However, it is not trivial to analyze them in order to obtain valuable information about
the error behavior of the system during failing executions, and especially about the
propagation of errors. Therefore, an ad-hoc methodology is required to extract and
analyze data provided by a monitoring technique in order to understand what happen
in the system in terms of errors when a fault is activated, according to the considered
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monitoring technique. More in details, the methodology has to leverage error data
generated by a monitoring technique to infer (i) the error model considered by this
technique, (ii) the error behavior of the system at varying the type of activated fault
and the type of failure occurred in the system, according to the inferred error model,
(iii) how errors propagate through the components of the target system, (iv) the fail-
ure reporting ability exposed by the considered monitoring technique at varying the
type of activated fault and the type of failure occurred in the system.
• RQ2: Is it possible to improve the error detection/recovery of a complex critical
software system from error data? The knowledge of the error behavior of the target
system and of how the errors propagate through its components are often used in the
literature to identify the locations for EDM and ERM, which allow an improvement of
the detection and recovery of errors in the target system. Therefore, the methodology
has to allow inferring the locations where the placement of EDM and ERM might be
beneficial for the system, and the type of error/failure they have to cope with.
• RQ3: How do the error and failure reporting ability change between different moni-
toring techniques implemented in a given system? And what about the dissimilarity
of their data? A number of monitoring techniques can be implemented in a complex
critical software system, which can be of different types and consider different error
models; therefore, it can be useful to compare the performance exhibited by each
technique in order to provide insights to developers to implement better monitoring
techniques. To this aim, the methodology has to compare the performance exhibited
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by each monitoring technique in terms of (i) ability to report failure occurred in the
target system, (ii) failure coverage by failure and fault type, (ii) ability to report the
propagation of errors and (iv) dissimilarity of the data they provide at varying failure
manifestation. There are studies that try to address this topic; however, they do not
characterize the effectiveness of a monitoring technique with respect to failures and
errors, as discussed in Section 2.3.5.
• RQ4: Is it useful to combine different monitoring techniques implemented in a com-
plex critical software system? Different monitoring techniques implemented in a soft-
ware system might expose orthogonal performance, complementing each other in terms
of failure reporting and/or error propagation reportability. Therefore, the method-
ology has to be able to evaluate (i) the orthogonality of the monitoring techniques
implemented into the target system and (ii) the potential benefit of their combination.
The following chapters try to answer the above mentioned questions, by describing the
proposed methodology as well as the results obtained form its application to two different
real-world critical software systems in the field of Air Traffic Control domain. These chapters
are the result of a three years experience, and partially extend previously published results,
as [100, 101, 102].
Chapter 3
Software Error Analysis: a
data-driven methodology
The analysis of errors occurred in a software system is one of the main activity to incorporate
dependability structures and mechanisms where they are the most effective. To this aim, know where
errors tend to propagate and where errors tend to do the most damage, leading to failure, is of
paramount importance. Several solutions are proposed in the literature to conduct error analysis of a
software system. However, their application is not trivial in the context of complex critical software
systems. In this chapter a methodology to conduct error analysis in the context of complex critical
software systems is presented.
The methodology leverages field data generated by means of monitoring techniques (MUT) al-
ready implemented in the target system (SUT), in order to (i) understand the error behavior exposed
by the target system and to (ii) assess the effectiveness of the monitoring techniques implemented
in the system. An automated framework, based on software fault injection experiments, is used to
collect field data from the MUTs. The collected data are used to evaluate a number of metrics in
order to quantify the ability of MUTs at reporting useful notifications in face of failures, as well as
to evaluate the error behavior exhibited by the SUT they allow to infer.
3.1 Introduction
The knowledge on how faults and errors may affect a software system is of paramount
importance in order to improve their reliability. In particular, the design of effective error
detection mechanisms requires not only knowledge on which types of errors to detect but
also the effect these errors may have on the software, i.e., the failures they lead to, as well
as how they propagate through the software, i.e., the error propagation. Existing solutions
50
Chapter 3. Software Error Analysis: a data-driven methodology 51
allow obtaining this knowledge in different ways. However, their application is not trivial
in the context of complex critical software systems, as discussed in the Section 2.4, since
they are often characterized by multiple and distributed nodes, multiple levels, each one
with multiple modules, and also by some constraints in terms of intervention degree and/or
performance.
The proposed methodology aims to leverage field data generated by means of monitoring
techniques already implemented in the target software system in order to understand the
error behavior of the system, avoiding intrusive modifications of its source code to collect
useful data to analyze. It should be noted that the higher the effectiveness of the considered
monitoring techniques at reporting errors and failures occurred in the target system, the
higher the comprehensiveness the methodology is able to provide in terms of error behavior
of the system. For this reason, the proposal is also conceived as a methodology to compare
the effectiveness of different monitoring techniques implemented in different target systems.
To this aim, the methodology leverages information retrieval metrics and other proposed
metrics.
3.2 Proposed Methodology
Let the System Under Test (SUT) be the target software system, i.e., the software
implementing the monitoring techniques to assess. The SUT is exercised with a faultload
and a workload. The faultload consists of a set of software faults, which represents common
programming mistakes found in real software systems; the workload is a typical operational
profile for the SUT. The execution of the SUT subjected to the faultload and the workload
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allows inducing errors and failures into the SUT. The proposed method makes it possible
to measure the extent the direct monitoring techniques implemented by the SUT are able
to report the occurrence of the failures induced through the faultload and also to evaluate
the error behavior exhibited by the SUT according the considered monitoring techniques.
According to this concept, the notion of Monitoring technique Under Test (MUT) is
introduced.
Considered MUTs are evaluated by using different metrics. Precision and Recall of a
MUT, i.e., the ability of a MUT at generating monitoring data upon the occurrence of a
failure, and its failure coverage, i.e., the ability of a MUT at reporting different types of
failure occurred in the SUT, are measured. In addition, three new metrics are defined:
• Data Dissimilarity, which allows gaining insights into the suitability of the data
generated by a MUT for manual failure analysis.
• Error Determination Degree, which allows gaining insights into the ability of error
notifications of a MUT to suggest either the fault that led to the error, or the failure
the error led to in the SUT.
• Error Propagation Reportability, which allows understanding the ability of the
MUT at reporting the propagation of errors in the SUT.
The effectiveness of different MUTs at reporting the set of failures induced in the SUT
are compared as well as their effectiveness in terms of Error Determination Degree and Error
Propagation Reportability. The metrics that are adopted in this dissertation are detailed
in Section 3.3. All the characteristics of the proposed method, such as faultload, workload
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and experimental procedures, are detailed in the following.
3.2.1 Faultload
The faultload consists of a set of software faults, i.e., common programming mistakes
that can be found in the source code of real-world software systems. The faults adopted in
this dissertation belong to the well consolidated orthogonal defect classification (ODC)
[103]. The fault types proposed by [104] have been considered, which extend the ODC classes
for practical injection purposes. The authors in [104] analyzed the fault distributions of a
number of software systems and identified a subset of representative fault types observed
in the field.
Table 3.1 reports the fault types used in the proposed methodology and the ODC class
to which they belong, i.e., algorithm (ALG), assignment (ASG), checking (CHK ), interface
(INT ). Each fault type represents a typical programming mistake, such as missing variable
initialization, missing function call, wrong values assigned to variable. According to the
estimates in [104], the fault types adopted in this study represent a subset accounting for
total around 80% of representative faults found in real-world software systems.
It should be noted that the methodology leverages fault injection means to induce the
faultload in the considered SUTs. The rationale behind this choice is to accelerate the
collection of failure data generated by the MUTs, avoiding to wait for naturally occurred
failures. However, practitioners might apply the proposed methodology also on naturally
occurred failure data. Indeed, knowing the root cause of the occurred failure and the failure
mode, i.e., the way the SUT fails, each failure manifestation can be categorized according
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Table 3.1: Fault types adopted in the methodology. (ALG-algorithm, ASG-assignment,
CHK -checking, INT -interface)
Fault
ODC
type
MFC missing function call ALG
MVIV missing variable initialization using ASG
a value
MVAV missing variable assignment using ASG
a value
MVAE missing variable assignment with an ASG
expression
MIA missing IF construct around CHK
statements
MIFS missing IF construct plus statements ALG
MIEB missing IF construct plus statements ALG
plus ELSE before statement
MLC missing AND/OR clause in expression CHK
used as branch condition
MLPA missing small and localized part ALG
of the algorithm
WVAV wrong value assigned to variable ASG
WPFV wrong variable used in parameter INT
of function call condition
WAEP wrong arithmetic expression in INT
parameter of a function call
the considered fault types and failure model, which is detailed in the next section.
3.2.2 Workload and Failure Model
Each fault of the faultload is injected into the SUT: the SUT is exercised with the workload
in order to trigger the fault and to induce the occurrence of a failure. The workload is
SUT-dependent and does not vary across the experiments that emulate the faults.
A general classification to categorize the failures induced in the SUT has been adopted.
The classification is based on a reference paper in the area of dependability [1]:
• CRASH : abrupt/unexpected termination of the SUT; the pid(s) of the process(es)
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encapsulating the software are deallocated by the operating system before the software
system is correctly halted.
• SILENT : the SUT is up, but no output/functionality is provided within the expected
timeout, e.g., the system is hung or no output is generated at all. The expected
timeout has to be established by means of fault-free runs of the system before the
injection experiments.
• ERRATIC: bad output, misconfigurations, exceptional conditions, and errors impact-
ing the system internal components that do not cause CRASH or SILENT failures.
• NO FAILURE: no failure manifestation is noted during the experiment; the injected
fault is not activated or it does not cause the failure of SUT.
3.2.3 Experiments procedure
A campaign of experiments is conducted to collect the data generated by the MUTs. For
each experiment, one fault belonging to the faultload is induced into the SUT. The SUT is
exercised with the workload, and the monitoring data generated by the MUTs are collected.
Figure 3.1 shows the steps of the procedure adopted for each experiment. The execution
of the experiments is automated and supervised by a controller program, such as indicated
by Figure 3.1. The controller injects the faults, starts/stops the SUT, and reboot the ma-
chines to ensure the same initial conditions for each experiment (e.g., no zombie processes,
unallocated semaphores, and shared memories are left by the previous experiment). The
steps are described in the following:
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Figure 3.1: Assessment approach.
1. Experiment setup. One fault belonging to the faultload is introduced in the SUT.
Then, the SUT is started.
2. Workload activation. The SUT is exercised with the workload. The workload
invokes the SUT with the goal of triggering the fault and activating the MUTs under
error conditions.
3. Data collection and experiment finalization. The monitoring data generated by
a MUT are saved in a file either when (i) the workload completes or (ii) a predefined
timeout expires (the timeout is established before the campaign by means of fault-free
runs of the SUT). After the files containing the data generated by the MUTs are saved
for subsequent analysis, the SUT is restored, the files are cleaned, and the machines
are rebooted before the next experiment is performed.
The Controller establishes whether a failure occurred or not upon the completion of
the experiment. The Controller analyzes both operating system-level data (e.g., pid(s) of
the process(es) executing the SUT, core dumps), and workload -level data (e.g., the output
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Figure 3.2: Labeling and Error Clustering.
generated by the SUT and the response time) to establish the type of failure out of the
adopted failure model. For example, the Controller would label as SILENT an experiment
where all the OS processes incarnating the SUT are still alive after the completion of the
experiment, but no function has been delivered within the expected timeout.
3.2.4 Labeling and Error Clustering
In order to make the collected data suitable for the analysis, the methodology provides two
further steps, i.e., labeling and error clustering, as shown in Figure 3.2.
Labeling aims to label each notification generated by a MUT into no error-reporting,
i.e., the notification does not report an error, and error-reporting, i.e., the notification
reports an error; the labeled data allow the evaluation of the metrics provided by the
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proposed methodology.
Error clustering aims to classify the types of error reported by each MUT, and to infer
the error model of the MUT in the related SUT, i.e., the types of error that the MUT is
able to report into the related SUT. The clustered error data allow obtaining insights about
the error behavior exposed by a SUT according to the considered MUT. Once the error
model of a MUT is defined, all its error notifications are labeled with the type of reported
error. In addition, this step also includes the labeling of each error notification with its
source function and component, i.e., the function that generates the error notification and
the component of the SUT the function belong to, respectively, which are provided by the
error notification.
3.2.5 Error Propagation Graph
The dataset that contains for each fault injection experiment (i) the number of errors of
each type reported by a MUT in each component of the related SUT during the experiment,
(ii) the type of injected fault, (iii) the ODC class the fault belongs to, and (iv) the type
of failure occurred in the SUT, has to be generated from the dataset obtained during the
experimental campaign. For each MUT of a SUT, a dataset of this type is generated in
order to evaluate how the errors propagate through the components of the considered SUT.
The information contained in these datasets allows to build non-exhaustive directed
graphs, one for each ODC class, that summarizes the error propagation phenomena obtained
during the experimental campaign in a SUT, named Error Propagation graphs. These
graphs have been partially inspired by the ones proposed in [105]. It should be noted that
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the error propagation graphs are considered non-exhaustive because they are built based
on the errors detected by a MUT, i.e., the errors that led to at least an error notification to
be generated by the MUT in the components of the SUT. Therefore, the errors undetected
by the MUT cannot be considered. Each directed graph is characterized by three types
of node: (i) the fault type nodes, i.e., the nodes that represent the fault types that belong
to the considered ODC class, (ii) the component nodes, i.e., the nodes that represent the
components, or groups of components, of the considered SUT, and (iii) the failure nodes,
i.e., two nodes that represent the occurrence or not of a failure in the considered SUT.
Noteworthy, the node that represents the component where the faults have been injected
during the experimental campaign, named faulty component here, is divided in two nodes:
• faulty component-IMMEDIATE that represents the function where a fault has
been injected;
• faulty component-QUICK that represents the remaining part of the faulty com-
ponent.
An example of error propagation graph for a specific ODC class and MUT of a SUT
is shown in Figure 3.3. The absolute and probability values in a fault type node indicate
the number of fault of this type for which the considered MUT have generated at least an
error notification and the probability to have an error notification from the MUT about this
type of fault, i.e., the ratio between the before mentioned absolute value and the number
of faults of the considered ODC class for which the MUT has generated at least an error
notification, respectively.
Chapter 3. Software Error Analysis: a data-driven methodology 60
Figure 3.3: Example of directed graph with failure nodes.
Differently, the absolute and probability values in a component node refer to the errors
generated as a consequence of a fault of the considered ODC class and for which the MUT
has generated at least an error notification, named MUT reported errors here. Precisely,
the absolute value indicates the number of MUT reported errors that propagate through the
related component, i.e., the number of MUT reported errors for which only the component,
or almost the component and the faulty component at the same time, has generated at
least an error notification; while the probability value indicates the probability that a MUT
reported error propagates only through the component, or almost through the component
and the faulty component at the same time, i.e., at least an error notification is generated
for it by the component, or almost by the component and the faulty component at the
same time, which is obtained as ratio between the before mentioned absolute value and
the number of MUT reported errors. In particular, the absolute and probability values in
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the faulty component-IMMEDIATE node indicate the number of MUT reported errors for
which at least an error notification has been generated by the function where the fault has
been injected, named faulty function, and the probability that at least an error notification
is generated for a MUT reported error by the faulty function, which is obtained as ratio
between the before mentioned absolute value and the number of MUT reported errors. Sim-
ilarly, the absolute and probability values in the faulty component-QUICK node indicate the
number of MUT reported errors for which at least an error notification has been generated
by the other non-faulty functions, i.e., all the function excluding the faulty function, and
the probability that at least an error notification is generated for a MUT reported error
by one these non-faulty functions, which is obtained as ratio between the before mentioned
absolute value and the number of MUT reported errors. It should be noted, that in case
of component nodes that represent a group of nodes, these nodes only refer to the MUT
reported errors that are exclusively reported by them at the same time, or almost by them
and the faulty component at the same time.
Regarding the arcs, the absolute and probability values on an arc from a fault type node
and a component node indicate the number of fault of this type that led to a MUT re-
ported error notified by the component, i.e., the number of MUT reported errors, generated
as consequence of a fault of this type, that propagated through the component, and the
probability that a MUT reported errors, generated as consequence of a fault of this type,
propagates through the component, which is obtained as ratio between the before mentioned
absolute value and the absolute value of the considered fault type node, respectively. In the
same way, the absolute value on an arc from two component nodes indicates the number of
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MUT reported errors that propagate form the first component to the second one, i.e., the
MUT reported errors for which at least an error notification has been generated in both
the components at the same time, while probability value indicates probability that a MUT
reported error propagates from the first component to the second one, i.e., the probability
that a MUT reported errors lead to at least an error notification to be generated in both the
components at the same time, which is defined as the ratio between the before mentioned
absolute value and the number of MUT reported errors. Finally, the absolute value on an
arc from a component node to the FAILURE node indicates the number of MUT reported
errors, which have been reported by the component, that have led to a failure in the con-
sidered SUT (the break down of the failure is reported in the square brackets); while the
probability value represents the probability that a MUT reported errors, which have been
reported by the component, have led to a failure in the considered SUT, which is obtained
as ratio between the before mentioned absolute value and the absolute value related to the
node component. In the same way, the absolute value on an arc from a component node
to the NO-FAILURE node indicates the number of MUT reported errors, which have been
reported by the component, that have not lead to a failure in the considered SUT; while
the probability value represents the probability that a MUT reported errors, which have
been reported by the component, have not led to a failure in the considered SUT, which
is obtained as ratio between the before mentioned absolute value and the absolute value
related to the node component.
It should be noted that the propagation phenomena showed in the error propagation
graphs are almost three-level propagation phenomena. The assumption here is that the error
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reported in the faulty component are the cause of the errors reported by other components,
as well as the error reported by the faulty function is the cause of the error reported by the
non-faulty functions of the faulty component. Therefore, for example, if error notifications
are generated by the faulty function, by a non-faulty function of the faulty component, and
by another component of the considered SUT, e.g., COMPONENT X, at the same time, it is
possibly to assume that the error has been propagated from the faulty function to the non-
faulty function of the faulty component, and from the latter to the other component, than
an arc form the faulty component-IMMEDIATE node to the faulty component-QUICK node
can be drown, as well as an arc form the faulty component-QUICK to the COMPONENT
X node.
Differently, nothing can be said about the causality between the notification generated
in two non-faulty components since no information are available on how the components
interact each other, and which requires a deep knowledge of the system. Therefore, if an
error notification is generated in two non-faulty components, no directed arcs can be drawn
between the components.
Noteworthy, it is also possible to build a graph by considering many MUTs at the same
time. In this case, the concept of MUT reported errors is substituted with the MUTs
reported errors, which represents the errors generated as a consequence of a fault of the
considered ODC class and for which the at least one of the considered MUTs has generated
at least an error notification. In addition, another node can be also introduced in the error
propagation graph, i.e., the detection node, which allows to understand what MUTs have
reported/detected the errors, as shown in Figure 3.4. The absolute values on an arc from a
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Figure 3.4: Example of directed graph with detection node.
component node to the DETECTION node indicates the number of MUTs reported errors,
which have been reported by the component, that have been reported by each MUTs; while
the percentage value represents the same information in percentage terms, which is obtained
as ratio between the before mentioned absolute value and the absolute value related to the
node component, multiplied by 100.
3.3 Evaluation Metrics
The output of each experiment consists of the (i) type of fault induced in the SUT, (ii)
type of failure (if any), and (iii) the files containing the monitoring data generated by each
MUT. Each entry in these files is labeled as error- or no error- reporting, as well as with
the source component and function, and the type of reported error in the entry.
The data collected through the proposed method make it possible to evaluate the MUTs
implemented by a system and to quantify their ability at reporting useful notifications in
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face of failures, as well as to evaluate the error behavior exhibited by the SUT they allow
to infer. The evaluation metrics are presented in the following.
3.3.1 Recall and Precision
The files containing the data generated by a MUT during the injection experiments, are
attributed to four disjoint sets, i.e., true negative (TN), true positive (TP), false negative
(FN) and false positive (FP). For example, the false negative set contains the files of a MUT
that do not report any failure notification even if, according to the controller, a failure was
actually caused by the injected fault. Similarly, the false positive (FP) set contains the
files that report a failure even if no failure occurred during the experiment according to the
controller.
Recall (R) and precision (P) of a MUT are computed based on the cardinality of TN,
TP, FN and FP. In the context of this study, R measures the probability that a failure is
reported by the MUT, i.e., R = |TP |/(|TP |+ |FN |); P measures the probability that a file
reporting a failure corresponds to an actual failure, i.e., P = |TP |/(|TP |+ |FP |).
3.3.2 Failure Coverage
The overall recall of each MUT has to be broken down by failure type, i.e., CRASH, SILENT,
ERRATIC, in each SUT in order to evaluate the failure coverage of the MUT. The failure
coverage of a MUT with respect to a type of failure is the ratio between the number of
failures of this type reported by the MUT in the considered SUT, and the total number
of failures of the same type observed during the campaign in the SUT. For example, let
|FAILURESSUT,X | be the number of failures of type X occurred in the target system
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SUT , and |FAILURESMUT,SUT,X | be the number of failures of type X reported by the
monitoring technique MUT in the target system SUT , the failure coverage of the monitoring
technique MUT in the target system SUT with respect to the failure of type X is:
FCMUT,SUT,X = |FAILURESMUT,SUT,X |/|FAILURESSUT,X |.
Failure coverage provides a big-picture of the failure reporting capability of the MUTs.
3.3.3 Error Determination Degree
The dataset that contains for each fault injection experiment (i) the number of errors of
each type reported by a MUT of a SUT in the experiment, (ii) the type of injected fault,
(iii) the ODC class the fault belongs to, and (iv) the type of failure occurred in the SUT,
has to be generated from the dataset obtained during the experimental campaign. For
each MUT of a SUT, a dataset of this type is created in order to evaluate the ability of
the error notifications generated by a MUT of a SUT to pinpoint the fault type, the ODC
class, and the failure type, related to those error notifications. It should be noted that each
of these datasets considers only the experiments where the MUT has reported almost one
error notifications.
The Error Determination Degree (EDD) metric is proposed to evaluate these abilities
of a MUT. In particular, the Error Determination Degree of a MUT of a SUT with respect
to the fault type, the ODC class, or the failure type, represents the ability of the error
notifications generated by the MUT to pinpoint the fault type, the ODC class, or the failure
type, respectively, related to those error notifications. Precisely, the EDD of a MUT of a
SUT with respect to X, i.e., the fault type, the ODC class, or the failure type, is defined as
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the correct classification rate of a classifier that has analyzed the dataset generated for the
MUT of the SUT by means of a k-fold cross-validation process, and considering the number
of errors of each type reported by the MUT as features and X as class to predict. The closer
the value to 100.00% the higher is the ability of the MUT to suggest the X related to the
error notifications the MUT has generated during the experimental campaign. Noteworthy,
the classifier used for the evaluation of EDD, as well as the number of folds to consider for
the cross validation, have to be the same for Each MUT of each SUT in order to perform
a comparison.
3.3.4 Error Propagation Reportability
The Error Propagation Reportability (EPR) metric is proposed to evaluate the ability of
each MUT of a SUT to report the error propagation phenomena in the related SUT with
respect to a specific ODC class. In particular, considering the fault related to the considered
ODC class, let |ENFC| be the number of MUT reported errors that have at least an error
notification generated in the faulty component of the considered SUT, i.e., the sum of
the absolute value on the arcs from a fault type node to a faulty component node (either
IMMEDIATE or QUICK ) on the error propagation graph, and |MRE| the number of
MUT Reported Errors of the considered SUT, i.e., the sum of the absolute values of the
fault nodes on the graph, the EPR of the monitoring technique MUT of the target system
SUT with respect to the ODC class X is defined as:
EPRMUT,SUT,X = |ENFC|/|MRE|
The closer the value to 1 the higher is the ability of the MUT to properly report the
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error propagation phenomena occurred in the SUT during the experimental campaign.
Differently, a low value for this MUT suggests that there is the need of add some EDMs
into the components of the considered SUT, in order to improve the ability of the MUT at
reporting the propagation of errors.
It should be noted that in some cases the assumption that all the errors are expected
to generate at least an error notification in the faulty component can be not valid. For
example, when a component that reports the error works as a detector of the faulty compo-
nent. Therefore, the proposed EPR metric might provide a not accurate value in this case.
However, it can be successfully used to decide where to place EDMs, and, more important,
as a comparative metric between MUTs. Indeed, if a MUT reports the error propagation
path that is unreported by another MUT (with a lower EPR), this suggests that the second
one actually exhibited a low ability at reporting error propagation paths.
3.3.5 Orthogonality of the MUTs
Given a SUT, the set of failures of the same type, i.e., CRASH, SILENT, ERRATIC, is
broken down into a number of disjoint subsets, which are detailed in the following:
• NONE: the failures reported by no MUT.
• MUT∗i : the failures reported exclusively by the MUTi (i=1. . . n, where n is the total
number of MUTs of the SUT, such as depicted by Figure 3.1). Let MUTi be the set
of failures reported by the MUTi: MUT
∗
i = MUTi −
⋃n
k=1 MUTk, where k6= i.
• (MUTi·MUTj)∗: the failures reported by both MUTi and MUTj but not by any other
MUT, i.e., (MUTi·MUTj)∗ = (MUTi ∩MUTj) −
⋃n
k=1 MUTk, where i,j=1. . . n, i 6=j,
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k6= i, j.
• ALL: the failures that are reported by all the MUTs;
Figure 3.5 shows a graphical representation of the sets in the case of three MUTs. For
example, MUTi=MUT
∗
i ∪ (MUTi·MUTj)∗ ∪ (MUTi·MUTk)∗ ∪ ALL.
For each set the percentage of reported failures, i.e., the cardinality of the set
divided by the total number of failures in percentage terms, are computed. These mea-
surements provide strong insights into the effectiveness of the MUTs. For example, a large
number of failures belonging to the NONE set, suggests the need for improving the detec-
tion mechanisms implemented by the SUT. Even more important, the analysis of the sets
(MUTi·MUTj)∗ allows understanding if the MUTs can complement at reporting failures.
3.3.6 Dissimilarity of the Monitoring Data
The above described evaluation metrics is complemented with measurements of dissimi-
larity of the data generated by the MUTs during the experiments. The dissimilarity aims
to measure the degree of difference among the data produced by a MUT in response to
different failures. It should be noted that, in spite of a high recall, a MUT might generate
Figure 3.5: Representation of the MUTs comparison approach.
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similar notifications under different failures. The data contained in few failure notifications
could be more effective when compared to the data that are repeated across many notifi-
cations, which indicate generic error reporting. The dissimilarity of the monitoring data
provides insights into the suitability of a MUT for manual failure inspection, since dissimilar
notifications help to discriminate between the failures occurred in the SUT.
The dissimilarity through the log.entropy scheme is measured. Log.entropy is a well-
established term weighting scheme in the information retrieval domain [106, 107]. Term
weighting assesses features, such as frequency, rarity and randomness of textual information
across a collection of documents (i.e., the files containing the monitoring data in this study).
Log.entropy is used because it allows gaining quantitative insights into unstructured data
with no specific assumptions regarding semantics and patterns they might contain. In this
respect, log.entropy allows potential analysts to measure the dissimilarity of the notifications
even without a deep knowledge of the MUT.
As described in Section 3.2.3, the data generated by the MUTs are saved into distinct
files at the end of each experiment. Given a MUT, let D (i.e., the documents set) denote
set of files produced by the MUT during the experiments where it reported the occurrence
of a failure. Term weighting is performed by generating a term-document matrix before-
hand. The term-document is a |T | × |D| matrix, where |T | is the total number of distinct
terms occurring across the collection of documents in D, and |D| the total number of doc-
uments (again, log files in this study). A term is a sequence of characters separated by
one or more whitespaces. Each element xi,j of the term-document matrix, with 1 ≤ i ≤ |T |
and 1 ≤ j ≤ |D|, represents the number of times the term i occurs in the document j.
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Log.entropy quantifies the importance of a term (i) within each document, and (ii) across
all the documents in D. The value of log.entropyj for a given document j is estimated as
follows:
log.entropyj =
√√√√ |T |∑
i=1
(ei · log2(1 + xi,j))2 (3.1)
ei = 1 +
1
log2(|D|)
·
|D|∑
j=1
pij log2(pij) (3.2)
where ei, with 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1, is computed according to Equation 3.2 (where pi,j = 1 +
xi,j/
∑|D|
j=1 xij), and represents the entropy value of the term i across the documents in the
set D. The occurrence of the term i in the document j, i.e., xi,j , is scaled by log2 in the
log.entropy technique.
Log.entropy is a positive numeric score computed for each document: the smaller the
value of log.entropy, the higher the chance the document contains terms that are strongly
repeated in D. As it can be inferred from Equations 3.2, terms that occur regularly across
the document set have a small weight. For example, a term occurring the same number of
times across all the documents would be weighted 0.
In the context of this study, it would be desirable that each file generated by a MUT
exhibited a large log.entropy score, which denotes that the file contains very specific notifi-
cations (i.e., not frequently repeated across the documents set) for a given failure, that is,
the MUT generates dissimilar data. At the other end of the spectrum, a small log.entropy
score denotes generic reporting (similar data).
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It should be noted that each of these metrics allows to provide insights related to the
research questions addressed in this dissertation. In particular, the analysis of the Error
Propagation Reportability and of the Error Determination Degree allows to understand the
suitability of the monitoring techniques for the characterization of the error behavior of the
considered system (RQ1 ). The analysis of the Error Propagation Graphs allows to infer the
potential locations for EDMs and ERMs (RQ2 ). In addition, the study of all the metrics
allows to characterize the failure and error reporting ability of the monitoring techniques
(RQ3). Finally, the study of the MUTs orthogonality, and of the EPR and EDD obtained
by combining the MUTs, allows to assess if the combination of MUTs can be useful (RQ4 ).
Chapter 4
Target Systems, Techniques, and
Datasets
This chapter provides the description of the target systems, i.e., the Systems Under Test (SUTs), and
the target monitoring techniques, i.e., the Monitoring techniques Under Test (MUTs), that are con-
sidered in this dissertation. The reference SUTs are two real-world critical industrial systems in the
Air Traffic Control (ATC) domain, i.e., a communication middleware (SUT1) and an arrival man-
ager (SUT2). Both the SUTs implemented three monitoring techniques, i.e., event logging (MUT1),
assertion checking (MUT2) and rule-based logging (MUT3), which represent the reference MUTs
in this dissertation. Also details about the conducted experimental campaign, i.e., the workloads,
faultloads, Labeling and Error Clustering processes, are provided. Finally, the obtained datasets are
detailed at the end of the chapter.
4.1 The Reference SUTs
The proposed methodology has been applied on the MUTs implemented by two real-world
critical industrial systems in the Air Traffic Control (ATC) domain, where monitoring
is strongly recommended.
The SUTs are a communication middleware (MW or SUT1) and a standalone ATC
program called arrival manager (AM or SUT2), described in the Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2,
respectively. A controller has been developed in order to supervise the injection experiments
for each SUT. The experimental framework consists of Virtual Machines (VMs), which run
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the SUTs. The VMs are hosted on machines equipped with Intel i7-2670QM CPU, 6 GB
of RAM, running a Fedora 16 OS installation. Each VM is based on the Red Hat 5 EL OS
and it is configured with 4 cores, and with 2GB of RAM.
4.1.1 Communication Middleware
The SUT1 is a communication middleware for the integration and the interoperability of
heterogeneous critical systems, such as ATC and crisis management applications. For exam-
ple, the middleware is used to integrate flight data processors (FDPs) and controller working
positions (CWPs) in the ATC domain. The access to the middleware and its source code
has been granted within the MINIMINDS academic-industrial project1. Figure 4.1 shows
the SUT1 and the experimental framework deployed to generate the monitoring data. The
framework includes the adapting layers, which allow legacy applications to invoke the SUT1
and its services. SUT1 ensures the communication between legacy applications, according
to the publish-subscribe paradigm; its source code consists of 796,353 lines of C code.
Figure 4.1: SUT1: Experimental framework.
1http://www.cosmiclab.it
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In details, the SUT1 is composed by 8 components, i.e., abstraction, which represents the
abstraction level between the middleware and the operating system, api, which represents
the API exposed to applications, database, which bridges data from middleware to a DBMS
and vice versa, ddsi2, which provides QoS-driven real-time networking based on multiple
reliable multicast channels, durability, which provides fault-tolerant storage for both state
data as well as persistent settings, kernel, which represents the core of the middleware,
spliced, which is responsible for creating and initialising the database which is used to
manage the middleware data, and user, which represents an intermediate level between the
api and the kernel module.
4.1.2 Arrival Manager
The SUT2 is the ATC arrival manager. This system manages the arrivals of flight in a given
airspace. The arrival manager implements two tasks, which are represented by Figure 4.2.
The sequencing process assists a human operator at optimizing the runway capacity;
the metering process regulates/manages the flow of aircrafts entering the airspace. The
arrival manager continuously computes an arrival sequences list (ASL) and times for flights
based on different parameters, such as the landing rate and the spacing requirements for
flights arrivals.
The system is multi-process and multi-thread, and adopts an Oracle Database2 to store
the data. The high-level architecture of the SUT2 is shown by Figure 4.2. The access to
the source code of the system, which is composed by 40,396 lines of C++ code, has been
granted in the context of an industrial partnership with the developers of the system.
2http://www.oracle.com/
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Figure 4.2: SUT2: Experimental framework.
4.2 Workloads
Controlled testbeds have been setup to exercise both the SUTs. It is worth noting that even
if the experiments are conducted in a controlled environment, adopted software emulate a
real-world scenario in order to collect representative monitoring data.
The experimental framework for the SUT1, i.e., the communication middleware, is com-
posed by real-world ATC prototypes, which are developed by the industrial partners of
the MINIMINDS project, to collect representative monitoring data. It is worth noting
that adopted software (i.e., middleware, adapters and applications) emulate a production
ATC installation. The experimental framework includes a number of Off-The-Shelf (OTS)
components, such as the JBoss application server3 and the Hypersonic Database4. The
workload of the SUT1 is implemented by two ATC legacy applications (shown by Figure
4.1). The applications exchange flight data through the communication middleware. The
considered applications are (i) a FDP that generates flight data (i.e., the data that describe
a flight, such as arrival and departure time, flight trajectory) and publishes the data on
3http://www.jboss.org
4http://hsqldb.org
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the communication middleware, and (ii) a web-based CWP that receives the data from the
middleware and displays the flight information on a web console.
The experimental framework for the SUT2, i.e., the arrival manager, represents a real-
world scenario, which has been deployed in conjunction with the developers of the system,
to collect representative monitoring data. The workload is represented by a test suite that
emulates the nominal usage of the system during the operations. The test suite consists of
a sequence of test cases that are adopted by the developers to exercise the SUT2 by means
of representative requests. The test cases (that are shown by Figure 4.2, i.e., Test Tool)
verify the behavior of the system under insert- and delete-flight orders submitted to the
SUT2.
4.3 The Reference MUTs
Both the considered SUTs natively implement event logging (EL or MUT1) and as-
sertion checking (AC or MUT2) in order to generate events of interest and failure
data during the execution. Furthermore, the code instrumentation technique proposed in
[64], called rule-based logging (RB or MUT3), has been implemented into both the
SUTs before the experimental campaign. Event logging, assertion checking, and source
code instrumentation represent widely-established direct monitoring techniques in critical
industrial systems.
4.3.1 Event Logging
Log-based techniques consist in collecting and analyzing event log files produced by the
system, where available. Event logs contain valuable human-readable information to gain
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insights into regular and anomalous system activities. Well known logging frameworks are
UNIX Syslog [108] and Microsoft Event Logging [109]. The SUTs implement a variety of
built-in mechanisms to generate the event logs.
The SUT1 adopts a variety of procedures to generate the events in the log, which are
reported by the leftmost column of Table 4.1. Figure 4.35 (line 4 ) shows a fragment of
logging code that adopts the OS REPORT procedure. The generation of the event is triggered
by an if statement (line 4): in particular, a warning is reported if no name is specified for
a topic.
Table 4.1: Logging procedures implemented by the SUT1.
logging
occurrences
occurrence with
procedure error message
OS REPORT 2,126 331
printf 1,713 79
snprintf 863 82
fprintf 485 21
DLRL Except THROW 467 189
sprintf 277 1
NN ERROR 67 43
OS DEBUG 45 32
YY 35 25
cfg error 35 35
NN FATAL 34 12
yyerror 30 30
gapi errorReport 15 15
tot. occurrences 6,192 895
Total 6,192 logging instructions have been identified in the SUT1, with a density 0.78%
as shown in TABLE 4.2, i.e., 1 logging instruction every 129 lines of code. The second
column of Table 4.1 reports the number of logging instructions by procedure. It is worth
5In the Figures showing snippets of code (sample monitoring data), omitted has been used in place of
the lines of code (notifications), which have not been reported in the dissertation.
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1 Communication Middleware (v topic.c, line 480)
2 //omitted
3 if (name == NULL) {
4 OS REPORT(OS WARNING, ”v topicNew”, 0,
5 ”Topic ’?’ is not created. No name specified (NULL).”);
6 r e t u r n n u l l ;
7 }
8 //omitted
Figure 4.3: Example of error logging (SUT1).
1 Communication Middleware (spliced.c, line 614)
2 //omitted
3 if (createResult == os resultSuccess) {
4 o s _ s h a r e d M e m o r y R e g i s t e r U s e r P r o c e s s ( s p l i c e d G e t D o m a i n N a m e ( ) , info−>p r o c I d ) ;
5 OS REPORT 2(OS INFO, OSRPT CNTXT SPLICED,
6 0, ”Started service %s with args %s”, info-¿name, args);
7 }
8 //omitted
Figure 4.4: Example of informational logging (SUT1).
noting that event logging is also used to report informational events, such as the code
snippet in Figure 4.4 that notifies the start of a service of the middleware. Total 895 out of
6,192 logging instructions contain an error message in the SUT1. The rightmost column of
Table 4.1 shows the breakdown of the logging instructions containing an error message by
procedure.
Similar considerations apply to the SUT2. Again, it has been observed that the event
logging mechanism consists of a variety of procedures. The distribution of the logging pro-
cedures is shown in Table 4.3, while Figure 4.5 reports an example of the most recurring
Table 4.2: MUTs density for each case study. EL-error* denotes the percentage of logging
instructions containing an error message out of the total of logging instructions.
SUT1 SUT2
(796,353 LOC) (40,396 LOC)
EL 0.78% 1.98%
EL-error* 14.45% 11.39%
AC 0.99% 0.18%
RB 0.36% 8.59%
Chapter 4. Target Systems, Techniques, and Datasets 80
Table 4.3: Logging procedures implemented by the SUT2.
logging
occurrences
occurrence with
procedure error message
DIAG 493 69
Log 115 2
sprintf 71 14
Diagnostic 66 3
TRACE 39 0
printf 15 3
tot. occurrences 799 91
logging procedure. The SUT2 contains 799 logging instructions, with a density of 1.98%,
i.e., 1 logging instruction every 51 lines of code. Total 91 logging instruction contain an
error message, such as indicated by the rightmost column of Table 4.3.
1 Arrival Manager (CSeqUtl.cpp, line 306)
2 //omitted
3 if ( 0 == pAerodromes ){
4 sDiag.Format(”searchForAerodrome(), aerodrome[%s] : DB CONNECT ERROR ”, pAdCode );
5 DIAG(sDiag);
6 //omitted
Figure 4.5: Example of logging instruction (SUT2).
4.3.2 Assertion Checking
Assertion checking is based on the use of assertions, i.e., code statements that check invari-
ant properties of a given program and produce an alert if one of the properties is violated at
runtime [61]. Examples are range checking, where the assertions perform boundary checks
on the values of program variables [62], and specification of function interfaces [61], where
the assertions perform checks on preconditions and postconditions of functions. Most of the
assertions implemented by the SUTs belong to the specification of function interfaces class.
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1 Communication Middleware (v writer.c, line 1670)
2 //omitted
3 v _ w r i t e r v _ w r i t e r N e w ( v _ p u b l i s h e r p , c o n s t c _ c h a r ∗ name , v _ t o p i c topic ,
4 v _ w r i t e r Q o s qos , c _ b o o l e n a b l e ){
5 //omitted
6 assert(p != NULL);
7 assert(C TYPECHECK(p, v publisher));
8 assert(C TYPECHECK(topic, v topic));
9 //omitted
Figure 4.6: Example of assert instructions (SUT1).
1 Arrival Manager (STUB HMI MTCD.cpp, line 582)
2 //omitted
3 v o i d H M I _ M T C D : : s e t _ T h d I n f o ( C D a t a b a s e ∗ pUserDB , t T h d I n f o ∗ p T h d I n f o )
4 {
5 assert(pUserDB != 0);
6 assert(pThdInfo != 0);
7 //omitted
Figure 4.7: Example of assert instructions (SUT2).
Examples of assertions implemented by the SUT1 are shown by Figure 4.6. The assert
instructions (lines 6-8) check the value/type of two variables: they evaluate to TRUE when
the internal state of the monitored program is correct, FALSE otherwise. The assert
statement at line 6 generates a warning if the p is NULL; lines 7-8 generate an alert if
C TYPECHECK returns FALSE.
Examples of assertions implemented by the SUT2 are shown by the snippets in Figure
4.7. The assert instructions (lines 5-6) check the values of two program variables: they
evaluate to TRUE when the internal state of the monitored program is correct, FALSE
otherwise. For example, the considered assert statement generate a warning if the pUserDB
and pThdInfo variables value is equal to 0.
Both the examples taken from SUT1 and SUT2 verify a precondition of a function, i.e.,
v writerNew and set ThdInfo, respectively. The source code of the SUT1 contains around
7,954 assert instructions, with a density of 0.99%, i.e., 1 assertion every 101 lines of code.
The source code of the SUT2 contains 72 assert instructions, with a density of 0.18%, i.e.,
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1 assertion every 561 lines of code.
4.3.3 Source Code Instrumentation
Source code instrumentation is based on the insertion of specific instructions into the code of
a software system with the aim of monitoring its behavior. The technique proposed in [64],
i.e., the rule-based logging, has been used to instrument both SUT1 and SUT2. Rule-
based logging consists of a number of rules, which drive the placement of the monitoring
instructions. For example, the Service STart (SST) and Service ENd (SEN) rules aim
to trace the start and the end of a function; similarly, the Interaction STart (IST) and
Interaction ENd (IEN) rules suggest how to trace the start and the end of a function call.
For example, Figure 4.8 shows a function that has been instrumented with the rule-
based logging technique. The function, i.e., CASDI t, belongs to the SUT2. It can be noted
that the SST (line 8) and SEN (line 14) instruction have been introduced to trace the start
and the end of the function, while IST (line 10) and IEN (line 12) are placed before and
after the invocation of SendOrdLst.
The instruction logAnEvent consists of three fields that indicate (i) the event introduced
1 Arrival Manager (CAsdIt.cpp, line 37)
2 //omitted
3 C A S D I _ t : : C A S D I _ t ( C A S F D o c ∗ p D o c ) :
4 m _ b M e s s a g e I n Q u e u e ( f a l s e ) , m _ n D i a g n o s t i c L e v e l ( 0 ) ,
5 m _ n T i m e A s s i g n T y p e ( 0 ) , m _ n T i m e ( 0 ) ,
6 m _ n Y e a r ( 0 ) , m _ n M o u n t h ( 0 ) , m _ n D a y (0 )
7 {
8 logAnEvent( SST, CASDI t, CAsdIt.cpp);
9 //omitted
10 logAnEvent( IST, SendOrdLst, CAsdIt.cpp );
11 S e n d O r d L s t ( ) ;
12 logAnEvent( IEN, SendOrdLst, CAsdIt.cpp );
13 //omitted
14 logAnEvent( SEN, CASDI t, CAsdIt.cpp);
15 }
16 //omitted
Figure 4.8: Example of rule-based instructions (SUT2).
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in the source code, (ii) the monitored function and (iii) the monitored module. The events
generated by the logAnEvent instruction are collected by a dedicated monitoring frame-
work, named LogBus [64], which generates error events. For instance, if the SEN (IEN)
event is not generated within an expected time since the observation of the correspond-
ing SST (IST), a Service Error (Interaction Error) is generated by the LogBus: the error
indicates that a function (or a call to a function) failed to terminate within the expected
timeout. The SUT1 contains 2,895 rule-based logging instructions, with a density of 0.36%,
i.e., 1 instruction every 275 lines of code, while the SUT2 contains around 3,470 rule-based
logging instructions, with a density of 8.59%, i.e., 1 instruction every 12 lines of code.
Table 4.2 summarizes the density of each MUT in both the SUTs. For example, the
density of the logging instructions in the SUT1 is 0.78%, i.e., (6, 192/796, 353) · 100. The
density of assertions and rule-based logging is rather different across the SUTs. It should
be noted that for SUT1 only the kernel component implements the rule-based logging.
4.4 Falutloads
The datasets considered in this dissertation have been obtained by running each SUT under
a representative faultload. The faultloads have been generated by the SAFE6 tool [110].
The tool parses the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) of the SUT (generated by the compiler
frontend) and automatically searches for all the locations in the source code where each fault
type reported by Table 3.1 can be injected. As a result, the greater the size and complexity
6http://www.critiware.com/safe.html
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of the source code, the larger the number of possible injectable faults that are inferred by
the tool. The injection is accomplished by means of changes of the source code, which
emulate the programming mistake. For each fault, SAFE generates a .patch file containing
the lines of code that will be subtracted and added to the SUT in order to emulate the fault.
It should be noted that the faultload has been generated by means of changes of the source
code. The rationale behind this choice is the availability of the source code of the SUTs
that have been considered in this dissertation. However, the same goal can be reached by
using a different tool or apporach, such as binay-level [111] and interface-level [112] fault
injection that allow fault injection also if the source code of the SUTs is not available.
The faultload of the SUT1 is composed by 12,733 faults. Overall 3,159 faults caused
the failure of the SUT1.
Table 4.4 presents the total number of failures by fault and failure type. For example,
the value 185 reported by the cell (MFC, CRASH ) indicates that 185 algorithm faults,
i.e., ALG, of type missing function call, i.e., MFC, caused a CRASH failure. Differently,
the value 1,482 reported by the cell (total, CRASH ) of the ALG ODC class indicates that
1,482 algorithm faults caused a CRASH failure. A closer look into the data collected by the
controller of the experiments revealed that the causes of ERRATIC failures can be divided
as follows: abnormal termination of one (more) internal service thread(s) of the SUT1 (39%),
misconfigurations and bad setting of the quality of service parameters (18%), inability of the
SUT1 at properly executing all the publish requests of the FDP (14%), interaction issues
between the publishing and the core module of the SUT1 (12%), data delivery issues (5%),
other minor causes (12%). It is worth noting that the dataset generated in the SUT1 has
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Table 4.4: Failures by fault and failure type (SUT1).
failure
fault
CRASH SILENT ERRATIC
tot.
ODC type faults
ALG
MFC 185 56 41 282
MIFS 54 2 13 69
MIEB 44 6 12 62
MLPA 1,199 94 156 1,449
total 1,482 158 222 1,862
ASG
MVIV 4 0 0 4
MVAV 23 1 2 26
MVAE 627 34 57 718
WVAV 22 0 4 26
total 676 35 63 774
CHK
MIA 38 1 9 48
MLC 4 0 2 6
total 42 1 11 54
INT
WPFV 389 9 20 418
WAEP 50 1 0 51
total 439 10 20 469
tot. failures 2,639 204 316 3,159
been made publicly available7.
A faultload of total 6,597 faults has been injected in the SUT2. Overall 685 injections
caused a failure of the SUT2. Table 4.5 divides the set of failures by fault and failure
type. For example, again the value 6 reported in the cell (MFC, CRASH ) indicates that 6
algorithm faults of type missing function call caused a CRASH failure. Differently, the value
68 reported by the cell (total, CRASH ) of the ALG ODC class indicates that 68 algorithm
faults caused a CRASH failure. ERRATIC failures are mainly caused by corruptions of
timestamps at determining the arrival time of flights (49%) and database exceptions (45%);
other minor causes account for around 6% of ERRATIC failures.
7http://www.mobilab.unina.it/Datasets.htm
Chapter 4. Target Systems, Techniques, and Datasets 86
Table 4.5: Failures by fault and failure type (SUT2).
failure
fault
CRASH SILENT ERRATIC
tot.
ODC type faults
ALG
MFC 6 6 12 24
MIFS 0 0 0 0
MIEB 0 1 0 1
MLPA 62 199 258 519
total 68 206 270 544
ASG
MVIV 0 1 0 1
MVAV 0 0 0 0
MVAE 11 63 48 122
WVAV 0 0 0 0
total 11 64 48 123
CHK
MIA 1 3 0 4
MLC 0 0 0 0
total 1 3 0 4
INT
WPFV 2 4 8 14
WAEP 0 0 0 0
total 2 4 8 14
tot. failures 82 277 326 685
4.5 Labeling and Error Clustering
The files that contains the data generated by the MUTs during the fault injection exper-
iments have been analyzed through a post-mortem inspection in order to conduct the
labeling and error clustering of the data. Labeling aims to label each notification generated
by a MUT into no error-reporting, i.e., the notification does not report an error, and error-
reporting, i.e., the notification reports an error; the labeled data allow the evaluation of the
metrics provided by the proposed methodology that are related to the failure coverage of
MUTs. Differently, Error Clustering aims to classify the types of error reported by each
MUT, and to infer the error model of the MUT in the related SUT; the clustered error
data allow obtaining insights about the error behavior exposed by a SUT according to the
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considered MUT.
4.5.1 Labeling
The files that contains the data generated by the MUTs after each fault injection experiment
have been labeled into no error- and error-reporting through a post-mortem inspection.
The files have been scrutinized with the aim of pinpointing one or more error notifications
generated by the MUTs. The presence of error notifications in a given file, possibly suggests
that a failure occurred during the execution of the experiment according to the MUT that
generated the file. Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 report error notification generated by means
of event logging and assertion checking, respectively.
In order to label the event logs, the procedures that have been commonly used by several
works in the area, such as [113, 114], have been adopted. First, the content of the event logs
collected across all the experiments has been de-parameterized, i.e., variable fields, such
as IP and memory addresses, file system paths and timestamps, has been replaced with a
general token (e.g., IP ADDRESS, PATH). For example the entries
sshd[7654]: Accepted publickey for rob from 192.168.0.184
sshd[4154]: Accepted publickey for lisa from 210.140.12.6
share the same information structure, referred here as statement, once the variable fields
have been replaced with the generalized tokens:
sshd[PID]: Accepted publickey for USER from IP ADDRESS
This procedure identifies a small number of statements because most of the entries in the
event logs differ because of the variable fields. A manually categorization of each statement
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as error and no-error reporting has been performed by inspecting the source code of the
SUTs, by analyzing available documentation, and trough direct communication with the
developers. A regular expression, which catches only the statements that have been flagged
as error-reporting after the manual categorization, is applied to the event logs in order to
identify the ones reporting an error.
The post-mortem labeling of the files containing the notifications generated by means of
assertion checking and rule-based logging required a smaller effort because these techniques
1 Communication Middleware
2 Report : ERROR
3 Date : Tue Dec 10 18 : 3 4 : 5 3 2013
4 Description : Type mismatch : object type . . .
5 . . . is v_cfEle but v_cfAttr was expected
6 Node : localhost . localdomain
7 Process : Receiver <26873>
8 Thread : ddsdeamon 2b05e366c940
9 Internals : //Database : : c_checkType/c_misc . c
10 ===========================================
11 Report : ERROR
12 Date : Tue Dec 10 18 : 3 4 : 5 3 2013
13 Description : Type mismatch : object type . . .
14 . . . is v_cfEle but v_cfAttr was expected
15 Node : localhost . localdomain
16 Process : Sender <26874>
17 Thread : ddsdeamon 2b23441ae940
18 Internals : //Database : : c_checkType/c_misc . c
19
20 Arrival Manager
21 13 2 3 : 5 7 : 3 2 . 2 1 9 [ ELGT−8] CEligThdHandler : . . .
22 . . . Invalid ETO in points : H=24, M=00, S=00
23 13 2 3 : 5 7 : 3 2 . 2 1 9 [ ELGT−8] ACDPM_getEtoTime : . . .
24 . . . Invalid ETO in points : H=24, M=00, S=00
25 13 2 3 : 5 7 : 3 2 . 2 2 0 [ ELGT−8] CEligThdHandler : . . .
26 . . . Invalid ETO in points : H=24, M=00, S=00
27 13 2 3 : 5 7 : 3 2 . 2 2 0 [ ELGT−8] CEligThdHandler : . . .
28 . . . Invalid ETO in points : H=24, M=00, S=00
Figure 4.9: Example of error notifications in the event logs.
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1 Communication Middleware
2 //code/qentc : 1 2 1 2 : proxywriteraddconn : . . .
3 . . . Assertion ‘pwr−>ctopic != ( 0 ) ’ failed
4
5 Arrival Manager
6 1 9 : 5 0 : 4 7 . 2 3 7 TST : WARNING EXCEPTION , . . .
7 . . . Assertion Failed .
8 ( 26) B729EFE0 : WARN/Assert
9 Module Procedure Line Instruction
10 CDB_AM_UKR AM_TST_CMD 26 B729EFE0
Figure 4.10: Example of assertions.
are inherently conceived for error reporting. In this respect, all the files containing the
notifications generated by the assert instruction or by the LogBus monitoring framework
have been labeled as error-reporting.
It should be noted that the labeling step has been conducted in this study by a post-
mortem manual inspection of the obtained data. However, practitioners might apply dif-
ferent approaches in order to reach the same goal.
4.5.2 Error Clustering
The error notifications generated from the reference MUTs during the experimental cam-
paign have been further analyzed in order to infer the error model they consider. For each
MUT, the files that contains the error notifications have been scrutinized with the aim of
grouping together the error notifications that have common characteristics, such as same
message, same semantic, same source module/file, etc. Groups containing error notifica-
tions with similar characteristics, here named clusters, for a given MUT possibly represent
the types of error that the MUT is able to report into the target system, i.e., its error
Chapter 4. Target Systems, Techniques, and Datasets 90
1 Error notification #1
2 Description : Operation failed , couldn ’ t resolve
3 type ”kernelModule v_builtin”
4 Internals : //kernel : : v_builtinNew/v_builtin . c
5
6 Error notification #2
7 Description : Field ( null ) not found in type d_deleteData_s
8 Internals : //kernel : : v_filterNew : / v_filter . c
Figure 4.11: Example of error notifications in the event logs of SUT1
model in the target system. For example, Figure 4.11 reports two different error notifica-
tions generated by event logging in the SUT1 in different fault injection experiments. It
should be observed that, despite the error notifications contain different messages, they
have quite similar semantic since both refer to a data type problem. Therefore, they can be
potentially grouped together in a cluster that represent data type errors. Noteworthy, the
type of characteristics to consider in order to create clusters of error notifications of a MUT
changes based on the nature of the MUT. For example, the event logging often generates
notifications with a very high semantic level, as seen in Figure 4.11. Therefore, the semantic
of the notifications can be a valid feature to cluster error notifications of event logging.
Differently, assertion checking, which is based on assertions that check invariant proper-
ties of a given program and produce an alert if one of the properties is violated at runtime,
generates notifications where only the violated property and the location of the assertion
are reported, as seen in Figure 4.10. Therefore, for this MUT the type of violated properties
can be a potential feature to group together the notifications. For example, Figure 4.12
reports two different notifications generated by assertion checking in the SUT1 in different
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1 Error notification #1
2 //code/v_networkQueue . c : 4 1 4 : v_networkQueueTakeFirst . . .
. . . Assertion ‘ sample != NULL ’ failed .
3
4 Error notification #2
5 //code/v_groupInstance . c : 1 1 4 0 : v_groupInstanceInsert . . .
. . . Assertion ‘ message != NULL ’ failed .
Figure 4.12: Example of assertions in SUT1
fault injection experiments. It should be observed that, despite the notifications have differ-
ent content, both indicate that the checked variable contains a NULL value. Therefore, they
can be potentially grouped together in a cluster that represent errors due to NULL value.
Finally, the rule-based logging generates error notifications with a very low verbosity
level, where only the type of error, e.g., SER, IER, the source function and module are
reported. All the three reported information represent potential features for clustering.
However, the source module has been considered as feature to generate clusters of error
notifications of this MUT since it avoids obtaining both large number of clusters with few
occurrences (in the case of source function) and small number of clusters with many oc-
currences (in the case of error type). For example, Figure 4.13 shows two different error
notifications generated by rule-based logging in the SUT1 in different fault injection exper-
iments. The reported error notifications indicate two different errors raised in two different
functions, i.e., v kernelNew and v builtinNew, which belong to the same module of the
kernel, i.e., kernel, which represents the core module of the kernel component of the SUT1
(as a reminder, only the kernel of the SUT1 implements the rule-based logging; therefore
the reported modules are the ones that compose the kernel itself, i.e., Writer, DataReader,
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Subscriber, Publisher, Network, Topic, Group, Kernel, Message). Therefore, they can be po-
tentially grouped together in a cluster that represent errors generated in the core component
of the kernel of the SUT1.
Based on the above considerations, the clusters of error notifications have been gener-
ated, and their error model in the related SUT has been inferred. It should be noted that
the data clustering approach has been applied only to the MUTs implemented by the SUT1,
which is the most complex one (it is a distributed system deployed on two different nodes
and it is composed by 796,353 lines of code for each node; differently, the SUT2 is not a
distributed system, and it is composed by a lower number of lines of code, i.e., 40,396).
In addition, a high number of experiments in SUT1 lead to at least one error notification
generated by one of the MUTs (2,748 for SUT1 against the 957 for SUT2).
The semantic of the message, the type of check and the source kernel module of the
notifications are used as feature to group together the error notifications for MUT1, MUT2
and MUT3, respectively. Regular expressions, which catch the error notifications that
belongs to each considered cluster, has been applied to the error notifications of each MUT
in SUT1 in order to place each one in the right cluster.
Table 4.6 contains the error model considered by each MUT in the SUT1, i.e., the set
1 Error notification #1
2 SER v_kernelNew kernel
3
4 Error notification #2
5 IER v_builtinNew kernel
Figure 4.13: Example of error notifications of rule-based logging in SUT1
Chapter 4. Target Systems, Techniques, and Datasets 93
Table 4.6: Error models considered by MUTs in SUT1.
cluster errors description example of notification
event logging
e1-EL Memory errors Failed to allocate cache
e2-EL Quality of Service errors Writer not created inconsistent qos
e3-EL Unexpected result errors Operation returned ... but expected ...
e4-EL Data type errors Operation failed, couldn’t resolve type ...
e5-EL Main daemon errors Could not claim the DDSdaemon!
e6-EL Consistency errors Illegal contained object
e7-EL Topic errors Failed to produce built-in ... topic
e8-EL Mutex errors Operation failed mutex ... Invalid argument
e9-EL Kernel entities errors Create kernel entity failed
e10-EL Timeout/liveliness errors A fatal error was detected when trying to...
...register the daemon liveliness hbCheck ...
e11-EL Threads progress errors Thread ... failed to make progress
e12-EL Configuration errors Could not initialise configuration
e13-EL Other errors Maximum number of network queues exceeded ...
Expression ... is not a valid ... statement
assertion checking
e1-AC Data type errors ‘(w == c checkType(w,"v writer"))’ failed
e2-AC Unexpected value errors ‘c refCount(found) == 4’ failed.
e3-AC Forced assertion execution ‘(0)’ failed.
e4-AC NULL value errors ‘message != NULL’ failed
e5-AC Data size errors ‘c aSize(msgKList) == c aSize(instKList)’ failed
rule-base logging
e1-RB Writer module errors IER v pubGetQosRef writer
e2-RB DataReader module errors IER v subAddReader datareader
e3-RB Subscriber module errors SER v subNew subscriber
e4-RB Publisher module errors SER v pubNew publisher
e5-RB Network module errors IER v grpNotifyAwareness network
e6-RB Topic module errors IER v cfEleXPath topic
e7-RB Group module errors SER regInstance group
e8-RB Kernel module errors IER c free kernel
e9-RB Message module errors SER v msgQos new message
of obtained clusters for each MUT, and an example of error notification included in each
cluster.
During the error data clustering process, each error notifications generated by each
MUT has been also labeled with its source function and component, i.e., the function
that generates the error notification and the component of the SUT1 the function belong
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to, respectively. Indeed, the error notifications generated by each MUT in SUT1 allow
obtaining these information. For example, the Internals field in the error notifications
of the event logging provides both information, as can be seen in Figure 4.11, where the
source function of the first error notification is v builtinNew, while its source component
is kernel. Similarly, both assertions and rule-base logging provide the source function
and component of the error notification by design. For example, in Figure 4.12 the source
function and component of the first assert notification are v networkQueueTakeFirst and
v networkQueue.c, which is one of the source file of the kernel component, respectively;
while in Figure 4.13 the source function and component of the first rule-based logging
notification are v kernelNew and kernel, respectively.
It should be noted that practitioners might apply different approaches respect than the
one described here in order to reach the same goals.
4.5.3 Discussion on the Error Models
Error clustering allowed inferring the error model considered by each MUT in the SUT1.
According to the obtained clusters, each MUT considers a rather different error model in
SUT1, as it can be observed by Table 4.6. More in details, the main differences are:
• MUT1 mainly considers error types that are related to application logic of the target
systems, such as e2-EL and e7-EL that represent errors on the management of the
Quality of Service and of the Topics, respectively.
• MUT2 considers error types that are less related to application logic respect than the
ones considered by MUT1. Instead, they are related to the properties that the target
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system has to satisfy at runtime, such as e2-AC and e5-AC that represent errors
related to an unexpected value for a system variable/function result, e.g., when the
value of a system variable/function result does not satisfy a constraint, and to an
unexpected size of a system variable/function result, respectively. Exceptions are the
errors included in e3-AC, which are explicitly raised by the developers by verifying a
property that is always unsatisfied, e.g., when the control flow enters in a known error
path.
• The inferred error model for the MUT3 considers error types that are related to the
module of the kernel that reports the error, e.g., e1-RB and e2-RB, which represent the
errors raised by the Writer and DataReader kernel module, respectively. Indeed, rule-
based logging, differently from the other MUTs, aims to detect errors reflecting the
adopted system structure in terms of modules, functions/services, and interactions.
4.6 Obtained Datasets
The overall results of the campaigns are summarized from Table 4.7 to Table 4.16.
Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 report the absolute number and percentage (i.e., RF%)
of failures reported by each MUT by ODC fault and failure type in SUT1 and SUT2,
respectively. For example, the value 210 reported by the cell (EL, Absolute) - CRASH
column and ALG row - in Table 4.7 indicates that 210 out of 1,482 CRASH failures caused
by ALG faults (the number of failures by fault type is shown in Table 4.4) were detected
by the event logs, i.e., EL, of the middleware (SUT1). On the other hand, the value 38
reported by the cells (EL, Absolute) - CRASH column and ALG row - in Table 4.8, indicates
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that the event logs generated by the arrival manager (SUT2), reported 38 CRASH failures
caused by ALG faults out of 68 (again, the number of failures by fault type for the SUT2
is shown in Table 4.5). In percentage terms, the event logs generated by the SUT1 and the
SUT2 reported 14.17% (i.e., (210/1, 482) · 100) and 55.88% (i.e., (38/68) · 100) of CRASH
failures caused by ALG faults, respectively: these values are reported by the RF% column
of Table 4.7 and Table 4.8, respectively. The rightmost columns of Table 4.7 and Table 4.8
report the total number of activated faults detected by each MUT in the SUT1 and SUT2,
respectively. Similarly, the bottom rows of Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 aggregate the number
and the percentage of reported failures by type.
Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 report the absolute number of errors reported by each MUT
by fault (ODC class and type, according to Table 3.1) and failure type in SUT1, respectively.
Table 4.7: Absolute number (Absolute) and percentage of reported failures (RF %) by fault
and failure type for each MUT of SUT1.
failure
fault MUT
CRASH SILENT ERRATIC total faults
Absolute RF % Absolute RF % Absolute RF % Absolute RF %
ALG
EL 210 14.17 93 58.86 45 20.27 348 18.69
AC 916 61.80 0 0.00 0 0.00 916 49.19
RB 987 66.60 115 72.79 16 7.21 1,118 60.04
ASG
EL 130 19.23 30 85.71 16 25.40 176 22.74
AC 396 58.58 0 0.00 0 0.00 396 51.16
RB 474 70.12 22 62.86 2 3.17 498 64.34
CHK
EL 9 21.43 1 100.00 1 9.09 11 20.37
AC 29 69.05 0 0.00 0 0.00 29 53.70
RB 20 47.62 0 0.00 0 0.00 20 37.04
INT
EL 116 26.42 9 90.00 4 20.00 129 27.51
AC 263 59.91 0 0.00 0 0.00 263 56.08
RB 313 71.30 6 60.00 0 0.00 319 68.02
EL 465 17.62 133 65.20 66 20.89 664 21.02
AC 1,604 60.78 0 0.00 0 0.00 1,604 50.78tot. failures
RB 1,794 67.98 143 70.10 18 5.70 1,955 61.89
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Table 4.8: Absolute number (Absolute) and percentage of reported failures (RF %) by fault
and failure type for each MUT of SUT2.
failure
fault MUT
CRASH SILENT ERRATIC total faults
Absolute RF % Absolute RF % Absolute RF % Absolute RF %
ALG
EL 38 55.88 5 2.43 24 8.89 67 12.32
AC 19 27.90 0 0.00 21 7.78 40 7.35
RB 23 41.18 199 96.60 169 62.59 396 72.79
ASG
EL 1 9.09 1 1.56 1 2.08 3 2.44
AC 5 45.45 0 0.00 0 0.00 5 4.07
RB 10 90.91 59 92.19 47 97.92 116 94.31
CHK
EL 1 100.00 3 100.00 0 0.00 4 100.00
AC 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
RB 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
INT
EL 2 100.00 1 25.00 4 50.00 7 50.00
AC 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
RB 0 0.00 0 0.00 6 75.00 6 42.86
EL 42 51.22 10 3.61 29 8.90 81 11.82
AC 24 29.27 0 0.00 21 6.44 45 6.57tot. failures
RB 38 46.34 258 93.14 222 68.10 518 75.62
For example, the value 68 reported by the cell (MFC, EL) - ALG row - in Table 4.9 indicates
that 69 algorithm faults, i.e., ALG, generated by a missing function call, i.e., MFC, have
lead to an error in the SUT1, which has been reported by the event logging, i.e., EL; while
the value 369 reported by the cell (total, EL) indicates that 369 algorithm faults have lead to
an error in the SUT1, which has been reported by the event logging. On the other hand, the
value 1,604 reported by the cells (CRASH, EL) in Table 4.10, indicates that the assertions
generated by the communication middleware (SUT1) reported 465 errors that lead to a
CRASH failures in the SUT. The bottom rows of Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 aggregate the
number of reported errors for each MUT.
Table 4.11, Table 4.12 and Table 4.13 report the absolute number (i.e., Abs) and
percentage (i.e., %) of errors reported by MUT1, MUT2 and MUT3, respectively, by
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Table 4.9: Absolute number of reported errors by fault type for each MUT of SUT1.
error
fault
EL AC RB
ODC type
ALG
MFC 69 160 140
MIEB 26 29 31
MIFS 12 44 34
MLPA 262 684 926
total 369 917 1,131
ASG
MVAE 175 364 468
MVAV 8 14 15
MVIV 0 3 4
WVAV 12 16 17
total 195 397 504
CHK
MIA 15 27 18
MLC 2 2 2
total 17 29 20
INT
WAEP 11 36 38
WPFV 122 227 282
total 133 263 320
tot. errors 714 1,606 1,975
Table 4.10: Absolute number of reported errors by failure type for each MUT of SUT1.
error
failure EL AC RB
CRASH 465 1,604 1,794
SILENT 133 0 143
ERRATIC 66 0 18
NO FAILURE 50 2 20
tot. errors 714 1,606 1,975
fault and error type, i.e., the error clusters identified for each MUT during the error data
clustering phase (as a reminder, the error data clustering phase has been conducted only
on the SUT1). For example, the value 2 reported by the cell (MFC, Abs) - e1-EL column -
in Table 4.11 indicates that 2 out of 69 errors detected by the event logs of the middleware
(SUT1), and caused by ALG faults of type MFC (the number of the detected errors by fault
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Table 4.12: Absolute number (Abs) and percentage of reported errors (%) by fault and
error type for MUT2 of SUT1.
error
fault
e1-AC e2-AC e3-AC e4-AC e5-AC
Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs %
MFC 4 2.50 107 66.88 9 5.63 36 22.50 4 2.50
MIEB 0 0.00 10 34.48 8 27.59 11 37.93 1 3.45
MIFS 2 4.55 30 68.18 0 0.00 11 25.00 1 2.27
MLPA 90 13.16 336 49.12 67 9.80 147 21.49 48 7.02
total ALG 96 10.47 483 52.67 84 9.16 205 22.36 54 5.89
MVAE 70 19.23 166 45.60 39 10.71 70 19.23 21 5.77
MVAV 0 0.00 4 28.57 1 7.14 7 50.00 2 14.29
MVIV 0 0.00 3 100.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
WVAV 0 0.00 7 43.75 1 6.25 6 37.50 2 12.50
total ASG 70 17.63 180 45.34 41 10.33 83 20.91 25 6.30
MIA 0 0.00 15 55.56 1 3.70 11 40.74 0 0.00
MLC 0 0.00 2 100.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
total CHK 0 0.00 17 58.62 1 3.45 11 37.93 0 0.00
WAEP 16 44.44 12 33.33 5 13.89 3 8.33 0 0.00
WPFV 35 15.42 126 55.51 14 6.17 51 22.47 5 2.20
total INT 51 19.39 138 52.47 19 7.22 54 20.53 5 1.90
tot. errors 217 13.51 818 50.93 145 9.03 353 21.98 84 5.23
type and MUT is shown in Table 4.9) are of type e1-EL; while the value 47 reported by
the cell (total ALG, Abs) - e1-EL column - in Table 4.11 indicates that 47 out of 369 errors
detected by the event logs of the middleware, and caused by ALG faults (again, the number
of the detected errors by fault type and MUT is shown in Table 4.9) are of type e1-EL. On
the other hand, the value 4 reported by the cells (MFC, Abs) - e1-AC column - in Table
4.12, indicates that 4 out of 160 errors detected by the assertion checking of the middleware,
and caused by ALG faults of type MFC are of type e1-AC ; while the value 96 reported
by the cell (total ALG, Abs) - e1-AC column - in Table 4.12 indicates that 96 out of 917
errors detected by the assertion checking of the middleware, and caused by ALG faults are
of type e1-AC. Similarly, the value 63 reported by the cells (MFC, Abs) - e1-RB column -
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Table 4.13: Absolute number (Abs) and percentage of reported errors (%) by fault and
error type for MUT3 of SUT1.
error
fault
e1-RB e2-RB e3-RB e4-RB e5-RB e6-RB e7-RB e8-RB e9-RB
Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs %
MFC 63 45.00 40 28.57 29 20.71 28 20.00 29 20.71 10 7.14 55 39.29 97 69.29 0 0.00
MIEB 9 29.03 11 35.48 5 16.13 5 16.13 0 0.00 0 0.00 9 29.03 26 83.87 0 0.00
MIFS 13 38.24 8 23.53 3 8.82 3 8.82 6 17.65 2 5.88 14 41.18 23 67.65 2 5.88
MLPA 346 37.37 278 30.02 109 11.77 147 15.87 94 10.15 80 8.64 290 31.32 753 81.32 3 0,32
total ALG 431 38.11 337 29.80 146 12.91 183 16.18 129 11.41 92 8.13 368 32.54 899 79.49 5 0.44
MVAE 169 36.11 150 32.05 67 14.32 54 11.54 36 7.69 44 9.40 163 34.83 377 80.56 6 1.28
MVAV 3 20.00 6 40.00 1 6.67 0 0.00 1 6.67 1 6.67 2 13.33 12 80.00 0 0.00
MVIV 2 50.00 1 25.00 1 25.00 1 25.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 3 75.00 4 100.00 0 0.00
WVAV 5 29.41 6 35.29 1 5.88 1 5.88 1 5.88 2 11.76 6 35.29 16 94.12 0 0.00
total ASG 179 35.52 163 32.24 70 13.89 56 11.11 38 7.54 47 9.33 174 34.52 409 81.15 6 1.19
MIA 8 44.44 5 27.78 1 5.56 2 11.11 1 5.56 2 11.11 9 50.00 13 72.22 0 0.00
MLC 0 0.00 1 50.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 100.00 0 0.00
total CHK 8 40.00 6 30.00 1 5.00 2 10.00 1 5.00 2 10.00 9 45.00 15 75.00 0 0.00
WAEP 26 68.42 9 23.68 6 15.79 5 13.16 0 0.00 2 5.26 15 39.47 31 81.58 0 0.00
WPFV 62 21.99 127 45.04 32 11.35 22 7.80 11 3.90 38 13.48 71 25.18 219 77.66 0 0.00
total INT 88 27.50 136 42.50 38 11.88 27 8.44 11 3.44 40 12.50 86 26.88 250 78.13 0 0.00
tot. errors 706 35.75 642 32.51 255 12.91 268 13.57 179 9.06 181 9.16 637 32.25 157379.65 11 0.56
in Table 4.13, indicates that 63 out of 140 errors detected by the rule-based logging of the
middleware, and caused by ALG faults of type MFC are of type e1-RB ; while the value
431 reported by the cell (total ALG, Abs) - e1-RB column - in Table 4.13 indicates that
431 out of 1,131 errors detected by the rule-based logging of the middleware, and caused
by ALG faults are of type e1-RB. In percentage terms, the 2.90% (i.e., (2/69) · 100), 2.50%
(i.e., (4/160) ·100) and 45.00% (i.e., (63/140) ·100) of detected errors by MUT1, MUT2 and
MUT3, respectively, and caused by ALG faults of type MFC are of type e1-EL, e1-AC and
e1-RB, respectively: these values are reported by the % column of Table 4.11, Table 4.12
and Table 4.13, respectively. The bottom rows of Table 4.11, Table 4.12 and Table 4.13,
aggregate the number and the percentage of reported errors by type.
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Table 4.15: Absolute number (Abs) and percentage (%) of reported errors by failure and
error type for MUT2 of SUT1.
error
failure
e1-AC e2-AC e3-AC e4-AC e5-AC
Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs %
CRASH 217 13.53 817 50.94 144 8.98 353 22.01 84 5.24
SILENT 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
ERRATIC 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
NO FAILURE 0 0.00 1 50.00 1 50.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
tot. errors 217 13.51 818 50.93 145 9.03 353 21.98 84 5.23
Table 4.16: Absolute number (Abs) and percentage (%) of reported errors by failure and
error type for MUT3 of SUT1.
error
failure
e1-RB e2-RB e3-RB e4-RB e5-RB e6-RB e7-RB e8-RB e9-RB
Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs %
CRASH 633 35.28 591 32.94 226 12.60 223 12.43 139 7.75 154 8.58 577 32.16 145781.22 10 0.56
SILENT 69 48.25 44 30.77 26 18.18 43 30.07 26 18.18 20 13.99 54 37.76 110 76.92 0 0.00
ERRATIC 2 11.11 5 27.78 3 16.67 1 5.56 12 66.67 1 5.56 4 22.22 1 5.56 0 0.00
NO FAILURE 2 10.00 2 10.00 0 0.00 1 5.00 2 10.00 6 30.00 2 10.00 5 25.00 1 5.00
tot. errors 706 35.75 642 32.51 255 12.91 268 13.57 179 9.06 181 9.16 637 32.25 157379.65 11 0.56
Table 4.14, Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 report the absolute number (i.e., Abs) and
percentage (i.e., %) of errors reported by MUT1, MUT2 and MUT3, respectively, by
failure and error type. For example, the value 49 reported by the cell (CRASH, Abs) -
e1-EL column - in Table 4.14 indicates that 49 out of 465 errors detected by the event
logs of the middleware (SUT1), which have lead to a CRASH failures in the SUT (the
number of the detected errors by failure type and MUT is shown in Table 4.10), are of
type e1-EL. On the other hand, the value 217 reported by the cells (CRASH, Abs) - e1-AC
column - in Table 4.15, indicates that 217 out of 1,604 errors detected by the assertion
checking of the middleware, which have lead to a CRASH failures in the SUT, are of type
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e1-AC. Similarly, the value 633 reported by the cells (CRASH, Abs) - e1-RB column -
in Table 4.16, indicates that 633 out of 1,794 errors detected by the rule-based logging of
the middleware, which have lead to a CRASH failures in the SUT, are of type e1-RB.
In percentage terms, the 10.54% (i.e., (49/465) · 100), 13.53% (i.e., (217/1, 604) · 100) and
35.28% (i.e., (633/1, 794) ·100) of detected errors by MUT1, MUT2 and MUT3, respectively,
which have lead to a CRASH failures in the SUT, are of type e1-EL, e1-AC and e1-RB,
respectively: these values are reported by the % column of Table 4.14, Table 4.15 and Table
4.16, respectively. The bottom rows of Table 4.14, Table 4.15 and Table 4.16, aggregate the
number and the percentage of reported errors by type.
Chapter 5
Experimental Results: Analysis of
the target Techniques
The effectiveness of the considered MUTs, i.e., event logging (EL - MUT1), assertion checking (AC
- MUT2), rule-based logging (RB - MUT3), has been evaluated by measuring the evaluation met-
rics presented in Section 3.3. Precisely, Recall (R), Precision (P), Failure Coverage (FC), Error
Determination Degree (EDD) and Error Propagation Reportability (EPR) have been evaluated for
each MUT. It should be noted that Recall, Precision and Failure Coverage of each MUT have been
evaluated on both the target SUTs considered in this dissertation. Differently, the Error Determina-
tion Degree and the Error Propagation Reportability have been evaluated only on the SUT1, which
is the most complex one (again, it is a distributed system deployed on two different nodes and it is
composed by 796,353 lines of code for each node; differently, the SUT2 is not a distributed system,
and it is composed by a lower number of lines of code, i.e., 40,396); moreover, a high number of
experiments in SUT1 led to almost one error notification generated by one of the MUTs.
5.1 Event Logging Analysis
The effectiveness of the MUT1, i.e., event logging, has been evaluated by analyzing the data
generated by the MUT during the conducted experimental campaign, which are summarized
in the tables described in Section 4.6. The data have allowed the measurement of the metrics
defined in the proposed methodology, i.e., Recall (R), Precision (P), Failure Coverage (FC),
Error Determination Degree (EDD) and Error Propagation Reportability (EPR). It should
be noted that Recall, Precision and Failure Coverage of the MUT have been evaluated on
both the considered target SUTs, i.e., the communication middleware (SUT1) and arrival
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manager (SUT2). Differently, the Error Determination Degree and the Error Propagation
Reportability have been evaluated only for the MUTs implemented by the SUT1.
5.1.1 Recall and Precision
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show the percentage of reported errors of the MUT1, i.e., the
percentage of experiments where the MUT has generated at least one error notification,
with respect to the failure and non-failure experiments, i.e., the experiments where the
injected fault led to a failure in the considered SUT or not, respectively, conducted during
the experimental campaign for SUT1 and SUT2, respectively.
Figure 5.1 shows that MUT1 has reported at least an error notification for a high
percentage of SILENT failures occurred in the SUT1, i.e., 65.20%, while reported at least an
error notification for a limited percentage of CRASH and ERRATIC failures, i.e., 17.62%
and 20.89%, respectively. However, most of the errors reported by the MUT1 led to a
CRASH failure in the SUT1. Indeed, CRASH failures are the most occurred failures in the
SUT1, i.e., 2,639 out of 3,159 failures occurred in SUT1 (as reported in Table 4.4), which are
followed by the SILENT and ERRATIC failures that account for 204 and 316, respectively.
Differently, Figure 5.2 shows that MUT1 has reported at least an error notification for
a high percentage of CRASH failures occurred in the SUT2, i.e., 51.22%, while reported
at least an error notification for a limited percentage of SILENT and ERRATIC failures.
Figure 5.1: Percentage of reported errors of MUT1 by failure type for SUT1.
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Figure 5.2: Percentage of reported errors of MUT1 by failure type for SUT2.
As for SUT1, most of the errors reported by the MUT1 in the SUT2 led to a CRASH
failure. Indeed, MUT1 has generated at least an error notification in 42 experiments where
a CRASH occurred in the SUT2, against the 10 and 29 experiments where a SILENT and
an ERRATIC occurred, respectively. In addition, Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show also that
MUT1 has generated error notifications also when no failures occurred in the SUTs. These
error notifications represent False Positives (FPs) with respect to the failures.
Table 5.1 reports FP, FN, TP, P and R for the MUT1 for each SUT. It can be noted that
the precision is very close to 1 for the event logging mechanism implemented by the SUT1
(i.e., MW-EL): almost all the failures reported by the MUT are actual failures occurred in
the communication middleware. Differently, MUT1 exhibits a low precision value in the
SUT2. In fact, event logging generates a relevant number of FPs in the arrival manager
(i.e., AM-EL). The number of FNs is 2,495 out of total 3,159 failures in the SUT1 and 604
out of total 685 failures occurred in the SUT2. These findings suggest that event logging
Table 5.1: False Positive (FP), False Negative (FN), True Positive (TP), Precision and Recall
of MUT1 for each SUT.
FP FN TP Precision Recall
MW-EL 50 2,495 664 0.930 0.210
AM-EL 243 604 81 0.250 0.118
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might miss a relevant number of failures. The rightmost column of Table 5.1 reports the
recall of the MUT.
It should be noted that the density of the MUT, which is reported by Table 4.2 (i.e., EL
and EL-error), is potentially related to the value of recall/precision. For example, Table 5.1
reports that the recall of MW-EL is bigger than AM-EL: the percentage of error logging
instructions out of the total number of logging instructions of MW-EL, i.e., 14.45%, is
bigger than AM-EL, i.e., 11.39%. Nevertheless, the high density of the MUT might affect
the precision, as it can be inferred from the values of precision of AM-EL reported by
Table 5.1. In fact, a large number of logging instructions might increase the probability to
generate FPs.
5.1.2 Failure Coverage
The overall recall has been broken down by failure type in each SUT. Given a failure type,
the bottom row of Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 show the absolute number and the percentage
of failures that have been reported by each MUT in SUT1 and SUT2, respectively. For
example, EL reports 465 and 45 CRASH failures in SUT1 and SUT2, respectively (such
as shown by the first row of the third cell in the bottom of Table 4.7 and Table 4.8,
respectively). These numbers account for total 17.72%, i.e., (465/2, 639) · 100, and 51.22%,
i.e., (45/82) · 100, of CRASH failures that have been induced in the SUT1 and SUT2,
respectively.
Figure 5.3 shows the percentage of reported failures of MUT1 by failure type and SUT.
It can be noted that the reporting ability of the MUT changes significantly across
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Figure 5.3: Percentage of reported failure of MUT1 by type and case study.
the SUTs. Moreover, the MUT might show a different ability at reporting the
same type of failure in different SUTs. In fact, the coverage of the event logs ranges
from a minimum of 3.61%, i.e., AM-EL (SILENT failures), to a maximum of 65.20%, i.e.,
MW-EL (SILENT failures).
The overall recall has been also broken down by fault type in each SUT. Given a fault
type, the rightmost column of Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 shows the absolute number and
the percentage of failures that have been reported by each MUT in SUT1 and SUT2, re-
spectively. For example, EL reports 348 and 67 activated ALG faults in SUT1 and SUT2,
respectively (such as shown by the first row of the penultimate rightmost cell in Table
4.7 and Table 4.8, respectively). These numbers account for total 18.69% and 12.32% of
activated ALG faults that have been injected in the SUT1 and SUT2, respectively.
Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of activated faults that are reported by MUT1 in both
the SUTs. Percentage of reported failures can be observed in the rightmost column of Table
4.7 and Table 4.8 for SUT1 and SUT2, respectively. It can be noted that the reporting
ability by fault type of the MUT changes slightly in the SUT1,i.e., event logging is
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Figure 5.4: Percentage of reported failure of MUT1 by fault type and case study.
able to detect almost the same percentage of failures irrespectively of the type of injected
fault in the SUT1. Moreover, the MUT might show a different ability at reporting
the same type of fault in different SUTs. In fact, the reported failure by fault type of
the event logs ranges from a minimum of 18.69%, i.e., MW-EL (ALG faults), to a maximum
of 27.51%, i.e., MW-EL (INT faults), in the SUT1, and from a minimum of 2.44%, i.e.,
AM-EL (ALG faults), to a maximum of 100.00%, , i.e., AM-EL (CHK faults), in the SUT2.
5.1.3 Error Determination Degree
The error behavior inferred by the error notifications of the MUT1 has been evaluated by
considering the error model extracted during the error clustering process, which is described
in Section 4.5.2.
Figure 5.5 shows the breakdown of the errors reported by MUT1 in the SUT1 by error
type, i.e., the error types that belong to the inferred error model reported in Table 4.6,
and fault ODC class. Percentage of the errors reported by the considered MUT by error
type and ODC class can be observed in the total ALG, total ASG, total CHK and total
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INT rows of Table 4.11. It can be noted that the percentage of errors reported by
the MUT for each error type changes slightly at varying the ODC class in
SUT1. For example, considering the error type e4-EL, i.e., data type errors, the MUT
has generated at least an error notification of this type in 27.10%, 34.87% and 41.35% of
ALG, ASG, and INT experiments, respectively, i.e., experiments where only an ALG, an
ASG, or an INT fault has been injected in the SUT. Similarly, the MUT has generated
at least an error notification of type e5-EL, i.e., error related to the main daemon of the
SUT, in 10.53%, 18.46% and 22.22% of ALG, ASG, and INT experiments, respectively.
In particular, ALG and ASG exposed a very similar error behavior. A closer look into
the error notifications obtained from these ODC classes and into the source code of the
related injected faults allowed to understand that often faults of different classes led to
error notifications of the same type, and in some cases exactly the same ones. For example,
in some cases both the elimination of small part of source code, i.e., MPLA faults that
Figure 5.5: Percentage of reported errors by cluster and fault ODC type for MUT1.
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belong to the ALG class, and the substitution of variable assignment with an expression,
i.e., MVAE faults that belong to the ASG class, led a variable to be assigned with a data of
an unexpected type, which has been reported by the MUT with the same error notification,
i.e., "Type mismatch: object type is ... but ... was expected" that belongs to
the type e4-EL. Moreover, in three of the 4 ODC classes, i.e., ALG, ASG and INT, e4-EL
errors are the most reported ones by the MUT. It should be noted that CHK faults led to
a different error behavior with respect to the other fault types. However, a small number of
samples have been collected for this type of fault. Therefore, no conclusions can be drawn
for CHK class.
As discussed in section 3.3.3, an extract of the obtained dataset has been submitted to
a classifier in order to measure the Error Determination Degree of the event logging with
respect to the ODC fault class, i.e., the ability of its error notifications to suggest what is
the ODC class of the fault that have led to those error notifications. The extracted dataset
contains (i) the ODC class of the injected fault and (ii) the number of error notifications
generated by the event logging for each error type of its inferred error model, for each fault
injection experiment where at least one error notification has been generated by the MUT.
This dataset has been submitted to a Random Forest classifier1 classifier [115]. The numbers
of error notifications for each type are used as features of the classification, while the ODC
fault class is used as the class to predict, i.e., the value the classifier have to predict. A
K-fold cross-validation has been conducted, with K=30. It should be noted that different
classifiers and number of folds have been tried in order to choose the best combination;
1The parameters of the classifier have been left at default value.
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Table 5.2: Prediction results for MUT1 (k-fold cross-validation: Random Forest and k=30).
class correct classification (%) incorrect classification (%)
ODC fault class 57.10% 42.89%
fault type 43.47% 53.53%
failure type 88.92% 11.08%
the Random Forest classifier with the considered number of folds have outperformed all
other combinations. However, practitioners might apply different classifier and approaches
in order to evaluate the EDD.
The first row of Table 5.2 reports the results of the classification. The considered
classifier was able to predict the ODC type of a fault from the error notifications the fault
have led to with a not very high accuracy; in fact, the percentage of correct classification,
i.e., the considered Error Determination Degree, is equal to 57.10%. This result confirm the
finding inferred from Figure 5.5. Indeed, the low variability of the error behavior inferred
by means of the MUT1 at varying the ODC class led to the poor prediction performance of
the classifier.
The ODC fault class has been broken down by fault type in order to understand the
error behavior at varying the fault type. Figure 5.6 shows the percentage of errors that
are reported by MUT1 by error and fault type, i.e., the types of fault reported in Table 3.1.
Percentage of the errors reported by the considered MUT by error and fault type can be
observed in Table 4.11. It can be noted that the percentage of errors reported by the
MUT for each error type changes at varying the fault type in SUT1. For example,
the error type e1-EL, i.e., memory errors, has been reported with different percentages at
varying the fault type, e.g., at least an error notification of this type has been reported
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Figure 5.6: Percentage of reported errors by cluster and fault type for MUT1.
in 1.64% of experiments where a WPFV fault has been injected, as well as in 61.54% of
experiments where a MIEB fault has been injected. However, MLPA and MVAE faults
exposed a very similar error behavior. This finding is strictly related to the one obtained
for the ODC classes. Indeed, MLPA and MVAE are fault types that belongs to ALG and
ASG class, respectively, and they are the ones that occurred more often respect than the
other types in the related class, as can be seen in Table 4.9. Therefore, their error behaviors
influence the error behavior of the ODC class they belong to. In particular, as previously
discussed, they tended to generate the same errors, which are reported by MUT1 with error
notification of the same type. In addition, given a fault type, in almost all cases the
percentage of reported errors strongly changes at varying the error type. For
example, for MIEB faults the error type e1-EL is reported more than the other types as
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well as the error type e4-EL for MVAE faults. It should be noted that a limited number
of samples have been collected for some types of fault, i.e., MVIV, MIFS, MVAV, WVAV,
MIA, MLC and WAEP, as showed in Table 4.9 (EL column). Therefore, no conclusions
can be drawn for these types of fault.
An extract of the obtained dataset has been submitted to the Random Forest classifier
in order to measure the Error Determination Degree of the event logging with respect to
the fault type, i.e., the ability of its error notifications to suggest what is the type of the
fault that have led to those error notifications. The extracted dataset contains (i) the
type of the injected fault and (ii) the number of error notifications generated by the event
logging for each error type of its inferred error model, for each fault injection experiment
where at least one error notification has been generated by the MUT. The numbers of error
notifications for each type are used as features of the classification, while the fault type is
udes as class to predict. A K-fold cross-validation has been conducted, with K=30. The
second row of Table 5.2 reports the results of the classification. Despite the more variability
exposed by the error behavior at varying the fault type respect than the case where the
faults are grouped into ODC class, the considered classifier was able to predict the fault
type from the error notifications the fault have led to with a not very high accuracy; in fact,
the percentage of correct classification, i.e., the considered Error Determination Degree, is
equal to 43.47%, which is even worse than the one obtained in the case where the ODC
class has been considered as class to predict.
Figure 5.7 shows the breakdown of the errors reported by MUT1 in the SUT1 by failure
type, i.e., the failure that the reported error(s) led to, and error type. Percentage of the
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errors reported by the considered MUT by error and failure type can be observed in Table
4.14. It can be noted that the percentage of errors reported by the MUT for almost
all error types strongly changes at varying the failure type in SUT1. For example,
the percentage of experiments where at least an error notification of type e4-EL is raised
ranges from 0%, for experiments where a SILENT or an ERRATIC failures occurred in
the system, to 47.10%, for experiments where a CRASH failure occurred in the system.
Similarly, the percentage of experiments where at least an error notification of type e5-EL
ranges from 2.58%, for experiments where a CRASH failures occurred in the system, to
85.71%, for experiments where a SILENT failure occurred in the system.
An extract of the obtained dataset has been submitted to the Random Forest classifier
in order to measure the Error Determination Degree of the event logging with respect
to the failure type, i.e., the ability of its error notifications to suggest what is the type of
failure occurred in the system as consequence of the error(s) behind those notifications. The
Figure 5.7: Percentage of reported errors by cluster and failure type for MUT1.
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extracted dataset contains (i) the failure occurred in the system and (ii) the number of error
notifications generated by the event logging for each error type of its inferred error model,
for each fault injection experiment where at least one error notification has been generated
by the MUT. The numbers of error notifications for each type are used as features of the
classification, while the failure type is used as class to predict. A K-fold cross-validation
has been conducted, with K=30. The third row of Table 5.2 reports the results of the
classification. The classifier was able to predict the failure type from the error notifications
with a high accuracy; in fact, the percentage of correct classification, i.e., the considered
Error Determination Degree, is equal to 88.92%. This result confirms the finding inferred
from Figure 5.7. Indeed, the high variability of the error behavior inferred by means of the
MUT1 at varying the failure type led to the good prediction performance of the classifier.
Based on these findings, it should be noted that event logging can potentially allow
the determination of the failure type occurred in the communication middleware from the
obtained error notifications, while nothing can be said about the ODC class and the type
of the fault that has been injected.
5.1.4 Error Propagation Reportability
The propagation paths of the errors raised in SUT1 during the experimental campaign, as
consequences of the injected faults, have been inferred by means of the error notifications
generated by MUT1 in the SUT. As a reminder, the error notifications generated by event
logging in the SUT1 provides the component, and also the function, that has generated the
notification. Therefore, the knowledge of the component, and also of the function, where the
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faults have been injected (both provided by the tool used for the fault injection), along with
the knowledge of the source component and function of each error notification, allowed to
build non-exhaustive graphs (according to the methodology proposed in Section 3.3.4) that
summarize the error propagation phenomena obtained during the experimental campaign.
As a reminder, the obtained directed graphs are considered non-exhaustive because they
have been built based on the errors detected by the MUT1; therefore the errors undetected
by the MUT cannot be considered. It should be noted that only the directed graphs that
summarize propagation paths of the errors generated as a consequence of ALG and ASG
faults have been generated, since they are the ODC fault classes with the highest number
of collected samples.
Figure 5.8 shows the error propagation graph that summarizes the major error propa-
gation paths through the components of the SUT1, which are generated as a consequence of
ALG faults. Noteworthy, the number of faults considered in the graph refers to the number
of faults that have led to at least an error notification to be raised by event logging. It can
be observed that, excepted from the MIEB faults, most of the faults led to errors that
have not been reported by the event logging in the kernel . For example, 91.30%,
66.66% and 65.27% of MFC, MIFS and MLPA faults, respectively, did not lead to an error
notification in the kernel. In particular, 33.33%, 31.68% and 41.67% of MFC, MLPA and
MIFS faults, respectively, have led to at least an error that has generated at least an error
notification in the database component of the SUT1; while 37.68% and 15.27% of MFC and
MLPA faults, respectively, have led to at least an error that has generated at least an error
notification in the api, spliced and user components of the SUT1, at the same time. This
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finding is also confirmed by the proposed Error Propagation Reportability, which exhibits
a value of 26.02%, i.e., (96/369) · 100 (last cell of first row in Table 5.3), that suggests the
low ability of MUT1 at reporting the propagation of the errors generated as consequence of
ALG faults. Indeed, the errors are expected to arise in the kernel component of the SUT1
since all the faults have been injected into this component. Therefore, there is the need
to improve the error detection ability of the event logging in the kernel by adding some
EDMs, i.e., Error Detection Mechanisms, also with the aim to obtain more realistic error
propagation paths, which can help practitioners in different analysis, such as root cause
analysis, problem determination, etc. A closer look into the error notifications generated
by the MUT in the SUT’s components can allow to understand the type of error the EDMs
have to consider. For example, a closer look into the error notifications generated by the
database during the experiments, where no other components have reported an error, al-
lowed to understand that most of them belong to the e4-EL type. Therefore, a potential
EDM into the kernel have to consider this kind of error, e.g., by inserting a number of checks
on the type of data that are used at runtime. As a reminder, it should be noted that there
is the possibility that a propagation path has not been reported by a MUT because it is not
present by design in the target SUT, e.g., when the component that reports the error works
as a detector of the component where the fault has been injected. Therefore, the proposed
EPR metric might provide not accurate value in this case. However, it can be successfully
used to decide where to place EDMs, and, more important, as a comparative metric between
MUTs, as will be shown in Section 6. Indeed, if a MUT reports the error propagation path
that is unreported by another MUT (with a lower EPR), this suggests that the second one
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Table 5.3: Error Propagation Reportability (EPR) of MUT1 with respect to ALG and ASG
faults.
ODC
# experiments with at least # experiments with at least an error
EPR (%)
an error notification notification generated in the kernel
ALG 369 96 26.02
ASG 195 82 42.05
actually exhibited a low ability at reporting error propagation paths. Another findings that
can be inferred from Figure 5.8 is that a limited number of errors have been reported
in the function where the fault has been injected, as shown by the low probability
of the kernel-immediate node, i.e., 0.13. In addition, almost all the errors reported by
event logging in the kernel are not reported in any other components, as shown
by the high probability of the self-loop of the nodes kernel-immediate and kernel-quick, i.e.,
0.91 and 0.84, respectively.
Figure 5.8 also shows that errors reported by event logging in different system
components have led to different failures in the SUT. For example, in 100.00% of the
cases where an error have propagated to the api, spliced and user components of the SUT,
at the same time, a SILENT occurred in the SUT; while in 97.39% of the cases where an
error have propagated to the database component a CRASH occurred in the SUT. On the
other hand, it can be observed that ERRATIC failures occurred in the system mainly in the
cases where an error propagated to the functions different from the one where the fault has
been injected. It should be noted that this information allow to identify potential position
for ERMs, i.e., Error Recovery Mechanisms, that can increase the resiliency of the system.
For example, if the practitioners are interested in avoiding SILENT failures, probably it can
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be useful to insert an ERM in the api, spliced or user component, or an ERM that checks
these components at runtime. A closer look into the error notifications generated by event
logging in these components allowed to understand that most of them are of type e5-EL,
i.e., main daemon error ; therefore, it could be useful to add an ERM in the system that
checks for the availability of the main daemon (i.e., the spliced component) and provides a
recovery mechanism in case of problem, such as re-execution of the component, execution
of a different version of the component, i.e., the same component developed with a given
diversity degree. It should be noted that the implementation of ERM is not a trivial task an
requires a deep knowledge of the system, especially in complex critical system. Therefore,
system developers, which have this knowledge, can simply leverage the results obtained
from this analysis to design and implement effective ERM in their system.
Figure 5.9 shows the directed graph that summarizes the major error propagation paths
through the components of the SUT1, which are generated as a consequence of ASG faults.
Again, the number of faults considered in the graph refers to the number of faults that
have led to at least an error notification to be raised by event logging. It can be observed
that more than half of the errors reported by the event logging have not been
reported by the kernel component of the SUT1. In fact, 60.57% of MVAE faults,
i.e., the most recurrent fault type in the ASG class, have led to at last an error that
has generated at least an error notification in a component different form the kernel. In
particular, 34.86% of MVAE faults have led to at least an error that has generated at least
an error notification in the database component of the SUT1. This finding is also confirmed
by the proposed Error Propagation Reportability, which exhibits a value of 42.05%, i.e.,
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(82/195) · 100 (last cell of last row in Table 5.3), which means that 42.05% of the error
reported by the event logging are not reported by the kernel component. Noteworthy, EPR
value exhibited by the event logging for ASG class is greater than the one obtained for the
ALG, which means that for ASG class this MUT exposed better performance at reporting
error propagation. However, also for ASG there is the need to improve the error detection
ability of the event logging in the kernel by adding some EDMs. A closer look into the error
notifications generated by the MUT in the SUT’s components can allow to understand the
type of error the EDM have to consider. For example, the error notifications generated by
the database during the experiments where no other components have reported an error,
belong to the e4-EL type, as in the case of ALG class. This similarity is an expected result
since in Section 5.1.3 it has been found that ALG and ASG exposed a very similar error
behavior. In addition, almost all the errors reported by event logging in the kernel
are not reported in any other components.
Figure 5.9 also shows that also for the ASG class the errors reported by event
logging in different system components have led to different failures in the SUT.
For example, in 100.00% of the cases where an error have propagated to the api, spliced
and user components of the SUT, at the same time, a SILENT occurred in the SUT;
while in 97.26% of the cases where an error have propagated to the database component a
CRASH occurred in the SUT. Again, this information allows to identify potential position
for ERMs. For example, if the practitioners are interested in avoiding CRASH failures,
probably it can be useful to insert an ERM in the database component. A closer look into
the error notifications generated by event logging in this component allowed to understand
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that most of them are of type e4-EL; therefore, it could be useful to add an ERM in the
database component, which try to avoid failures by executing some recovery action when
an error data type occurs, such as request again the data or try to continue the execution
with default values, etc.
It should be noted that the analysis showed here, and also in the next sections, is inten-
tionally conducted to at an higher level, i.e., at component level. However, practitioners can
leverage the proposed methodology also to conduct a more fine-grained analysis, reaching
the function level.
The findings obtained from the analysis of event logging provide part of the answer
to the Research Question 1, i.e., RQ1, the Research Question 2, i.e., RQ2, and
the Research Question 3, i.e., RQ3. In fact, the analysis of the Error Propagation
Reportability allowed to understand that event logging can be used both to characterize the
error behavior of the considered SUT (RQ1 ) and to provide insights about the placement of
EDMs and ERMs (RQ2 ). In addition, this analysis also allows to understand that the Error
Propagation Reporting Ability of the event logging changes when different ODC fault class
are considered (RQ3). Differently, the analysis of Recall and Precision, of Failure coverage
and of Error Determination Degree exhibited by event logging during the experiments
allowed to infer how its Recall and Precision values change between the SUTs, how its
failure reporting ability changes at varying the failure and fault type, and also the values
exhibited by its EDD with respect to the fault type, ODC class and failure type (RQ3 ).
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5.2 Assertion Checking Analysis
The effectiveness of the MUT2, i.e., assertion checking, has been evaluated by analyzing the
data generated by the MUT during the conducted experimental campaign, which are sum-
marized in the tables in Section 4.6. The data have allowed the measurement of the metrics
defined in the proposed methodology, i.e., Recall (R), Precision (P), Failure Coverage (FC),
Error Determination Degree (EDD) and Error Propagation Reportability (EPR). It should
be noted that, as for event logging, Recall, Precision and Failure Coverage of the MUT have
been evaluated on both the considered target SUTs. Differently, the Error Determination
Degree and the Error Propagation Reportability have been evaluated only for the MUTs
implemented by the SUT1.
5.2.1 Recall and Precision
Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11 show the percentage of reported errors of the MUT2, i.e., the
percentage of experiments where the MUT has generated at least one error notification,
with respect to the failure and non-failure experiments, i.e., the experiments where the
injected fault led to a failure in the considered SUT or not, respectively, conducted during
the experimental campaign for SUT1 and SUT2, respectively.
Figure 5.10 shows that MUT2 has been able to report only CRASH failures occurred
Figure 5.10: Percentage of reported errors of MUT2 by failure type for SUT1.
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Figure 5.11: Percentage of reported errors of MUT2 by failure type for SUT2.
Table 5.4: False Positive (FP), False Negative (FN), True Positive (TP), Precision and Recall
of MUT2 for each SUT.
FP FN TP Precision Recall
MW-AC 2 1,555 1,604 0.999 0.508
AM-AC 0 640 45 1.000 0.066
in the SUT1, reporting at least an error notification for 60.78% of this kind of failures.
Differently, Figure 5.11 shows that MUT2 has reported at least an error notification for
29.27% of CRASH failures occurred in the SUT2, while reported at least an error notification
for a limited percentage of ERRATIC failures, i.e., 6.44%. However, in absolute terms, the
numbers of errors reported by the MUT2 in the SUT2 are quite similar for both kinds of
failure. Indeed, MUT2 has generated at least an error notification in 21 experiments where
an ERRATIC occurred in the SUT2, while has generated at least an error notification in 24
experiments where a CRASH occurred. In addition, Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11 show also
that MUT2 has generated error notifications also when no failures occurred in the SUT1.
These error notifications represent False Positives (FPs) with respect to the failures.
Table 5.4 reports FP, FN, TP, P and R for the MUT2 for each SUT. It can be noted
that the precision is very close to 1 in SUT1 and it is equal to 1 in the SUT2, therefore,
almost all the failures reported by the MUT are actual failures occurred in both the SUTs.
The number of FNs is 1,555 out of total 3,159 failures in the SUT1 and 640 out of total 685
Chapter 5. Experimental Results: Analysis of the target Techniques 128
failures occurred in the SUT2. These findings suggest that assertion checking might miss
a relevant number of failures, especially in the SUT2. The rightmost column of Table 5.4
reports the recall of the MUT.
It should be noted that the density of the MUT, which is reported by Table 4.2 (i.e.,
AC), is potentially related to the value of recall. For example, the rather different values
of recall measured for the MW-AC and AM-AC, are likely caused by the different density
of the assertions in the SUTs, i.e., 0.99% and 0.18% out of the total number of assertions
placed in the source code of SUT1 and SUT2, respectively.
5.2.2 Failure Coverage
The overall recall has been broken down by failure type in each SUT. Figure 5.12 shows
the percentage of reported failures of MUT2 by failure type and SUT. It can be noted that,
as for MUT1, the reporting ability of the MUT2 changes significantly across the
SUTs. Moreover, the MUT might show a different ability at reporting the same
type of failure in different SUTs. In fact, the coverage of assertion checking ranges from
a minimum of 0.00%, i.e., MW-AC for SILENT and ERRATIC failures, to a maximum of
68.78%, i.e., MW-AC for CRASH failures, in the SUT1. Differently, the coverage exposed
by this MUT in the SUT2 ranges from a minimum of 0.00%, i.e., AM-AC for SILENT
failures, to 29.27%, i.e., AM-AC for CRASH failures.
The overall recall has been also broken down by fault type in each SUT. Figure 5.13
shows the percentage of activated faults that are reported by MUT2 in both the SUTs. It
can be noted that the reporting ability by fault type of the MUT changes slightly
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Figure 5.12: Percentage of reported failure of MUT2 by type and case study.
Figure 5.13: Percentage of reported failure of MUT2 by fault type and case study.
in the SUTs. In fact, results indicate that assertion checking is able to detect almost the
same percentage of failures irrespectively of the type of injected fault in both the SUTs.
Moreover, the MUT might show a different ability at reporting the same type of
fault in different SUTs. In fact, the reported failure by fault type of assertion checking
ranges from a minimum of 49.19%, i.e., MW-AC (ALG faults), to a maximum of 56.08%,
i.e., MW-AC (CHK faults), in the SUT1, and from a minimum of 0.00%, i.e., AM-AC (CHK
and INT faults), to a maximum of 7.35%, , i.e., AM-AC (ALG faults), in the SUT2.
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5.2.3 Error Determination Degree
The error behavior inferred by the error notifications of the MUT2 has been evaluated by
considering the error model extracted during the error clustering process.
Figure 5.14 shows the breakdown of the errors reported by MUT2 in the SUT1 by error
type, i.e., the error types that belong to the inferred error model reported in Table 4.6, and
fault ODC class. Percentage of the errors reported by the considered MUT by error type
and ODC class can be observed in the total ALG, total ASG, total CHK and total INT
rows of Table 4.12. It can be noted that the percentage of errors reported by the
MUT for each error type changes slightly at varying the ODC class in SUT1.
For example, considering the error type e2-AC, i.e., unexpected value errors, the MUT has
generated at least an error notification of this type in 52.67%, 45.34%, 58.62% and 52.47%
of ALG, ASG, CHK and INT experiments, respectively, i.e., experiments where only an
ALG, an ASG, CHK or an INT fault has been injected in the SUT. Similarly, the MUT
Figure 5.14: Percentage of reported errors by cluster and fault ODC type for MUT2.
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has generated at least an error notification of type e4-AC, i.e., NULL value errors, in 20.53%,
20.91%, 22.36% and 37.93% of ALG, ASG, CHK and INT experiments, respectively. In
particular, ALG, ASG and INT exposed a very similar error behavior. A closer look
into the error notifications obtained from these ODC classes and the source code of the
related injected faults allowed to understand that often faults of different classes led to
error notifications of the same type. For example, in some cases the elimination of small
part of source code, i.e., MPLA faults that belong to the ALG class, the substitution of
variable assignment with an expression, i.e., MVAE faults that belong to the ASG class,
and the wrong use of a variable in a parameter of a function call, i.e., WPFV faults that
belong to the INT class, led to obtaining a NULL value as value returned by a function or
as value of a variable checked at runtime, which has been reported by the MUT with the
same type of notification, i.e., "Assertion ‘<<variable name>> != NULL’ failed" that
belongs to the type e4-AC. Moreover, in all the ODC classes e2-AC errors are the most
reported ones by the MUT. It should be noted that CHK faults led to a different error
behavior with respect to the other fault type. However, a small number of samples have
been collected for this type of fault. Therefore, no conclusions can be drawn for CHK class.
An extract of the obtained dataset has been submitted to a classifier in order to measure
the Error Determination Degree of the assertion checking with respect to the ODC fault
class, i.e., the ability of its error notifications to suggest what is the ODC class of the fault
that have led to those error notifications. The extracted dataset contains (i) the ODC class
of the injected fault and (ii) the number of error notifications generated by the assertion
checking for each error type of its inferred error model, for each fault injection experiment
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Table 5.5: Prediction results for MUT2 (k-fold cross-validation: Random Forest and k=30).
class correct classification (%) incorrect classification (%)
ODC fault class 56.30% 43.70%
fault type 42.12% 57.88%
failure type 99.87% 0.13%
where at least one error notification has been generated by the MUT. This dataset has
been submitted to the Random Forest classifier; the numbers of error notifications for each
type are used as features of the classification, while the ODC fault class is used as the
class to predict. A K-fold cross-validation has been conducted, with K=30. The first row
of Table 5.5 reports the results of the classification. The considered classifier was able to
predict the ODC type of a fault from the error notifications the fault have led to with a
not very high accuracy; in fact, the percentage of correct classification, i.e., the considered
Error Determination Degree, is equal to 56.30%. This result confirm the finding inferred
from Figure 5.14. Indeed, the low variability of the error behavior inferred by means of the
MUT2 at varying the ODC class led to the poor prediction performance of the classifier.
The ODC fault class has been broken down by fault type in order to understand the
error behavior at varying the fault types. Figure 5.15 shows the percentage of errors that
are reported by MUT2 by error and fault type. Percentage of the errors reported by the
considered MUT by error and fault type can be observed in Table 4.12. It can be noted
that the percentage of errors reported by the MUT for each error type changes
at varying the fault type in SUT1. For example, the error type e1-AC, i.e., data
type errors, has been reported with different percentages at varying the fault type, e.g., at
least an error notification of this type has been reported in 2.50% of experiments where
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a MFC fault has been injected as well as in 44.44% of experiments where a WAEP fault
has been injected. However, MLPA, MVAE and WPFV faults exposed a very similar error
behavior. This finding is strictly related to the one obtained for the ODC classes. Indeed,
MLPA, MVAE and WPFV are fault types that belongs to ALG, ASG and INT class,
respectively, and they are the ones that occurred more often respect than the other types in
the related class, as can be seen in Table 4.9. Therefore, their error behaviors influence the
error behavior of the ODC class they belong to. In particular, as previously discussed, they
tended to generate the same errors, which are reported by MUT2 with error notification of
the same type. In addition, given a fault type, in almost all cases the percentage of
reported errors strongly changes at varying the error type. For example, for MFC
faults the error type e2-AC is reported more than the other types as well as the error type
Figure 5.15: Percentage of reported errors by cluster and fault type for MUT2.
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e4-AC for MIEB faults. It should be noted that a limited number of samples have been
collected for some types of fault, i.e., MVIV, MVAV, WVAV, and MLC, as showed in Table
4.9 (AC column). Thus, no conclusions can be drawn for these types of fault.
An extract of the obtained dataset has been submitted to the Random Forest classifier
in order to measure the Error Determination Degree of the assertion checking with respect
to the fault type, i.e., the ability of its error notifications to suggest what is the type of the
fault that have led to those error notifications. The extracted dataset contains (i) the type
of the injected fault and (ii) the number of error notifications generated by the assertion
checking for each error type of its inferred error model, for each fault injection experiment
where at least one error notification has been generated by the MUT. The numbers of error
notifications for each type are used as features of the classification, while the fault type is
udes as class to predict. A K-fold cross-validation has been conducted, with K=30. The
second row of Table 5.5 reports the results of the classification. Despite the more variability
exposed by the error behavior at varying the fault type respect than the case where the
faults are grouped into ODC class, the considered classifier was able to predict the fault
type from the error notifications the fault have led to with a not very high accuracy; in fact,
the percentage of correct classification, i.e., the considered Error Determination Degree, is
equal to 42.12%, which is even worse than the one obtained in the case where the ODC
class has been considered as class to predict.
Figure 5.16 shows the breakdown of the errors reported by MUT2 in the SUT1 by failure
type, i.e., the failure that the reported error(s) led to, and error type. Percentage of the
errors reported by the considered MUT by error and failure type can be observed in Table
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4.15. It can be noted that the percentage of errors reported by the MUT changes
at varying the error types in the case of CRASH failures in SUT1, which are the
only type of failures reported by the MUT2. For example, the percentage of experiments
where at least an error notification is raised ranges from 5.24%, for errors of type e5-AC,
i.e., data size error, to 50.94%, for errors of type e2-AC. It should be noted that only error
of type e2-AC and e3-AC, i.e., forced assertion execution, led to false positives whit respect
to the failures.
An extract of the obtained dataset has been submitted to the Random Forest classifier
in order to measure the Error Determination Degree of the assertion checking with respect
to the failure type, i.e., the ability of its error notifications to suggest what is the type
of failure occurred in the system as consequence of the error(s) behind those notifications.
The extracted dataset contains (i) the failure occurred in the system and (ii) the number
of error notifications generated by the assertion checking for each error type of its inferred
Figure 5.16: Percentage of reported errors by cluster and failure type for MUT2.
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error model, for each fault injection experiment where at least one error notification has
been generated by the MUT. The numbers of error notifications for each type are used as
features of the classification, while the failure type is used as class to predict. A K-fold
cross-validation has been conducted, with K=30. The third row of Table 5.5 reports the
results of the classification. The classifier was able to predict the failure type from the error
notifications with a very high accuracy; in fact, the percentage of correct classification,
i.e., the considered Error Determination Degree, is equal to 98.87%. This result confirms
the finding inferred from Figure 5.16. Indeed, the high variability of the error behavior
inferred by means of the MUT2 at varying the failure type led to the very good prediction
performance of the classifier.
Based on these findings, it should be noted that also assertion checking can potentially
allow the determination of the failure type occurred in the communication middleware from
the obtained error notifications, while nothing can be said about the ODC class and type
of the fault that has been injected.
5.2.4 Error Propagation Reportability
The propagation paths of the errors raised in SUT1 during the experimental campaign, as
consequences of the injected faults, have been inferred by means of the error notifications
generated by MUT2 in the SUT. As a reminder, the error notifications generated by assertion
checking in the SUT1 provides the component, and also the function, that has generated the
notification. Therefore, the knowledge of the component, and also of the function, where
the faults have been injected (both provided by the tool used for the fault injection), along
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with the knowledge of the source component and function of each error notification, allowed
to build the error propagation graphs that summarize the error propagation phenomena
obtained during the experimental campaign.
Figure 5.17 shows the directed graph that summarizes the major error propagation paths
through the components of the SUT1, which are generated as a consequence of ALG faults.
Noteworthy, the number of faults considered in the graph refers to the number of faults
that have led to at least an error notification to be raised by assertion checking. It can be
observed that most of MFC and MLPA faults led to errors that have not been
reported by the assertion checking in the kernel . For example, 71.25% and 51.02%
of MFC and MLPA faults, respectively, did not lead to an error notification in the kernel.
On the other hand, 77.27% and 65.52% of MIFS and MIEB fault, respectively, led to an
error notification in the kernel. In particular, 49.38% and 36.55% of MFC and MLPA faults,
respectively, have led to at least an error that has generated at least an error notification in
the database component of the SUT1; while 20.63% and 12.28% of MFC and MLPA faults,
respectively, have led to at least an error that has generated at least an error notification
in the ddsi2 component of the SUT1.
This finding is also confirmed by the proposed Error Propagation Reportability, which
exhibits a value of 36.64%, i.e., (336/917) · 100 (last cell of first row in Table 5.6), that
suggests the low ability of MUT2 at reporting the propagation of the errors generated
as consequence of ALG faults. This suggest that there is the need to improve the error
detection ability of the assertion checking in the kernel by adding some EDMs. A closer
look into the error notifications generated by the MUT in the SUT’s components can allow
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Table 5.6: Error Propagation Reportability (EPR) of MUT2 with respect to ALG and ASG
faults.
ODC
# experiments with at least # experiments with at least an error
EPR (%)
an error notification notification generated in the kernel
ALG 917 336 36.64
ASG 397 250 62.97
to understand the type of error the EDM have to consider. For example, a closer look into
the error notifications generated by the database during the experiments, where no other
components have reported an error, allowed to understand that most of them belong to
the e2-AC type. Therefore, a potential EDM into the kernel have to consider this kind of
error, e.g., by inserting a number of assertions that checks the values returned by functions
in order to detect unexpected results. Another findings that can be inferred from Figure
5.17 is that a limited number of errors have been reported in the function where
the fault has been injected, as shown by the low probability of the kernel-immediate
node, i.e., 0.13. In addition, almost all the errors reported by assertion checking
in the kernel are not reported in any other components, as shown by the high
probability of the self-loop of the nodes kernel-immediate and kernel-quick, i.e., 0.98 and
0.99, respectively.
Figure 5.17 also shows that errors reported by assertion checking in different
system components have led to same type of failure in the SUT, i.e., CRASH
failures. For example, in all the components that are shown in Figure 5.17 the only type
of reported failure is CRASH. This is an expected result since, as seen in 5.2.2, assertion
checking is able to report only CRASH failures in the SUT1. Based on this findings,
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practitioners can find potential positions for ERMs. For example, since almost all the
errors that propagated to ddsi2 component of the SUT1 were not reported by any other
component, and all these errors led to a CRASH failure, practitioners can decide to put an
ERM in this component. A closer look into the error notifications generated by assertion
checking in this component allowed to understand that most of them are of type e4-AC ;
therefore, it could be useful to add an ERM in the ddsi2 component that tries to avoid that
NULL value error can further propagate into the system.
Figure 5.18 shows the directed graph that summarizes the major error propagation paths
through the components of the SUT1, which are generated as a consequence of ASG faults.
Again, the number of faults considered in the graph refers to the number of faults that
have led to at least an error notification to be raised by event logging. It can be observed
that more than half of the errors reported by the assertion checking have been
reported by the kernel component of the SUT1. In fact, 62.91% of MVAE faults,
i.e., the most recurrent fault type in the ASG class, have led to at least an error that has
generated at least an error notification in a the kernel. On the other hand, 23.35% of MVAE
faults have led to at least an error that has generated at least an error notification in the
database component of the SUT1.
This finding is also confirmed by the proposed Error Propagation Reportability, which
exhibits a value of 62.97%, i.e., (250/397) · 100 (last cell of last row in Table 5.6), which
means that 62.97% of the error reported by the assertion checking are reported by the kernel
component. Noteworthy, EPR value exhibited by the MUT2 for ASG class is greater than
the one obtained for the ALG, which means that for ASG class this MUT exposed better
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performance at reporting error propagation. However, also for ASG there is the need to
further improve the error detection ability of the assertion checking in the kernel by adding
some EDMs. A closer look into the error notifications generated by the MUT in the SUT’s
components can allow to understand the type of error the EDM have to consider. For
example, the error notifications generated by the database during the experiments where
no other components have reported an error, belong to the e4-AC type, as in the case
of ALG class. This similarity is an expected result since in Section 5.2.3 has been found
that ALG and ASG exposed a very similar error behavior. In addition, almost all the
errors reported by assertion checking in the kernel are not reported in any
other components, as shown by the high probability of the self-loop of the nodes kernel-
immediate and kernel-quick, i.e., 1.00 and 0.98, respectively.
Figure 5.18 also shows that also for the ASG class the errors reported by assertion
checking in different system components have led to same type of failure in the
SUT, i.e., CRASH failures, as in the case of ALG class. In fact, in all the components
that are shown in Figure 5.17 the only type of reported failure is CRASH. Again, this is
an expected result since, as seen in 5.2.2, assertion checking is able to report only CRASH
failures in the SUT1. Regarding the placement of ERMs, same considerations made for
ALG apply here, since the classes exposed a very similar error behavior.
The findings obtained from the analysis of assertion checking provide part of the answer
to the Research Question 1, i.e., RQ1, the Research Question 2, i.e., RQ2, and
the Research Question 3, i.e., RQ3. In fact, the analysis of the Error Propagation
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Reportability allowed to understand that assertion checking can be used both to characterize
the error behavior of the considered SUT (RQ1 ) and to provide insights about the placement
of EDMs and ERMs (RQ2 ). In addition, this analysis also allows to understand that the
Error Propagation Reporting Ability of the assertion checking changes when different ODC
fault class are considered (RQ3). Differently, the analysis of Recall and Precision, of Failure
coverage and of Error Determination Degree exhibited by assertion checking during the
experiments allowed to infer how its Recall and Precision values change between the SUTs,
how its failure reporting ability changes at varying the failure and fault type, and also the
values exhibited by its EDD with respect to the fault type, ODC class and failure type
(RQ3 ).
5.3 Rule-Based Logging Analysis
The effectiveness of the MUT3, i.e., rule-based logging, has been evaluated by analyzing
the data generated by the MUT during the conducted experimental campaign, which are
summarized in the tables in Section 4.6. The data have allowed the measurement of the
metrics defined in the proposed methodology, i.e., Recall (R), Precision (P), Failure Cover-
age (FC), Error Determination Degree (EDD) and Error Propagation Reportability (EPR).
It should be noted that, as for the other MUTs, Recall, Precision and Failure Coverage of
the MUT have been evaluated on both the considered target SUTs. Differently, the Error
Determination Degree and the Error Propagation Reportability have been evaluated only
for the MUTs implemented by the SUT1.
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5.3.1 Recall and Precision
Figure 5.19 and Figure 5.20 show the percentage of reported errors of the MUT3, i.e., the
percentage of experiments where the MUT has generated at least one error notification,
with respect to the failure and non-failure experiments, i.e., the experiments where the
injected fault led to a failure in the considered SUT or not, respectively, conducted during
the experimental campaign for SUT1 and SUT2, respectively.
Figure 5.19 shows that MUT3 has reported at least an error notification for a high per-
centage of SILENT and CRASH failures occurred in the SUT1, i.e., 70.10% and 67.98%,
respectively, while reported at least an error notification for a limited percentage of ER-
RATIC failures, i.e., 5.70%. However, most of the errors reported by the MUT1 are the
ones that led to a CRASH failure in the SUT1. Indeed, CRASH failures are the most
occurred failures in the SUT1, i.e., 2,639 out of 3,159 failures occurred in SUT1 (as reported
in Table 4.4), which are followed by the SILENT and ERRATIC failures that account for
204 and 316, respectively.
Differently, Figure 5.20 shows that MUT3 has reported at least an error notification for
a high percentage of SILENT and ERRATIC failures occurred in the SUT2, i.e., 93.14%
and 68.10%, respectively, while reported at least an error notification for 46.34% of CRASH
failures. However, in absolute terms, the numbers of errors reported by the MUT3 in the
Figure 5.19: Percentage of reported errors of MUT3 by failure type for SUT1.
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Figure 5.20: Percentage of reported errors of MUT3 by failure type for SUT2.
SUT2 are quite similar for SILENT and ERRATIC failures. Indeed, MUT3 has generated
at least an error notification in 258 experiments where a SILENT occurred in the SUT2,
while has generated at least an error notification in 222 experiments where an ERRATIC
occurred. In addition, Figure 5.19 and Figure 5.20 show also that MUT3 has generated error
notifications also when no failures occurred in both the SUTs. These error notifications
represent False Positives with respect to the failures.
Table 5.7 reports FP, FN, TP, P and R for the MUT3 for each SUT. It can be noted that
the precision is very close to 1 in SUT1 but not in SUT2. Therefore, almost all the failures
reported by the MUT are actual failures occurred in the SUT1. The number of FNs is 1,204
out of total 3,159 failures in the SUT1 and 167 out of total 685 failures occurred in the
SUT2. These findings suggest that rule-based logging might miss some failures, especially
in the SUT1. The rightmost column of Table 5.7 reports the recall of the MUT.
It should be noted that the density of the MUT, which is reported by Table 4.2 (i.e.,
Table 5.7: False Positive (FP), False Negative (FN), True Positive (TP), Precision and Recall
of MUT3 for each SUT.
FP FN TP Precision Recall
MW-RB 20 1,204 1,955 0.990 0.619
AM-RB 139 167 518 0.788 0.756
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RB), is potentially related to the value of recall. For example, the different values of recall
measured for the MW-RB and AM-RB, i.e., 0.619 and 0.765, respectively, are likely caused
by the different density of the rule-based logging instructions in the SUTs, i.e., 0.36% and
8.59% out of the total number of rule-based logging instructions placed in the source code
of SUT1 and SUT2, respectively.
5.3.2 Failure Coverage
The overall recall has been broken down by failure type in each SUT. Figure 5.21 shows the
percentage of reported failures of MUT3 by failure type and SUT. It can be noted that the
reporting ability of the MUT3 changes significantly across the SUTs. Moreover,
the MUT might show a different ability at reporting the same type of failure
in different SUTs. In fact, the coverage of rule-based logging ranges from a minimum of
5.70%, i.e., MW-RB (ERRATIC failures), to a maximum of 93.14%, i.e., AM-RB (SILENT
failures).
The overall recall has been also broken down by fault type in each SUT. Figure 5.22
Figure 5.21: Percentage of reported failure of MUT3 by type and case study.
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Figure 5.22: Percentage of reported failure of MUT3 by fault type and case study.
shows the percentage of activated faults that are reported by MUT3 in both the SUTs. It
can be noted that the reporting ability by fault type of the MUT changes slightly
across the SUTs. Moreover, the MUT might show a different ability at reporting
the same type of fault in different SUTs. In fact, the reported failure by fault type
of rule-based logging ranges from a minimum of 37.04%, i.e., MW-RB (CHK faults), to
a maximum of 68.02%, i.e., MW-RB (INT faults), in the SUT1, and from a minimum of
0.00%, i.e., AM-RB (CHK faults), to a maximum of 94.31%, i.e., AM-RB (ASG faults), in
the SUT2.
5.3.3 Error Determination Degree
The error behavior inferred by the error notifications of the MUT3 has been evaluated by
considering the error model extracted during the error clustering process.
Figure 5.23 shows the breakdown of the errors reported by MUT3 in the SUT1 by error
type, i.e., the error types that belong to the inferred error model reported in Table 4.6, and
fault ODC class. Percentage of the errors reported by the considered MUT by error type
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and ODC class can be observed in the total ALG, total ASG, total CHK and total INT
rows of Table 4.13. It can be noted that the percentage of errors reported by the
MUT for each error type slightly changes at varying the ODC class in SUT1.
For example, considering the error type e8-RB, i.e., kernel module errors, the MUT has
generated at least an error notification of this type in 79.49%, 81.15%, 75.00% and 78.13%
of ALG, ASG, CHK and INT experiments, respectively, i.e., experiments where only an
ALG, an ASG, CHK or an INT fault has been injected in the SUT. Similarly, the MUT has
generated at least an error notification of type e1-RB, i.e., writer module errors, in 38.11%,
35.52%, 40.00% and 27.50% of ALG, ASG, CHK and INT experiments, respectively. All
the ODC classes exhibited a very similar error behavior. A closer look into the error
notifications obtained from these ODC classes and the source code of the related injected
faults allowed to understand that often faults of different classes led to error notifications of
the same type, that is from the same module of the kernel in the case of rule-based logging.
Figure 5.23: Percentage of reported errors by cluster and fault ODC type for MUT3.
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Table 5.8: Prediction results for MUT3 (k-fold cross-validation: Random Forest and k=30).
class correct classification (%) incorrect classification (%)
ODC fault class 54.70% 45.30%
fault type 44.90% 55.10%
failure type 91.97% 8.03%
For example, the analysis of the error notifications revealed that different types of fault,
injected in different location of the kernel, generated errors that have propagated often to
the core module of the kernel, leading this module to generate an error notification, which
is than part of the e8-RB cluster. Indeed, it should be noted that e9-RB errors are the
most reported ones by the MUT in all the ODC classes.
An extract of the obtained dataset has been submitted to a classifier in order to measure
the Error Determination Degree of the rule-based logging with respect to the ODC fault
class, i.e., the ability of its error notifications to suggest what is the ODC class of the fault
that have led to those error notifications. The extracted dataset contains (i) the ODC class
of the injected fault and (ii) the number of error notifications generated by the rule-based
logging for each error type of its inferred error model, for each fault injection experiment
where at least one error notification has been generated by the MUT. This dataset has
been submitted to the Random Forest classifier; the numbers of error notifications for each
type are used as features of the classification, while the ODC fault class is used as the
class to predict. A K-fold cross-validation has been conducted, with K=30. The first row
of Table 5.8 reports the results of the classification. The considered classifier was able to
predict the ODC type of a fault from the error notifications the fault have led to with a
not very high accuracy; in fact, the percentage of correct classification, i.e., the considered
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Error Determination Degree, is equal to 54.70%. This result confirm the finding inferred
from Figure 5.23. Indeed, the low variability of the error behavior inferred by means of the
MUT3 at varying the ODC class led to the poor prediction performance of the classifier.
The ODC fault class has been broken down by fault type in order to understand the
error behavior at varying the fault types. Figure 5.24 shows the percentage of errors that
are reported by MUT3 by error and fault type. Percentage of the errors reported by the
considered MUT by error and fault type can be observed in Table 4.13. It can be noted
that the percentage of errors reported by the MUT for each error type slightly
changes at varying the fault type in SUT1. For example, the error type e3-RB,
i.e., subscriber module errors, has been reported with different percentages at varying the
fault type, e.g., at least an error notification of this type has been reported in 23.53% of
Figure 5.24: Percentage of reported errors by cluster and fault type for MUT3.
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experiments where a MIFS fault has been injected as well as in 45.04% of experiments where
a WPFV fault has been injected. However, many fault types exposed a very similar error
behavior. This finding is strictly related to the one obtained for the ODC classes, where
almost all the ODC classes exposed a very similar behavior. In addition, given a fault
type, in almost all cases the percentage of reported errors strongly changes at
varying the error type. For example, for MFC faults the error type e6-RB, i.e., topic
module error, is reported in 7.14% of experiments, while the error e8-RB is reported in
69.29% of experiments. It should be noted that a limited number of samples have been
collected for some types of fault, i.e., MVIV, MVAV, WVAV, MIA, and MLC, as showed in
Table 4.9 (RB column). Thus, no conclusions can be drawn for these types of fault.
An extract of the obtained dataset has been submitted to the Random Forest classifier
in order to measure the Error Determination Degree of the rule-based logging with respect
to the fault type, i.e., the ability of its error notifications to suggest what is the type of the
fault that have led to those error notifications. The extracted dataset contains (i) the type
of the injected fault and (ii) the number of error notifications generated by the rule-based
logging for each error type of its inferred error model, for each fault injection experiment
where at least one error notification has been generated by the MUT. The numbers of error
notifications for each type are used as features of the classification, while the fault type is
udes as class to predict. A K-fold cross-validation has been conducted, with K=30. The
second row of Table 5.8 reports the results of the classification. The considered classifier was
able to predict the fault type from the error notifications the fault have led to with a not
very high accuracy; in fact, the percentage of correct classification, i.e., the considered Error
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Determination Degree, is equal to 44.90%, which is even worse than the one obtained in the
case where the ODC class has been considered as class to predict. This result confirm the
finding inferred from Figure 5.24. Indeed, the low variability of the error behavior inferred
by means of the MUT3 at varying the fault type led to the poor prediction performance of
the classifier.
Figure 5.25 shows the breakdown of the errors reported by MUT3 in the SUT1 by failure
type, i.e., the failure that the reported error(s) led to, and error type. Percentage of the
errors reported by the considered MUT by error and failure type can be observed in Table
4.16. It can be noted that the percentage of errors reported by the MUT for almost
all error types strongly changes at varying the failure type in SUT1. For example,
the percentage of experiments where at least an error notification of type e8-RB is raised
ranges from 5.56%, for experiments where an ERRATIC failures occurred in the system,
to 81.22%, for experiments where a CRASH failure occurred in the system. Similarly, the
Figure 5.25: Percentage of reported errors by cluster and failure type for MUT3.
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percentage of experiments where at least an error notification of type e5-RB, i.e., network
module error ranges from 7.75%, for experiments where a CRASH failures occurred in the
system, to 66.67%, for experiments where an ERRATIC failure occurred in the system.
An extract of the obtained dataset has been submitted to the Random Forest classifier
in order to measure the Error Determination Degree of the rule-based logging with respect
to the failure type, i.e., the ability of its error notifications to suggest what is the type
of failure occurred in the system as consequence of the error(s) behind those notifications.
The extracted dataset contains (i) the failure occurred in the system and (ii) the number
of error notifications generated by the rule-based logging for each error type of its inferred
error model, for each fault injection experiment where at least one error notification has
been generated by the MUT. The numbers of error notifications for each type are used as
features of the classification, while the failure type is used as class to predict. A K-fold
cross-validation has been conducted, with K=30. The third row of Table 5.8 reports the
results of the classification. The classifier was able to predict the failure type from the
error notifications with a high accuracy; in fact, the percentage of correct classification,
i.e., the considered Error Determination Degree, is equal to 91.97%. This result confirms
the finding inferred from Figure 5.25. Indeed, the high variability of the error behavior
inferred by means of the MUT3 at varying the failure type led to the very good prediction
performance of the classifier.
Based on these findings, it should be noted that also rule-based logging can potentially
allow the determination of the failure type occurred in the communication middleware from
the obtained error notifications, while nothing can be said about the ODC class and type
Chapter 5. Experimental Results: Analysis of the target Techniques 154
of the fault that has been injected.
5.3.4 Error Propagation Reportability
The propagation paths of the errors raised in SUT1 during the experimental campaign, as
consequences of the injected faults, have been inferred by means of the error notifications
generated by MUT3 in the SUT. As a reminder, the error notifications generated by rule-
based logging in the SUT1 provides the module of the kernel, and also the function, that
has generated the notification. Therefore, the knowledge of the component, and also of the
function, where the faults have been injected (both provided by the tool used for the fault
injection), along with the knowledge of the source component and function of each error
notification, allowed to build non-exhaustive graphs that summarize the error propagation
phenomena obtained during the experimental campaign. It should be noted that the MUT3
is implemented only in the kernel component of the SUT1. Therefore, only the propagation
between the node kernel-immediate and kernel-quick can be inferred.
Figure 5.26 shows the directed graph that summarizes the error propagation paths that
can be inferred form the error notifications provided by the MUT3 in the SUT1, which are
generated as a consequence of ALG faults. Noteworthy, the number of faults considered
in the graph refers to the number of faults that have led to at least an error notification
to be raised by rule-based logging. It can be observed that most of errors raised the
4 fault type of the ALG class have been reported immediately, i.e., in the same
function where the fault has been injected. In fact, 70.82% of the faults considered in the
graph have led to an error notification in the same function where they have been injected.
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In addition, only a small fraction of the errors led to these faults have propagated in the
other modules of the kernel, as can be inferred from the high probability of the self loop in
the node kernel-immediate, i.e., 0.72.
Similar considerations apply also to Figure 5.18, which shows the directed graph that
summarizes the error propagation paths that can be inferred form the error notifications
provided by the MUT3 in the SUT1, which are generated as a consequence of ASG faults.
Indeed, the Figureshows that 78.37% of the faults considered in the graph have led to an
error notification in the same function where they have been injected; while only a small
fraction of the errors led to these faults have propagated in the other modules of the kernel,
as can be inferred from the high probability of the self loop in the node kernel-immediate,
i.e., 0.70.
It should be noted that for both the graphs the evaluation of the proposed Error Propa-
gation Reportability is not useful since it exposes a value equal to 100.00% in this case (i.e.,
all the errors notifications of the rule-based logging are generated from the kernel compo-
nent of the SUT1), which is not realistic because the rule-based logging is not implemented
in all the components of the system. However, by considering the obtained perfect value
for the EPR and the absence of notifications form other components of the target system,
one can infer that there is the need of EDMs in the other components.
Figure 5.26 and Figure 5.27 also show that errors reported by rule-based logging
in the kernel of the SUT1 have led to different failure manifestation in the SUT.
In fact, in both the Figures it can be seen that the errors reported in both the kernel nodes
led to all considered types of failure. However, in both the cases, most of the CRASH
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failures are reported by the error notifications generated in kernel-immediate; while most
of the SILENT failures are reported by the error notifications generated in kernel-quick for
the ALG class, i.e., Figure 5.26, and in kernel-immediate for the ASG class, i.e., Figure
5.27.
Based on these findings, practitioners can only define the kernel as potential location
for ERMs. However, they can obtain more detailed information on where put the ERMs
inside the kernel. A closer look into the error notifications generated by rule-based logging
allowed to understand what is the type of the most reported error notifications, i.e., the
module of the kernel that generates more error notifications with respect the other ones.
In particular, it has been found that in both the cases, i.e., ALG and ASG, most of the
error notifications are generated by the core module of the kernel, i.e., the cluster e8-RB.
Therefore, this module represents a good candidate where to locate an ERM.
It should be noted that the analysis showed here is intentionally conducted to at an
higher level, i.e., at component level. However, practitioners can leverage the proposed
methodology also to conduct a more fine-grained analysis, reaching the function level. More
in details, by leveraging the tracing ability of the rule-based logging, it is possible to recreate
the actual error propagation between the modules that compose the kernel. For example,
Figure 5.28 shows some of the error propagation paths inside the kernel component, lim-
ited to some MLPA experiments. It can be noted that it has been possible to recreate the
actual error propagation paths between the modules, as shown in the kernel-QUICK node,
occurred during the considered experiments, allowing to understand how the errors propa-
gated inside the kernel during these experiments. Noteworthy, only the absolute values are
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shown on the graph due to not comprehensive set of the considered MLPA experiments.
The findings obtained from the analysis of rule-based logging provide part of the answer
to the Research Question 1, i.e., RQ1, the Research Question 2, i.e., RQ2, and
the Research Question 3, i.e., RQ3. In fact, the analysis of the Error Propagation
Reportability allowed to understand that rule-based logging can be used to characterize the
error behavior of the considered SUT (RQ1 ), as well as that there is the need to improve
the rule-based logging in the other components since error notifications are raised only in
the faulty component (RQ2 ). Differently, the analysis of Recall and Precision, of Failure
coverage and of Error Determination Degree exhibited by rule-based logging during the
experiments allowed to infer how its Recall and Precision values change between the SUTs,
how its failure reporting ability changes at varying the failure and fault type, and also the
values exhibited by its EDD with respect to the fault type, ODC class and failure type
(RQ3 ).
5.4 Practical Implications and Threats to Validity
The conducted analysis allowed to obtain a number of practical implications to improve
the error detection and recovery of the target system. In particular, insights about the
placement of EDM and ERM in the source code of the communication middleware have
been provided. For example, the analysis of the Error Propagation Reportability of event
logging and assertion checking highlighted the need of EDMs in the kernel component,
which have to consider both the e4-EL and e2-AC error types, i.e., Data type errors and
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Unexpected value errors, respectively. In addition, also the need of ERM in the system
has been highlighted. Indeed, the analysis of the Error Propagation Reportability of event
logging revealed that the placement of an ERM, which tries to avoid e5-EL errors, i.e.,
Main daemon errors, into the api, spliced or user component can be beneficial to cope with
SILENT failures, while, in the case of assertion checking, it can be beneficial to insert an
ERM, which tries to avoid that NULL value error, i.e., e4-AC, into the ddsi2 component
can be beneficial to cope with CRASH failures.
Regarding the threats to validity, it should be noted that the study relies on the error
reported by the considered monitoring techniques, therefore the undetected errors cannot
be considered into the analysis. As a result, the propagation graphs have to be considered
non-exhaustive since they do not include all the errors occurred into the system, but only the
ones reported by the techniques. In addition, there is the possibility that some propagation
paths from the faulty component, i.e., where the fault has been injected, to the other ones of
the target system are not reported by a monitoring technique because they are not present
by design in the target system, e.g., when the component that reports the error works as a
detector of the faulty component. Therefore, the proposed EPR metric might provide not
accurate value in this case. However, it can be successfully used to decide where to place
EDMs and ERMs, and, more important, as a comparative metric between MUTs.
Chapter 6
Experimental Results: Comparison
of Monitoring Techniques
A comparison of the considered MUTs, i.e., event logging (EL), assertion checking (AC), rule-based
logging (RB), has been conducted by comparing the measures obtained from the evaluation metrics
presented in Section 3.3. The comparison allowed to understand how the effectiveness of a MUT
varies across the different SUTs in terms of failure reporting and dissimilarity of data, as well as to
understand how the EDD and EPR change between the MUTs of the SUT1. Also the combination
of different MUTs has been analyzed in order to evaluate the potential benefits that can be achieved
by considering multiple MUTs at the same time.
6.1 Comparison of the MUTs
The effectiveness of the MUTs of each SUT have been compared by analyzing the results
obtained for each MUT in the analysis described in Chapter 5. The comparison have been
conducted by studying the measures obtained for each evaluation metric defined in Section
3.3. In addition, the potential benefits that can be obtained by combining different MUTs
have been evaluated in terms of both failure reporting and error propagation reportability.
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6.1.1 Recall and Precision
Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 show the percentage of reported errors of the MUTs, i.e., the
percentage of experiments where the MUTs has generated at least one error notification,
with respect to the failure and non-failure experiments, i.e., the experiments where the
injected fault led to a failure in the considered SUT or not, respectively, conducted during
the experimental campaign for SUT1 and SUT2, respectively.
Figure 6.1 shows that MUT3, i.e., rule-based logging (RB), has been able to report at
least an error notification for a percentage of CRASH failures occurred in the SUT1 higher
than ones of the other MUTs, i.e., 67.98%, as well as for SILENT failures, i.e., 70.10%.
Differently, the MUT1, i.e., event logging (EL), has been able to report at least an error
notification for a percentage of ERRATIC failures occurred in the SUT1 higher than ones
of the other MUTs, i.e., 20.89%.
Figure 6.2 shows that MUT3 has reported at least an error notification for a percentage
of SILENT failures and of ERRATIC failures occurred in the SUT2 higher than the ones of
the other MUTs, i.e., 94.13% and 68.10%, respectively. Differently, MUT1 has reported at
least an error notification for a percentage of CRASH failures occurred in the SUT2 higher
Figure 6.1: Percentage of reported errors of MUTs by failure type for SUT1.
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Figure 6.2: Percentage of reported errors of MUTs by failure type for SUT2.
than the ones of the other MUTs, i.e., 51.22%.
In addition, Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 show also that in bothe the SUTs the MUT1 has
generated at least an error notification for a percentage of experiment where no failures
occurred in the SUTs higher than the ones of the other MUTs. These error notifications
represent False Positives (FPs) in respect to the failures.
Table 6.1 reports FP, FN, TP, P and R for each MUT and each SUT. It can be noted
that the precision is very close to 1 for all the MUTs implemented by the SUT1: almost
all the failures reported by the MUTs are actual failures occurred in the communication
middleware. In the SUT2, only the assertions exhibit a high precision value. In fact, event
Table 6.1: False Positive (FP), False Negative (FN), True Positive (TP), Precision and Recall
of each SUT and MUT.
FP FN TP Precision Recall
MW-EL 50 2,495 664 0.930 0.210
MW-AC 2 1,555 1,604 0.999 0.508
MW-RB 20 1,204 1,955 0.990 0.619
AM-EL 243 604 81 0.250 0.118
AM-AC 0 640 45 1.000 0.066
AM-RB 139 167 518 0.788 0.756
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(AM-EL) and rule-based (AM-RB) logging generate a relevant number of FPs. The number
of FNs in the SUT1 ranges from 1,204 (i.e., MW-RB) to 2,495 (i.e., MW-EL) out of total
3,159 failures. In the SUT2 FNs range from 167 (i.e., AM-RB) to 640 (i.e., AM-AC) out of
total 685 failures occurred in the system. These findings suggest that a monitoring technique
might miss a relevant number of failures. The rightmost column of Table 6.1 reports the
recall of the MUTs.
It should be noted that the density of the MUTs, which is reported by Table 4.2, is
potentially related to the value of recall/precision. For example, the rather different values
of recall measured for the MW-AC and AM-AC, are likely caused by the different density
of the assertions in the SUTs, i.e., 0.99% and 0.18%, respectively. The MW-RB detects a
smaller number of failures when compared to AM-RB: again, the density of RB in SUT2 is
bigger than the SUT1, i.e., 8.59% and 0.36%, respectively. Finally, it can be observed that
the recall of MW-EL is bigger than AM-EL: the percentage of error logging instructions out
of the total number of logging instructions of MW-EL is bigger than AM-EL, i.e, 14.45% and
11.39%, respectively. Nevertheless, the high density of a MUT might affect the precision,
as it can be inferred from the values of precision of AM-EL and AM-RB reported by Table
6.1. In fact, a large number of monitoring instructions might increase the probability to
generate FPs.
These findings provide part of the answer to the Research Question 3, i.e., RQ3.
In fact, Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 show that different MUTs of the same SUT exhibited a
very different ability at reporting failures occurred in the SUT. Different MUTs of the same
SUT exhibited also different values of Recall and Precision, as shown in Table 6.1, which
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also shows that the values of Recall and Precision exposed by the MUTs changes at varying
the SUT.
6.1.2 Failure Coverage
As discussed in Chapter 5, the overall recall has been broken down by failure type in each
SUT. Given a failure type, the bottom row of Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 show the absolute
number and the percentage of failures that have been reported by each MUT in SUT1 and
SUT2, respectively.
Figure 6.3 shows the percentage of reported failures by type, MUT and SUT. It can
be noted that the reporting ability of the MUTs changes significantly across the
SUTs. Moreover, a MUT might show a different ability at reporting the same
type of failure in different SUTs. For example, the coverage of the event logs ranges
from a minimum of 3.61%, i.e., AM-EL (SILENT failures) to a maximum of 65.20%, i.e.,
MW-EL (SILENT failures). Rule-based logging achieves the maximum failure coverage
observed in this study. Assertions are able to detect almost only CRASH failures, as it can
Figure 6.3: Percentage of reported failure by type, technique and case study.
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be inferred by Figure 6.3.
The overall recall has been also broken down by fault type in each SUT, as already
discussed in Chapter 5. Given a fault type, the rightmost column of Table 4.7 and Table
4.8 shows the absolute number and the percentage of failures that have been reported by
each MUT in SUT1 and SUT2, respectively.
Figure 6.4 shows the percentage of activated faults that are reported by the MUTs in
both the SUTs. Percentage of reported failures can be observed in the rightmost column
of Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 for SUT1 and SUT2, respectively. It can be observed that the
reporting ability of the MUTs by fault type changes significantly at varying the
SUT. In fact, the percentages range between a minimum of 18.69%, for MW-EL (ALG
faults), and a maximum of 68.02%, for MW-RB (INT faults), in SUT1; while they range
between a minimum of 0.00%, for AM-AC (CHK and INT faults) and AM-RB (CHK
faults), in SUT2. Moreover, a MUT might show a different ability at reporting the
same type of failure in different SUTs.
Figure 6.4: Percentage of reported failure of the MUTs by fault type and case study.
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These findings provide further insights related to the Research Question 3, i.e., RQ3.
In fact, Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show how the failure reporting ability of the MUTs changes
at varying the failure type and the fault type into the two SUTs, respectively.
6.1.3 Orthogonality of the MUTs
Given a SUT, the set of failures of the same type (i.e., CRASH, SILENT, ERRATIC ) is
broken down into 8 disjoint subsets, according to the notation described by Section 3.3.5:
NONE (i.e., the failures reported by no MUT), EL*, AC* and RB* (i.e., the failures re-
ported exclusively by one MUT), (EL·AC)*, (EL·RB)*, (AC·RB)* (i.e., the failures reported
exclusively by two out of the three MUTs), and ALL (i.e., the failures reported by all the
MUTs). The reader might refer to Figure 3.5 for the graphical representation of the sets,
where MUTi=EL, MUTj=AC and MUTk=RB.
Figure 6.5 shows that the MUTs are strongly orthogonal in SUT1. As a result, combining
the data produced by different MUTs might be useful to improve the detection of different
types of failures. For example, both event and rule-based logging, i.e., (EL·RB)* in Figure
Figure 6.5: Orthogonality of the MUTs (SUT1).
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6.5, report 51.96% of SILENT failures; moreover, each EL and RB detects additional 13.24%
and 18.14% of SILENT failures, respectively. AC alone does not give any contribution at
detecting SILENT failures. Similarly, both assertion checking and rule-based logging, i.e.,
(AC·RB)* in Figure 6.5, report 27.09% of CRASH failures; moreover, AC and RB report
further 20.58% and 26.83% of CRASH failures, respectively. Noteworthy, no MUT is able
to report around 75% of ERRATIC failures, which go undetected, as it can be inferred by
the NONE category.
Figure 6.6 shows that the considered MUTs are orthogonal also in the SUT2. For
example, event and rule-based logging, i.e., (EL·RB)* in Figure 6.6, report only 2.44% of
CRASH failures; however, EL and RB report additional 42.68% and 15.85% of CRASH
failures, respectively. This finding indicates that EL and RB report disjoints subsets of
CRASH failures. It can be noted that AC alone does not give a significant contribution
at detecting CRASH failures. For example, 21.95% of CRASH failures reported by means
of AC are also reported by RB. More important, RB is able to report the most part of
SILENT and ERRATIC failures in the SUT2.
Figure 6.6: Orthogonality of the MUTs (SUT2).
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Figure 6.7: Percentage of reported failure by different techniques combination.
Different monitoring techniques can be combined to increase the failure cov-
erage of a given SUT (for instance, by redirecting the notifications generated by different
MUTs to the same log file). Figure 6.7 shows the percentage of reported failures that can
be achieved by combining different MUTs by failure type and SUT. For example, the com-
bination of event and rule-based logging, i.e., EL∪RB, makes it possible to report 83.33%
of SILENT failures in the SUT1. This value is bigger than 70.10%, i.e., the percentage of
SILENT failures reported by RB in the SUT1 (RB is the MUT with the maximum SILENT
reporting ability in the SUT1).
Differently from the SUT1, combining EL and RB is beneficial to improve the detection
of CRASH in the SUT2. EL ∪ RB reports 89.02% of CRASH failures, which is higher
than the 51.22% exhibited by EL (i.e., the MUT with the best CRASH reporting ability in
the SUT2). In both the SUTs the combination of all the MUTs (i.e., ALL in Figure 6.7)
exhibits the maximum coverage in each failure type.
The obtained findings provide further insights related to the Research Question 4,
i.e., RQ4. Indeed, the results obtained from the analysis of the orthogonality of the
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considered MUTs allows understanding that the MUTs are orthogonal in both the SUTs,
which allows to obtain an improvement of the failure coverage in each SUT, as seen in
Figure 6.7.
6.1.4 Dissimilarity of the Monitoring Data
For each SUT three document sets are established based on the data collected during the
campaigns. In the SUT1, the sets contain 664, 1,604 and 1,955 files for EL, AC, and RB,
respectively; while in the SUT2, they contain 81, 45 and 518 files for EL, AC, and RB. The
sets are composed by the files generated under the reported failures by each MUT/SUT.
The total number of reported failures by MUT is in the rightmost cell of the bottom row
of Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 for SUT1 and SUT2, respectively.
Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9 compare the CDFs obtained for the considered MUTs in the
SUT1 and the SUT2. Given a log.entropy value taken from the x-axis, i.e., l, the y-axis
reports the probability that the log.entropy of the documents generated by a given MUT
Figure 6.8: CDFs of log.entropy estimated for MUTs in SUT1.
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is ≤ l (or, equivalently the percentage of documents whose entropy is ≤ l). For example,
the point marked with a × (MW-RB series) in Figure 6.8 indicates that around 97% of RB
documents produced by the SUT1 under failures have entropy ≤ 1.5.
The log.entropy of the notifications produced by RB under failures is smaller than EL
and AC, with around 3% and 2% of documents exhibiting a log.entropy value > 1.5 in
both SUT1 and SUT2, respectively. It is worth noting that, while RB is the MUT covering
the largest number of failures in both the SUTs, the dissimilarity of the notifications it
generates across different failures is smaller than the other MUTs.
A closer look into the data allowed gaining insights into the causes of the small dissim-
ilarity obtained by the monitoring data of RB. It has been noted that a small number of
notifications occurs across many documents. Figure 6.10 shows the top 5 recurring gener-
ated by RB in both the SUTs. For example, in the SUT1 the SER, v kernelNew, kernel
notification, which notifies that the function v kernelNew did not terminate, was found in
1,325 out of 1,955 documents, i.e., the 67.7%. In the SUT2 the CER, root notification,
Figure 6.9: CDFs of log.entropy estimated for MUTs in SUT2.
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which notifies the unexpected crash of the root software module of AM, was found in 486
out of 518 documents, i.e., the 93.82%. While these notifications ensure high failure cover-
age, they become less useful for troubleshooting because RB frequently generates them.
The top 2 recurring notifications of EL are reported in Figure 6.11. The Description
Type mismatch notification of the SUT1 was found in 110 out of 664 documents, i.e.,
the 16.6%. In the SUT2 the Descr Not Implemented notification was found in 35 out
of 81 documents, i.e., 43.2%. The event logs generated under different failures are rather
dissimilar in both the SUTs. This dissimilarity allows EL to achieve log.entropy values
Communication Middleware (1,955 documents)
1 ,325 SER v_kernelNew kernel
648 IER v_builtinNew kernel
506 SER v_dataReaderNew reader
353 SER v_writerWrite writer
291 SER v_writerNew writer
Arrival Manager (518 documents)
486 CER service root
273 SER StateEventTrans Main
268 SER StartThd Main
265 SER RunInit EligThd
263 IER read Main
Figure 6.10: Top 5 recurring notifications in RB.
Communication Middleware (664 documents)
110 Description Type mismatch object . . .
. . . type is OBJ but OBJ was expected
94 Description Could not claim DDSdeamon
Arrival Manager (81 documents)
35 Descr Not ImplementedNUM NUM
34 NUM NUM NUEXCEPTION Code ENUMh from . . .
. . . Task Search in Table PidNUM NUM
Figure 6.11: Top 2 recurring notifications in EL.
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Communcation Middleware (1,604 documents)
162 Sender codecsyncc122 cmutexUnlock . . .
. . . Assertion osthdIdToInt mtx owner . . .
. . . osthIdToInt osthdIdSelf failed
159 Receiver codecsyncc122 cmutexUnlock . . .
. . . Assertion osthdIdToInt mtx owner . . .
. . . osthdIdToInt osthdIdSelf failed
Arrival Manager (45 documents)
45 TIMESTAMP TST WARNING EXCEPTION . . .
. . . Assertion Failed
Module Procedure Line Instruction
2 MAIN MAINTEST 2446 B7A81588
Figure 6.12: Top 2 recurring notifications in AC.
greater than or equal to AC and RB logging in both the SUTs (i.e., around 50% and 40%
of documents exhibiting a value > 1.5 for SUT1 and SUT2, respectively). The experiments
suggest that the monitoring data generated by means of event logging might be
more suitable for manual failure analysis with respect to the other MUTs.
The dissimilarity of the monitoring data obtained by EL is very close to AC in the SUT1:
in both cases, log.entropy is > 1.5 for around 50% of documents. Examples of assertions
occurred in the SUT1 are shown by Figure 6.12, which report the top 2 recurring assert
notifications in both the SUTs.
Differently from SUT1, in the SUT2 EL and AC have different dissimilarity values. The
log.entropy of AC varies in a small range around 1.5,as it can be noted from Figure 6.9.
There is a lack of differentiation in the notification generated by AC in SUT2. For example,
the top recurring notification TIMESTAMP TST WARNING EXCEPTION (shown by Figure 6.12)
was found in 45 out of 45 documents, i.e., the 100.0%, while the second top recurring
notification MAIN MAINTEST 2446 B7A81588 was found in 2 out of 45 documents, i.e., the
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4.4%. The lack of differentiation leads to very similar log.entropy values in the monitoring
data generated by AC.
The obtained findings provide further insights related to the Research Question 3,
i.e., RQ3. Indeed, the results obtained from the dissimilarity analysis shows that the
monitoring data generated by means of event logging might be more suitable for manual
failure analysis with respect to the other MUTs, since event logging generate data rather
dissimilar under different failures.
6.1.5 Error Determination Degree
The Error Determination Degrees, i.e., EDD with respect to the ODC fault class, the fault
type, and the failure type, exhibited by each MUT of the SUT1 have been compared. In
addition, the EDDs have been also measured for the combination of all the MUTs of the
SUT1, i.e., the ones obtained by considering all the MUTs at the same time. Table 6.2
contains the values of the before mentioned EDDs.
It can be noted that all the MUTs of the SUT exhibited an EDD lower than 60% with
respect to the fault type and ODC fault class, which means that no MUT of the SUT1
allows to infer either the fault type or the ODC class of the fault that have led
to the error from its error notifications. On the other hand, all the MUTs of the SUT
exhibited an EDD greater than 88% with respect to the failure type, which means that
each MUT of the SUT1 allows to infer the type of the failure occurred in the
SUT from its error notifications.
Similar considerations apply to the the combination of the MUTs. Indeed, the EDD
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Table 6.2: Error Determination Degrees exhibited by each MUT of SUT1 and by their
combination.
EDD w.r.t.
EDD (%)
MW-EL MW-AC MW-RB all MUTs
ODC fault class 57.10 56.30 54.70 58.98
fault type 43.47 42.12 44.90 47.08
failure type 88.92 99.87 91.97 96.36
with respect to both the ODC fault class and the fault type exhibited a value lower than
60%. However, an improvement can be observed in both the cases; in fact, the EDDs of the
combination of all the MUTs outperforms all other in the case of ODC fault class and fault
type, exhibiting a value of 58.98% and of 47.08%, respectively. Differently, the combination
of the MUTs does not allow to obtain the highest EDD with respect to the failure type.
Indeed, the combination exhibited a value of 96.36% that is lower than the 99.87% of
the MW-AC. However, it should be noted that assertion checking was able to detect only
CRASH failures in the SUT1, as discussed in Section 5.2.2. Therefore, in absolute terms,
the value exhibited by the combination of the MUTs can be considered as an improvement
of the EDD with respect to the failure type. Both the findings suggest that the combination
of all the MUTs of the SUT1 can be useful to obtain a little improvement in terms of EDDs.
The obtained findings provide further insights related to both the Research Question
3, i.e., RQ3 and the Research Question 4, i.e., RQ4. Indeed, Table 6.2 allows under-
standing that the MUTs implemented in SUT1 exhibited very similar ability to determine
the type/ODC class of the fault that have led to an error reported by the MUT as well as
the type of the failure that the reported error have led to. On the other hand, Table 6.2
allows also understanding that a combination of the MUTs implemented in the SUT1 can
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be useful to improve the EDDs.
6.1.6 Error Propagation Reportability
The Error Propagation Reportability values exhibited by each MUT of the SUT1 with
respect to the ALG ODC class, i.e., the one for which the higher number of samples has
been obtained, have been compared. In addition, the EPR with respect to the same ODC
class has been also measured for the combination of all the MUTs of the SUT1, i.e., the
one obtained considering all the MUTs at the same time. Table 6.3 contains the values
of the before mentioned EPRs. Noteworthy, the best highest EPR have been exposed by
the rule-based logging. However, as discussed in Section 5.3.4, this value is not realistic
because the rule-based logging is not implemented in all the components of the system,
but only in the kernel component; thus, it can be excluded from the comparison. Based
on this consideration, the best EPR is exhibited by the combination of the MUTs, i.e,
79.78%, which significantly outperformed both MW-EL and MW-AC, i.e., 26.01% and
36.64%, respectively. Therefore, the combination of the MUTs of the SUT1 allow
obtaining an improvement in terms of Error Reporting Ability.
The EPR of the combination of the MUTs of the SUT1 has been evaluated by analyzing
Table 6.3: Error Propagation Reportability (EPR) of each MUTs of SUT1, and of their
combination, with respect to the ALG faults.
MUT EPRALG (%)
MW-EL 26.01
MW-AC 36.64
MW-RB 100.00
all MUTs 79.78
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the related directed graph. Figure 6.13 shows the obtained graph, which summarizes the
major error propagation paths through the components of the SUT1 that which are gener-
ated as a consequence of ALG faults. The number of faults considered in the graph refers
to the number of faults that have led to at least an error notification to be raised by at
least one of the considered MUTs. The analysis of the graph shows that an improvement
has been obtained by combining the MUTs. For example, it can be noted that, differently
form the information inferred form the graph generated considering only the event logging,
Figure 5.8, all the errors that led to some error notifications in the api, spliced and user
components of the SUT1 at the same time, i.e., api+spliced+user node in the graph, are
propagated through the kernel component. Therefore, the assumption that the errors are
expected to arise in the kernel component of the SUT1 since all the faults have been injected
into this component is correct for these components.
Similar considerations apply to the ddsi2 and database components. Indeed, it can be
noted that, differently form the information inferred form the graph generated considering
only the assertion checking, Figure 5.17, where only the 0.8% of the errors that led to
at least an error notification in the ddsi2 component have been reported as propagated
through the kernel component, the combination of the MUTs reported that 24.78% of those
error have been propagated through the kernel component. Similarly, more than the half
of the errors that led to at least an error notification in the database component have
propagated through the kernel component, differently from the information inferred form
the graph generated considering only the event logging and only the assertion checking.
Therefore, the assumption is correct also for these components. It should be noted that
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this improvement is substantially due to the presence of the rule-based logging, which
reports only errors occurred in the kernel. Indeed, as it can be inferred form Figure 6.14,
where the detection node is shown, the number of errors reported by rule-base logging in
the considered components is almost equal to the number of error that are reported as
propagated from the kernel.
However, the presence of errors for both the components that generated an error noti-
fications without leave any traces in the kernel component, suggest that there is the need
of further EDMs in the SUT1 in order to improve the reporting of errors, as well as of the
error propagation. A closer look into the obtained error notifications in these cases allowed
to understand that most of the errors that are reported by the database and not from ker-
nel are of the type e2-AC, i.e., unexpected value errors; while most of the errors that are
reported by the ddsi2 and not from kernel are of the type e4-AC, i.e., NULL value errors.
Therefore, the EDMs to insert into the system have to cope to this kinds of errors. It should
be noted that both the types belong to the error model of the assertion checking. Indeed,
most of the error notifications raised in both the components have been raised by means of
assertions, as can be inferred into the Figure 6.14, where the detection node is shown. In
fact, 94% and 92% of error notifications reported in the database and ddsi2, respectively,
are raised by means of assertions.
Finally, Figure 6.13 allows also inferring that there is the need of ERMs in the system
since almost all the errors reported by the MUTs led to a failure in the systems. For
example, the error notifications reported by the api, spliced and user components at the
same time led to almost SILENT failures, while the ones reported by the database led to
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only CRASH failures; therefore, ERMs can be added in these components to cope with
these kinds of failure.
The obtained findings provide further insights related to all the Research Questions
addressed in this dissertation. Indeed, Figure 6.13 allows understanding that it is possible to
use monitoring techniques to characterize the error behavior of a complex critical software
system (RQ1), even if in a non-exhaustive way. As a reminder, only the errors reported
by the MUTs can be considered in the analysis. In addition, there is the possibility that
some propagation paths from the faulty component to the other ones are not reported by a
MUT because they are not present by design in the target SUT, e.g., when the component
that reports the error works as a detector of the faulty component, i.e., where the fault has
been injected. Therefore, the proposed EPR metric might provide not accurate value in this
case. Moreover, the analysis of the graph also allows to understand that the information
obtained from the error data collected by the MUTs can be leveraged to improve the
error detection/recovery of the MUTs of the SUT (RQ2), by providing insight about the
placement of EDMs/ERMs. Differently, both Figure 6.13 and Table 6.3 highlight how the
error and error propagation reporting ability changes between the MUTs (RQ3), even if
limited to the only ALG class, as well as that the combination of the MUTs can be useful
(RQ4) to improve the EPR, obtaining better insight about how the error propagates int
the SUT.
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6.2 Practical Implications and Threats to Validity
The content of the monitoring data collected during the experiments has been further
investigated to gain insights into the motivations underlying the coverage results. The
conducted investigation aims to identify, if any, specific characteristics of the SUTs that
motivate the results and provide practical implications to improve the MUTs.
A key finding of this study suggests that the effectiveness of a MUT is strongly affected
by the SUT and type of failure. It has been noted that MW-EL and AM-EL report 17.62%
and 51.22% of CRASH failures, respectively; on the contrary MW-EL outperforms MW-AC
under SILENT failures, i.e., 65.20% and 3.61% of reported SILENT failures, respectively.
A closer look into the monitoring data generated by EL in the SUTs allowed understanding
the motivations of such a difference.
It has been noted that 34 out of 45 CRASH failures induced in the SUT2 have been
notified by the example pattern in Figure 6.15, where TIMESTAMP and PROCESS PID represent
the timestamp of the log entry and the PID of the mentioned process, respectively. The
analysis of the source code of the SUT2 indicates that the pattern in Figure 6.15 is generated
by a supervisor software module of the arrival manager. The supervisor module is able to
manage the errors raised by its supervised processes (i.e., sequencing and metering processes,
shown in Figure 4.2) by executing different actions based on the given error. If no actions
can be executed, such as the case of a CRASH failure, the supervisor raises an exception
and appends an entry to the event log.
Differently, it has been noted that 92 out of 133 SILENT failures occurred in the SUT1
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were notified by the example pattern in Figure 6.15. The pattern indicates the occurrence
of some problems affecting the main daemon of the middleware, i.e., DDSdaemon. By
means of repeated runs of the middleware, it has been observed that during most of the
SILENT failure manifestations the DDSdaemon has been not responsive. Again, the manual
inspection of the source code allowed understanding that the pattern in Figure 6.15 is
generated by a diagnostic method that performs heartbeat checks on the DDSdaemon.
The method allows detection anomalies occurring under SILENT failures.
The above presented examples indicate that architectural features of a system are
potentially beneficial to event logging. The implementation of the supervisor module
in the SUT2 allowed AM-EL to report more CRASH failures than MW-EL. The heartbeat
checks on the main internal daemon of the SUT1 allowed MW-EL to better report SILENT
failures when compared to AM-EL. The inclusion of diagnostic supports in the system
architecture is beneficial to improve the reporting capability of event logs.
Arrival Manager - CRASH failures
TIMESTAMP EXCEPTION Code E829h from . . .
. . . Task Search in Table Pid PROCESS_PID
Communication Middleware - SILENT failures
//omitted
Description : An error occurring during . . .
. . . exithandling . Unable to determine the . . .
. . . presence of application participants .
The DDSdaemon service object was NULL .
//omitted
Description : Could not claim DDSdaemon .
Figure 6.15: Top recurring EL pattern of CRASH failures in SUT2 and SILENT failures
in SUT1.
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Beside architectural considerations, it has been observed that the placement of mon-
itoring instructions can affect the reporting ability of a MUT. In the SUT1 17.62%
and 60.78% of CRASH failures are reported by EL and AC. The inspection of the source
code of the SUT1 revealed that assertions are often placed before the logging instructions.
It is worth noting that the assertions implemented in the SUT1 belong to the specification of
function interface class (as discussed in Section 4.3): in this respect, they are likely placed
at the beginning of functions. The triggering of an assertion might suppress the notifications
generated by the logging instructions placed later in the source code of a function.
Figure 6.16 shows an example of AC and EL in the SUT1. It can be note that the
assertion (line 6) is placed before the logging instructions (lines 9-10), which is activated
upon the same condition (line 8) of the assertion, i.e., if this is NULL. In the case this is
NULL, the assertion is triggered and the logging instruction is not executed. This placement
of the assertions motivates to the small CRASH reporting ability shown by EL in the SUT1.
Both AC and EL have been enabled in the conducted experiments because one of the goals
of this dissertation is to assess the combined used of different MUTs
As a practical programming implication, developers should place the logging instructions
before the assertions triggered by the same conditions. It is worth noting that placement of
the assertions does not impact RB: the error detection mechanism of RB relies on the lack of
expected events (e.g., the end of a function call) rather than on the execution of a notifica-
tion instruction. Moreover, the experiments suggest that the monitoring instructions should
be placed along the paths where the errors are more likely to manifest. The log.entropy
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1 Communication Middleware (v spliced.c, line 729)
2 //omitted
3 s t a t i c v o i d n o t i f y C o h e r e n t R e a d e r s ( v _ k e r n e l _this ,
4 v _ d a t a R e a d e r S a m p l e r S a m p l e ){
5 //omitted
6 assert( this != NULL);
7 //omitted
8 if ( this == NULL) {
9 OS REPORT(OS WARNING, ”v spliced::notifyCoherentReaders”, 0,
10 ”Received illegal ’ this’ reference to kernel.”);
11 r e t u r n ;
12 }
13 //omitted
Figure 6.16: Example of assert and logging instructions (SUT1).
analysis discussed in Section 6.1.4 indicates that only a limited number of monitoring in-
structions is frequently activated under different failures. In this respect, the knowledge
of the system architecture (in terms of software modules and interactions among them) is
potentially useful to infer strategic source code locations, which are more suitable to contain
the monitoring instructions.
Regarding the threats to validity, it should be noted that the analysis has been conducted
on two datasets generated by the execution of controlled experiments aimed to assess recall,
precision and the three proposed metrics of the considered monitoring techniques (MUTs)
in two target systems (SUTs), under given workload and faultload. The discussed findings
might be subject to both construct and internal validity threats. In fact, special care
must be taken to reproduce realistic operation scenarios and to exercise the MUTs with
representative workload and faultload. The adoption of a scenario that is far from the
real application of the SUT or the execution of simplified workload and faultload represent
potential threats that practitioners replicating this type of analysis should be aware of.
In this work, special attention has been devoted to exercise both the SUTs according
to representative operations. Both MW and AM are deployed according to the settings
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provided by the industrial developers and are fed with realistic input data. For instance,
in the case of MW the workload consist of real flight data items produced by two legacy
ATC applications and consumed by a real instance of the web-based CWP, which is usually
deployed at customers’ premises. In the case of AM, the system is exercised with the
same test suite used by its developers to emulate the nominal usage of the system at the
production site.
Regarding the faultload, the study relies on faults belonging to the well consolidated or-
thogonal defect classification (ODC) [103] and the fault types that account for around
80% of representative faults found in real-world software systems have been selected, ac-
cording to the estimates in [104]. In addition, the faultload has been generated by using
the SAFE tool [110], which automatically searches for all the locations in the source code
where each of the considered fault types can be injected. As a result, a large number of
representative faults in all the possible code locations has been considered.
As a side effect, given the size of the faultload, some faults could be never activated
during the experiments (e.g., the fault is injected in a piece of code which is not exercised
by the workload, or it causes an error that is tolerated by the SUT). For instance, in the
case of MW, even if the faultload is composed by 12,733 faults, only 3,159 fault injections
resulted in a failure. Practitioners should be aware of this issue when replicating this type
of analysis by introducing faults in a large number of code locations.
Nevertheless, even if faults are exhaustively placed in all possible code locations, still for
some of the fault/failure combinations it might happen to have a small number of samples.
As an example, the (CHK, SILENT ) combination yields 1 failure in the MW case study.
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In these cases conclusions cannot be drawn.
Finally, as for external validity, results observed on two case studies are not statistically
generalizable. However, the reported findings, which are strongly supported by data, are
still useful to get an overall understanding on the type of characterization that can be per-
formed with the proposed method. Results show how the proposed method can be used
to understand the error behavior of complex critical software systems and to assess the
monitoring techniques of a given system, to uncover their limitations and to infer insight
useful to improve them accordingly. In addition, due to the lack of studies on monitoring
techniques of proprietary industrial systems in literature, the reported results can be ex-
tremely relevant to reliability engineers and practitioners in spite of the limitations in terms
of external validity.
Conclusion
The thesis addressed issues and challenges concerning the use of field data for the analysis
of the error behavior of complex critical software systems. Field data contain rich infor-
mation about the system reliability, providing valuable information on actual error/failure
behavior of a software system during the normal system operation. The thesis discussed a
substantial body of literature using field data, which highlighted that the analysis of field
failure data is useful in a variety of application domains, encompassing error and failure
classification, evaluation of dependability attributes, diagnosis and correlation of failures,
failure prediction. Field data are also used to understand the error behavior of software
systems as well as to characterize monitoring techniques, which are one of the main source
of field data. Nevertheless, the analysis of literature also revealed that the application of
existing techniques for the analysis of error behavior of software system is not not trivial in
the context of complex critical software systems, as well as that there are no past experi-
ences on the characterization of the effectiveness of monitoring techniques with respect to
failures and errors.
The work proposed a methodology that leverages field data generated by means of
monitoring techniques already implemented in the target complex critical software system
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in order to understand the error behavior of the system, avoiding intrusive modifications of
its source code for the collection of useful data to analyze. Moreover, the proposal is also
conceived as a methodology to compare the effectiveness of different monitoring techniques
implemented in different target systems. To this aim, the methodology leverages information
retrieval metrics and proposed metrics, i.e., Error Determination Degree, Error Propagation
Reportability, and Dissimilarity of monitoring data.
The proposed methodology has been applied in two real-world critical industrial software
systems in the context of Air Traffic Control domain, i.e., the communication middleware
and the arrival manager. The method leverages and analyzes the data reported by mon-
itoring techniques implemented by the mentioned systems, i.e., event logging, assertion
checking and source code instrumentation.
The obtained results reveal that field data generated by means of monitoring techniques
can be leveraged to understand the error behavior of complex critical software systems,
allowing to infer the types of error that affect the system, the effect they have on the
system and, more important, how they propagate through the components of the system.
The results show that these abilities change in different monitoring techniques, as well as
that the reporting ability of the considered techniques changes across the two systems and
the failure types. Moreover, the methodology suggests that the considered techniques are
strongly orthogonal in the considered case studies: different monitoring techniques can be
combined to increase the failure coverage and the error propagation reportability, obtaining
more detailed information about the propagation of errors. The analysis also indicates that
in the considered systems the monitoring data generated by means of event logging are
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more suitable for failure analysis purposes with respect to the other techniques.
Finally, a closer investigation of the error notifications collected during the experimental
campaigns revealed that the failure reporting ability of the considered monitoring techniques
is impacted by a variety of features, such as architecture of the system and placement of
the monitoring instructions. This finding has a number of practical implications that the
developer should consider in order to implement better monitoring techniques, and also to
place EDM and ERM where they can be more effective.
The general achievements have been summarized in the following, referring to the re-
search questions of this work:
• RQ1: Is it possible to use monitoring techniques to characterize the error behavior in
complex critical software system? The use of the proposed methodology to the mon-
itoring techniques implemented in the communication middleware, along with their
comparison, allowed understanding that it is possible to use the data they provide to
characterize the error behavior of the system. In particular, the proposed methodol-
ogy allowed to infer the types of error that affect the system, the effect they have on
the system and, more important, how they propagate through the components of the
system, according to the considered monitoring technique, even if in a non-exhaustive
way as discussed in the Section 5.4.
• RQ2: Is it possible to improve the error detection/recovery of a complex critical
software system from error data? The analysis of the error propagation graphs created
using the monitoring data of the communication middleware allowed inferring insights
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about potential locations where EDMs and ERMs might be beneficial for the system,
as well as the type of error/failure they have to cope with.
• RQ3: How do the error and failure reporting ability change between different moni-
toring techniques implemented in a given system? And what about the dissimilarity of
their data? Both the analysis of each monitoring techniques implemented in the two
considered target systems, and their comparison, allowed to understand that different
monitoring techniques of the same target system exhibited a very different ability at
reporting occurred failures. In particular, the failure reporting ability of the tech-
niques changed at varying the failure type and the fault type into the two target
systems. In addition, the results obtained from the dissimilarity analysis showed that
the monitoring data generated by different monitoring techniques exposed different
level of dissimilarity, also in different target systems. More in details, the analysis
showed that monitoring data generated by means of event logging might be more
suitable for manual failure analysis with respect to the other techniques, since event
logging generate data rather dissimilar under different failures. Finally, Error De-
termination Degree analysis allowed understanding that the techniques implemented
in the communication middleware exhibited very low ability to determine the type-
/ODC class of the fault that have led to an error reported by the techniques, while
they exhibited very high ability to determine the type of the failure that the reported
error have led to. The Error Propagation Reportability analysis highlighted instead
how the error and error propagation reporting ability changes between the considered
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monitoring techniques in the communication middleware.
• RQ4: Is it useful to combine different monitoring techniques implemented in a com-
plex critical software system? The results obtained from the analysis of the orthogo-
nality of the considered monitoring techniques allowed understanding that the tech-
niques are orthogonal in both the considered systems, which allowed to obtain an im-
provement of the failure coverage in each SUT, as highlighted by the results obtained
from their combination. In addition, the combination of the considered monitoring
techniques allowed also the improvement at reporting the propagation of errors in
the communication middleware, as showed by the results of the analysis on the Error
Propagation Reportability.
The proposed methodology allowed to answer to the research questions of this study,
showing that the field data generated by means of monitoring techniques can be leveraged for
error analysis in complex critical software systems. In particular, useful insights have been
obtained about the propagation of errors through the components of a target system, and on
where the placement of ERM and EDM can be potential beneficial in order to improve the
reliability of the system. Practical implications on how improve the monitoring techniques
implemented by the target system have been also provided.
Future work will be devoted to extend this work on different paths. First, the insights
obtained from this study will be provided to developers of the considered systems in order to
improve their monitoring techniques, as well as to introduce potential beneficial EDMs and
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ERMs. Second, the methodology will be applied to other software systems, either critical or
not, in order to further validate the proposed approach. In addition, a study on the so-called
indirect monitoring techniques has been started in order to understand if data generated
by operating system-level probes are suitable for error analysis purposes. Finally, also a
study on the suitability of monitoring techniques for the detection of anomalies occurred as
a consequence of security attacks has been started.
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